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The social sciences are often thought to be inferior to the natural sciences because 
they do not have laws. Bohman writes that “the social sciences have never achieved much 
in the way of predictive general laws—the hallmark of naturalistic knowledge—and so 
have often been denied the honorific status of ‘sciences’” (1994, pg. vii). Philosophers 
have suggested a number of reasons for the dearth of laws in the social sciences, including 
the frequent use of ceteris paribus conditions in the social sciences, reflexivity, and the use 
of ‘odd’ concepts. This thesis argues that the scarcity of laws in the social sciences is 
primarily due to the concepts that social scientists often work with. These concepts are 
described as Nomadic and are characterised by disagreement about what can reasonably 
be included within the scope of a concept. The second half of the thesis explores the 
implications of this analysis. It argues firstly, that counterfactual analysis is problematic 
when using Nomadic concepts. Secondly, it argues that taking an intentional perspective 
on behaviour often involves the use of Nomadic concepts so, if social scientists do hope 
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Chapter 1 discusses three methodological problems that are taken to explain why 
the social sciences have had considerable difficulty in finding laws. It argues that these 
methodological problems, which have traditionally been seen as separate, are in fact a 
consequence of the sorts of ‘odd’ concepts that social scientists often use. The concepts 
used by social scientists are thought to be ‘odd’ because it is often difficult to give 
necessary and sufficient criteria for inclusion within a concept. This is extensively 
discussed by Bradburn (2011), Little (1993), and Crasnow (2015) among others. The 
concepts used in the social sciences are, it is argued, not as precise as paradigmatic 
scientific concepts, such as ‘length’, or ‘mass’. This is not a controversial point. It is also 
uncontroversial to note that the social sciences often face extensive ceteris paribus clauses, 
and reflexivity. The contribution of this chapter is to argue that these problems, the use 
of ‘odd’ concepts, extensive ceteris paribus clauses, and reflexivity are inter-related. 
Specifically, reflexivity is one reason why concepts used in the social sciences are often 
‘odd’, and the existence of extensive ceteris paribus clauses is a consequence of using these 
‘odd’ concepts.  
 Given the importance of this ‘oddness’ of the concepts social scientists often use, 
a number of explanations of it are discussed. These are whether the concepts used in the 
social sciences are essentially contested, whether they are vague, and whether they are 
multiply realisable. It will be argued that, while some concepts fit all these descriptions, 
these descriptions do not fully account for the ‘oddness’ of many concepts social scientists 
use. Concepts used in the social sciences have been described in a variety of ways, and the 
philosophers doing so invariably use different examples when doing so. Examples of 
essentially contested concepts include ‘democracy’ and ‘work of art’, examples of multiply 
realisable concepts include ‘money’ and ‘markets’. The question posed by this is how we 
know which of these categories a specific concept belongs in. Woodward (2016) argues 
that we need a way of deciding whether concepts are good ones for using in analysis. 
Chapter 1 concludes by arguing that, while broadly correct, Woodward’s proposal is not 
well suited to the social sciences.  
Chapter 2 proposes a new way of thinking about concepts used in the social 
sciences. It will be argued that the various ways in which social science concepts have 
been described; that they are essentially contested, that they are multiply realisable, and 
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that they are vague can all be subsumed within this framework. Concepts used in the 
social sciences are described as Nomadic. The implications of accepting this Nomadic 
framework are firstly, that this provides an a priori way of deciding whether concepts are 
useful for social science research; secondly, it explains why the social sciences have had 
so much difficulty discovering regularities; and thirdly, that current proposals for making 
concepts more precise are unsatisfactory. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates the implications of accepting the framework for analysing 
social concepts outlined in Chapter 2. The structure of the concepts used in any particular 
case affects the viability of counterfactual analysis. Specifically, it is argued that 
Woodward’s (2003) idea of a ‘hypothetical experiment’ is difficult to apply to many social 
science cases. This is because, often, social science concepts allow different social 
scientists to construct multiple, plausible, but inconsistent counterfactual scenarios, which 
there is little principled way of choosing between. This makes it difficult to agree about 
the truth value of a counterfactual.  
Chapter 4 begins with the observation that taking an intentional perspective on 
behaviour usually means explaining behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires. These 
beliefs and desires are often expressed using concepts that are Nomadic, which means 
that there will often be a number of plausible explanations of behaviour which it is 
difficult to decide between. One possible response to this is to seek to redescribe beliefs 
and desires in other terms. McIntyre’s (1996) argument in support of this is reviewed, but 
found unconvincing. The second part of the chapter analyses an example of regular 
behaviour- Middle bias, with the aim of understanding whether it is intentional. It will be 
argued that middle bias behaviour does not fit within the usual understanding of what 
intentional action is. It is described as ‘derivatively intentional’ because this behaviour is 
only intentional because of wider behaviour, of which it is a part. This chapter concludes 
that behaviour that is ‘derivatively intentional’ is describable using concepts that are less 
Nomadic.  
Chapter 5 deals with a number of clarifications and possible concerns. These are 
firstly, the possible implications the Nomadic framework has for social policy. Secondly, 
showing that less Nomadic concepts from earlier chapters may be derivatively intentional. 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Outline 
This chapter begins with the observation that the social sciences are often thought 
to be inferior to the natural sciences. One of the main justifications for this view is the 
dearth of laws in the social sciences. Three possible reasons for the lack of laws in the 
social sciences are then discussed. These are the existence of extensive ceteris paribus 
clauses, reflexivity, and the use of concepts that are ‘odd’ when compared to the concepts 
natural scientists often use. I argue that understanding the concepts used by social 
scientists is critical, firstly, because reflexivity partly explains why many concepts are ‘odd’ 
and secondly, because extensive ceteris paribus clauses are to be expected when social 
scientists are using ‘odd’ concepts. The second part of the chapter argues that none of the 
ways in which the concepts social scientists use have been characterised is satisfactory, 
and suggests that a new way of understanding these concepts is needed. Finally, this 
chapter shows that the methodological problems faced by the social sciences; the 
existence of extensive ceteris paribus clauses, reflexivity, and multiple realisability, are a 
consequence of the ‘oddness’ of the concepts that social scientists often use.   
 
1. Why do people think that the social sciences are inferior to the natural 
sciences? 
It is often suggested that the social sciences are inferior to the natural sciences. 
Fritz Machlup (1994, pg. 5) correctly notes that deciding why this is the case depends 
on how we interpret ‘inferior’, and what we consider the ‘social sciences’ to be. He 
discusses nine points of comparison between the natural and social sciences, but I will 
focus on one, which is the purported absence of laws in the social sciences, because this 
is often seen as the most important point of comparison between the social and natural 
sciences. Illustrating this, Bohman writes that “the social sciences have never achieved 
much in the way of predictive general laws—the hallmark of naturalistic knowledge—
and so have often been denied the honorific status of ‘sciences’” (1994, pg. vii).  
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The absence of laws is judged to be a critical mark of inferiority because of the 
central role that laws play in explanation, at least according to Hempel’s extraordinarily 
influential Covering Law model of explanation (Hempel, 1962/ 1998) 1. Salmon et al write 
that this model is “central to all discussions of the subject” of explanation (Salmon et al, 
1999, pg. 14), while Staley writes “The discussion of explanation within contemporary 
philosophy of science […] really begins with Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s 
Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of explanation” (2014, pg. 199. Italics in original). 
Hempel argued that a successful explanation of an event, in the natural or social sciences, 
shows that this event was to be expected, given particular facts of the world prior to the 
occurrence of the event, and general laws that show how the prior facts led to the event. 
This view has been influential in the natural and social sciences. For example, McIntyre 
says that it is the ‘intuition’ behind Hempel’s covering law model that has inspired 
explanation, and the way in which laws are seen, in the social sciences (McIntyre, 1996, 
pg. 4). If the social sciences do not have laws, therefore, they are inferior to the natural 
sciences because they cannot explain events. 
Nevertheless, despite the influence of this approach, the applicability of the 
Covering Law model has been questioned in the natural sciences (see, for example, 
Salmon et al, 1999, Ch 1). Part of this criticism hinges on the difficulty with specifying 
exactly what a law is. Illustrating this, Roberts writes that “The concept of a law has been 
terribly difficult to explicate, and the literature on laws is rife with disagreement” (2004, 
pg. 153). Some philosophers, such as Hume and Ayer (Ayer, 1956/1998) argue that laws 
are true universal generalisations. ‘All cats are mammals’ is an example of a true universal 
generalisation. This is perhaps the most intuitive description of what a law is. However, 
this view is problematic because it does not exclude vacuous laws—laws that refer to 
things that don’t exist. An example is ‘All hobbits are under three feet tall’. This account 
also makes it difficult to distinguish between laws and accidental generalisations. The 
following two statements are true universal generalisations: ‘there are no gold spheres a 
mile wide’ and ‘there are no uranium spheres a mile wide’. However, there is a reluctance 
                                                          
1 Hempel also identified a form of probabilistic explanation, less frequently mentioned in 
discussions of Hempel’s philosophy of science, known as the inductive-statistical 
explanation. In these cases, the prior facts about the world, combined with a statistical 
law, or generalisation, make the event we are seeking to explain very likely. He defines a 
statistical probability as, “roughly speaking, the long-run relative frequency with which an 




to accept the statement about gold spheres as a law because there is no reason why this 
has to be the case. It seems entirely accidental. Uranium, on the other hand, cannot be 
combined in such quantities. However, defining laws more precisely has proven difficult. 
Some philosophers have sought to explicate a necessary relation that they take to exist 
between the predicates of laws (for example, see Dretske 1998, Armstrong 1983). Some 
philosophers even deny that laws play a role in successful explanation in the natural 
sciences (for example, see Cartwright 1998, Van Fraassen 1980, Giere, 1999).   
Roberts provides a pragmatic way through this impasse by finding a point of 
common agreement within this dispute. This agreement is about regularities. Roberts 
distinguishes between three kinds of regularities:  
Strict regularities: Universally quantified conditionals, holding throughout the 
universe. Such as ‘All copper conducts electricity’. 
Statistical regularities: Characterise an unrestricted domain. 
Such as ‘Any atom of uranium-238 has a probability of 0.5 of decaying within any 
time-interval of 4.5 billion years’  
Hedged, or ceteris paribus, regularities: Regularities that are qualified by 
admitting that they have exceptions in various circumstances (Roberts, 2004, pg. 
153-4). 
Roberts writes that “Most philosophers who have written on the topic of laws of 
nature allow that laws may be (or may entail) either strict or statistical regularities” (2004, 
pg. 154). Some also allow that they might be hedged regularities (2004, pg. 154). So, this 
provides a useful starting point for the social sciences because, if there are no regularities 
in the social sciences, it is highly unlikely that there will be laws. However, he says, a 
regularity is not necessarily a law. The fact that there are no gold spheres with a radius of 
a mile is a strict regularity, and it is most probably true. Nevertheless, this is not a law 
because, Roberts says “No law that we have any inkling of rules out gargantuan spheres 
of gold; it just happens that to be the case that there are no such spheres” (Roberts, 2004, 
pg. 154). But what additional features a regularity must have in order to count as a law is 
unclear (See Roberts, 2004, 154-157 for an overview). Nevertheless, if the social sciences 
have regularities, then there are, potentially, laws. This thesis therefore discusses 
‘regularities’ rather than ‘laws’.  
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Nevertheless, even if we talk of ‘regularities’, the social sciences have, so far, 
provided very few examples. Why is this? Three reasons have often been given for the 
inferiority, or peculiarity of the social sciences. These three reasons are:  
i. The reflexivity of social sciences (see Cartwight 2007, Hacking 1995, Day 
2012) 
ii. The necessity of ceteris paribus condition in the social sciences (see Scriven 
1994, McCauley, 2004) 
iii. The use of ‘odd’ concepts (see Bradburn 2011) 
The following section discusses each of these in turn, and concludes that the use 
of ‘odd’ concepts is of primary importance. I argue that this is because reflexivity is one 
reason why the social sciences often deal with ‘odd’ concepts, and that the necessity of 
ceteris paribus conditions is a consequence of the ‘oddness’ of many concepts that social 
scientists use. In other words, if we understand the ‘oddness’ then the other two reasons 
are subsumed within this. The following section therefore concludes that understanding 
why concepts that social scientists use are ‘odd’ is worthy of further investigation. 
 
i. Reflexivity 
Cartwright provides a nice summary of the ‘reflexivity’ of the social sciences. She 
says, “people change in response to the way we study them, the way they conceive 
themselves, or in reaction to what they think will happen” (2007, pg. 40). As this quote 
highlights, there are two aspects to reflexivity. The first is people reacting to the ways in 
which they are classified. The second is people acting in anticipation of a law. Both of 
these pose a problem for finding regularities in the social sciences because behaviour 
changes, and may change in a way that makes it no longer regular. 
The first aspect of reflexivity is described by Hacking. People change the way they 
see themselves when they become aware of what they believe is an accurate generalisation. 
Hacking describes human kinds as classifications of types of people that we use in an 
attempt to change these types of people or their living conditions. He says that we can 
only ‘improve the person’ if we know what kind of person we are dealing with (Hacking, 
1995, pg. 351). Human kinds are ways of classifying people that are used in the social 
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sciences, and Hacking does not provide an exact definition. He does illustrate what he 
means when he writes that these are kinds about which social scientists would like to have 
systematic, reliable knowledge that can be used to predict behaviour. Pregnant teenagers, 
child abusers, and those suffering from multiple personality disorder, are examples of 
human kinds. The important thing about human kinds, according to Hacking, is that when 
we apply a kind to a person it not only changes the way we view that person, and how we 
act towards them. Additionally, it may also change the way the person views themselves, 
which may lead them to behave in new ways, such as behaving in the way that they believe 
a person of that kind behaves, or conversely in such a way that the ‘kind’ no longer applies 
to them. As people of a kind change their behaviour this, in turn, leads social scientists to 
change the way they think about the kind. This process generates the so-called “looping 
effect” of human kinds (Hacking, 1995, Ch. 12). The greater the moral connotations of a 
kind, the greater the potential for this looping effect because people are more likely to 
change their behaviour in response to a classification that labels them as particularly 
praiseworthy or blameworthy.  
Day (2012) discusses the second aspect of reflexivity. He says that generalisations 
about human behaviour can be ‘used’. For example, we can improve our ability to appear 
trustworthy by acting in accordance with the ‘law’ that looking at people directly when 
talking to them is an indicator of trustworthiness. Adopting the behaviour to disguise 
untrustworthiness means that the law no longer holds. Day’s worry does not just apply to 
individual behaviour. He says that becoming aware of a law stating that “money increases 
the chances of political power” (Day, 2012, pg. 67) may motivate changing the system 
upon which this law depends. This is different to the natural sciences where expectations 
about laws do not affect how a law behaves in a particular situation. 
There are two things going on here. Firstly, when people believe that the 
consequences of some policy or action are regular, or predictable, they can change their 
behaviour in the light of these expectations, which can make the effects of a policy 
unpredictable. Secondly, people often respond to the terms that are applied to them, 
which in turn changes the way they are analysed. If these terms form part of a law, this 
suggests that the regularity expressed may not apply as behaviour changes in the future. 
Further evidential support for these two phenomena is found in Bergenholtz and Busch, 
who write that “Various studies seem to show that exposure to economics changes how 
economics students behave in social science labs” (Bergenholtz & Busch, 2016, pg. 29). 
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They also describe a ‘self-falsifying’ theory, as follows, “a recent study on racial bias 
among basketball referees shows that the racial bias disappeared after an academic study 
and media attention highlighted the problem” (Bergenholtz & Busch, 2016, pg. 27). The 
reflexivity phenomenon appears relatively well confirmed empirically. 
This is not a feature of the natural sciences because many natural phenomena, 
such as electrons, or planets, or chemical elements, do not change as a result of 
generalisations that are made about them. On the face of it, this suggests a significant 
difference between the social and natural sciences.  McIntyre says this appears to make 
the possibility of finding laws remote, because relationships between variables are unlikely 
to remain constant for long. “Human systems […] are not stable enough over time for us 
to understand the relationship between underlying variables, due to the constant 
realignment in the network of underlying influences.” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 21). Steuer 
says the “single greatest difference” between the social and natural sciences is that “society 
in all its aspects is, or may be, changing” (2003, pg. 36). This is in contrast with the natural 
sciences, he says, because the ageing of the universe, for example, “is slow for all practical 
purposes”. Even biology, where change occurs much more quickly, remains subject to 
continuing “underlying principles” whereas “the social universe is a place of deep seated 
and of superficial change”.  (Steuer, 2003, pg. 35). 
McIntyre responds to the problem of reciprocal complexity, or reflexivity, by 
arguing that the complexity of phenomena depends on the level at which we describe it. 
In other words, complexity is derived from our description of the phenomena, rather than 
inherent in the phenomena itself. Even if we grant that at some level social phenomena 
may be too complex for us to discover laws, this does not mean that the phenomena will 
be too complex at any level. He cites Scriven’s claim that if physicists sought to explain 
how a particular leaf falls from a particular tree then physics would be in a similar state to 
social science in relation to laws. He says that “the possibility of social science laws is 
crucially dependent upon how the phenomena are framed by our level of engagement 
with them” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 23). In a later paper, he elaborates on what ‘levels of 
engagement’ are, suggesting that levels are synonymous with “modes of explanation” 
(McIntyre, 2000, pg. 107). He gives the example of a suicide, which is amenable to a 
number of different explanations “depending on the level at which the questioner was 
enquiring about the behaviour” (McIntyre, 2000, pg, 108). These explanations are a 
psychological one (which considers how the man saw himself), explanation by his 
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neighbours (which considers traits he may have inherited from his father), a sociological 
explanation (in terms of cultural factors), a medical explanation (in terms of the specific 
effects of drugs he took). McIntyre writes that the interests in this case are diverse and 
that each of these explanations are “legitimate”. Understood in this way, levels of enquiry 
are really just different ways of explaining phenomenon. Picking the right level, or 
explanation, is key to formulating generalisations for McIntyre. 
In the 1996 book, he considers the problem that social phenomena are perhaps 
too complex to find generalisations at the level of inquiry in which we are interested. We 
may be able to discover stable relationships at another level, but we just aren’t interested 
in these. McIntyre does not give an example, but we might find generalisations about 
human brains at the level of brain chemistry, but find these unilluminating from a social 
science perspective. McIntyre’s response is that the problem of complexity is due, not to 
the levels of enquiry in which we are interested, but “is due, perhaps, to the very nature 
of the natural kinds and descriptive terms used to characterise the phenomena at this level 
of inquiry” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 27). The problem, as he sees it, is with the way we 
describe and think about phenomena, not, necessarily, the phenomena itself. Rosenberg 
(1995) gives a nice example that shows how the use of certain categories can hamper the 
discovery of laws. He begins with the supposition that we define ‘fish’ as ‘aquatic animals’ 
and try to discover a generalisation about how ‘fish’ breathe. We might begin by looking 
at fish, and decide that they breathe through gills. However, then, we might find dolphins 
and whales, which lead us to specify these animals as exceptions to our generalisation. 
Unfortunately, we then find some crabs, starfish, lobsters, jellyfish and barnacles, and 
think there is no longer any point in our generalisation about fish because there are just 
too many exceptions to it. However, if we define ‘fish’ as ‘scaly aquatic vertebrates’ a 
generalisation about the breathing mechanisms of fish is possible (Rosenberg, 1995, pg. 
16).2 This example illustrates that things may indeed become less complicated if we 
describe them differently. 
McIntyre provides a possible solution to the second type of reflexivity, which is 
that explanation at different levels, or different types of explanation, may not suffer from 
this reflexivity. However, as discussed above, it remains somewhat unclear what levels 
are, and how we are to know which ones are the right ones for formulating generalisations. 
                                                          
2 However, there is disagreement about whether the concept of a ‘fish’ is well-formed because some 
fish, like salmon, are more closely related to mammals than to other fish. 
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More problematically, McIntyre does not suggest a solution to the first type of reflexivity 
that Hacking discusses; which is the self-conscious behaviour of human beings 
responding to how they are categorised, or theorised about. Even if a law were formulated 
at some other level of description, whatever this may be, McIntyre gives no reason for 
thinking that such a law would be isolated from the reflection of human beings categorised 
by this law.  
Reflexivity in the social sciences does therefore present a significant problem for 
social scientists. This is because it means that any regularities or explanations we do find 
may only be relevant for a short period of time. While McIntyre provides a partial 
response to this worry, by suggesting that social scientists analyse phenomena at different 
‘levels’ he fails to show that self-reflection will cease to be a problem if we do so.  
 
ii. The necessity of ceteris paribus condition in the social sciences  
The second reason why the social sciences can be seen as inferior, and which 
makes regularities difficult to formulate, is the diverse and complicated ceteris paribus 
conditions attached to any purported generalisation, or law. McCauley discusses this in 
terms of ‘invariance principles’ (McCauley, 2004, pg. 2). For example, Galileo suggested 
dropping a ball from the mast of a uniformly moving ship on a smooth sea to show that 
the ball would fall parallel to the mast. The experiment is intended to illustrate that relative 
motion does not matter. McCauley says that the experiment “would have made no sense 
were the earth not a local inertial frame for times on the order of seconds or minutes. 
Nor would it have made sense if initial conditions like absolute position and absolute time 
mattered” (McCauley, 2004, pg. 2). Laws of physics are grounded in local invariance 
principles, with respect to frames moving at constant velocity, local translational 
invariance, and local time-translational invariance. These invariances, says McCauley, 
“form the theoretical basis for repeatable identical experiments whose results can be 
reproduced by different observers independently of where and at what time the 
observations are made, and independently of the state of relative motion of the 
observational machinery” (2004, pg. 2). McCauley contrasts this with economics, where 
there is no invariance. He says, “Because the laws of physics […] are based on local 
invariance principles, they are independent of initial conditions like time, absolute position 
in the universe, and absolute orientation. We cannot say the same about markets” (2004, 
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pg. 4) Any economic regularity can be changed by people, at least in principle. 
Furthermore, economic regularities may vary by country and depend upon initial 
conditions. If McCauley is right, then it is more difficult to set up experiments in the social 
sciences because the ceteris paribus conditions may be different each time we set up the 
experiment and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to discover. Unlike with physics 
there is no ‘invariance’ that grounds such experiments. 
The question for the social sciences is whether McCauley is wrong, and whether 
it is possible to set up the world in such a way as to see law-like behaviour. One reason 
that this might be difficult is because often there is little consensus about why certain 
relationships, such as the infrequency with which democracies go to war one another (the 
democratic peace thesis), hold in the social sciences. There are a variety of different 
explanations of democratic peace which focus on different factors, including the 
decentralised decision-making process of a democracy, and the economic structure of 
democracies (see Maoz et al (1993)). Without consensus about the underlying factors that 
give rise to the regularity it isn’t clear how we would know how to set up an experiment, 
to say nothing about the difficulties (pragmatic or moral) faced in even setting up an 
experiment. In Galileo’s demonstration of relative motion we can, to a great extent, fill in 
the ceteris paribus conditions by conceptual analysis or by reflecting on limiting factors. 
With democratic peace, even if the decentralised decision-making process and economic 
structure were the only limiting factors how could we test the democratic peace thesis by 
trying to identify the exact properties of a democracy which contribute to peaceful 
relations with other democracies?  
Cartwright (2005) disagrees that there is a fundamental difference between the 
natural and social sciences in this regard, arguing that we can set up the social world in 
the same way as the physical world. Her terminology for this is a ‘nomological machine’.3 
She says we need this ‘nomological machine’ to see the relationship described by a law in 
physics. A nomological machine is a fixed arrangement of factors with stable capacities 
that, in the right sort of environment, gives rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we 
can describe as law-like. “Where there is a nomological machine, there is law-like 
behaviour but we need parts described by special concepts before we can build a 
                                                          
3 Nomological machines will be discussed here as they relate to the social and natural sciences. 
However, it is important to note that, for Cartwright, the concept of a nomological machine is quite 
broad. According to her view, a vending machine would also qualify as a nomological machine. 
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nomological machine.” (Cartwright, 2005, pg. 57). For example, it is easy to set up a simple 
nomological machine to observe the law-like behaviour suggested by Newton’s second 
law of motion. This law states that when an object is acted on by an outside force, the 
strength of the force equals the mass of the object multiplied by the resulting acceleration 
(F=ma). We can observe this relationship by simultaneously dropping various objects of 
different weights from the same height. Their acceleration is approximately constant due 
to the force of gravity acting on them, so both hit the ground at the same time. The object 
with the greater mass will make a bigger impact on the ground, which can be seen if they 
are dropped into loose material, such as flour. In cases like this we have set up a ‘machine’ 
which enables us to observe the relationships described by the law. Cartwight believes 
that nomological machines are not only found in the natural sciences. She argues that we 
can have nomological machines in economics, and the following paragraph describes such 
a nomological machine. 
She considers the example of an “economic lever that multiplies money” 
(Cartwright, 2005, pg. 142). This is analogous to a mechanical lever that multiplies force. 
The money multiplying force is the following: A central bank has a monopoly on money 
creation. This money is transferred to the commercial banks, who multiply it based on 
their reserve ratio. The reserve ratio is the amount of money that banks keep to meet their 
obligations; the remainder is lent out. The total money in the economy as a whole is 
therefore larger than the money issued by the Central Bank. The factors relevant to 
determining the multiplication effect are the banks’ reserve ratios, and the amount of 
money deposited with banks. Her numerical illustration of this is as follows: 
Money issued by the Central Bank: £100 
Commercial bank receives £100.  
Commercial bank retains £20 and lends out £80 (reserve ratio of 1:5) 
The borrower deposits this £80 in a retail bank (100% deposit rate).  
The retail bank retains £16 and lends out £64 (reserve ratio of 1:5) 
The total money in the economic system now is £100 + £80 + £64: £244. 
This process continues 
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This is described by the following equation: 
M= ((1+cu)/(re+cu))H 
Where M is the total money in the economy 
H= the money issued by the Central Bank 
cu= the rate of currency to deposits 
re= the reserve ratio 
This equation, according to Cartwright, describes a “socio economic machine that 
would give rise to a regular association if it were set running repeatedly and nothing else 
relevant […] happens” (2005, pg. 143). The ‘nothing else relevant’ corresponds to ceteris 
paribus clauses. Importantly, she notes that this equation rarely describes accurately the 
amount of money in an economy, because other things interfere. However, she argues 
that the observation of a regularity is not the only thing that matters. What we want from 
theories is knowledge that enables us to adjust relevant factors to give us a predictable 
outcome. In other words, we want to be able to set up a nomological machine (Cartwright, 
2005, pg. 144). Cartwright suggests that there is less separating the social and natural 
sciences in this regard. Is it more difficult to set up such nomological machines in the 
social sciences though? I will argue that here are two reasons for thinking so. 
Firstly, although experiments are difficult to set up in the natural sciences, in the 
social sciences we are not often in the happy situation of even knowing that our 
nomological machine has been set up successfully. For example, Cartwright gives the 
example of a model which, if run repeatedly gives rise to the following regularity: 
“All profitable projects which have no initial sunk costs and whose initial 
returns are at least as large as the returns from the alternative use of the 
assets will be undertaken” (Cartwright, 2005, pg. 146).  
This model tells us the parts that make up the machine, how the parts are 
assembled and the rules for calculating the effects. The components are two game players, 
who have the same discount rates, who are ‘motivated only by greed’, ‘operate under 
perfect certainty’, and ‘are perfect and costless calculators’ (Cartwright, 2005, pg 146). 
Again, skirting what it means to have ‘perfect certainty’, the worry is that even if we know 
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what perfect certainty is, we do not know when we have it. Even if a player were to tell 
us that they are operating under perfect certainty or are motivated just by greed, we have 
no way of knowing whether this is true. This is because it relates to the mental states of 
people, which are essentially inaccessible. For example, they may say that they are 
motivated by greed, and behave as if they are, but in reality they may also be applying 
some other rule—such as ‘when the other player has lost everything you can stop being 
greedy’. The other player may not explicitly be aware of this additional rule, and it will 
only become apparent through their behaviour under a particular set of circumstances. 
Furthermore, behaviour is rarely as transparent as this—observers often disagree about 
someone’s motivations. We can agree that if conditions of perfect certainty are met then 
behaviour will conform to a particular model, but how do we know when the conditions 
of the model are met?  
Now, clearly this model is theoretical and needs no commitment to the realism of 
its assumptions, such as perfect certainty. My purpose is not to criticise this example on 
the basis that it is unrealistic, nor on the basis that that the assumptions need to be checked 
empirically. The criticism is more general than this. The worry is that when ceteris paribus 
conditions include references to motivations and mental states it is difficult to know 
whether they hold. If our aim is purely theoretical this need not worry us; but if we are 
seeking to use theories practically to generate predictable outcomes then it is a concern.    
Davidson is helpful for expanding on this point. He says that when we attribute 
a belief or desire to a person, we assume that a diverse range of background attitudes are 
also true. These are, most notably, rationality and consistency. This is why we are hard 
pressed to say what would convince us that a person preferred a to b, b to c and c to a, 
because, says Davidson, we only make sense of such preferences against background 
assumptions of rationality and consistency (Davidson, 1974/2002, pg. 237). Furthermore, 
Davidson argues, we cannot understand what a person means when they say something, 
without knowing a lot about their beliefs. Davidson’s argument for this is that to interpret 
verbal behaviour we have to be able to tell when a speaker believes that one of his 
sentences is true. However, we can’t judge the truth of sentences in isolation; sentences 
are taken to be true on the basis of both what a person believes, and what they meant by 
their words. Therefore, “just as we cannot infer beliefs from choices without also inferring 
desires, so we cannot decide what a man means by what he says without at the same time 
constructing a theory about what he believes.” (Davidson, 1974/2002, pg. 238). The 
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significance of this for the present discussion is that firstly, in order to make sense of the 
behaviour of others we must assume a substantive set of background beliefs, conforming 
to certain criteria such as rationality or consistency, which may not be accurate. Secondly, 
judging whether players have certain beliefs or motivations is not only difficult, but not 
discernible in isolation, without consideration of their wider beliefs. Both of these make 
it extraordinarily difficult to know whether ceteris paribus conditions referring to 
motivations and mental states hold. 
The second reason for thinking that nomological machines are more difficult to 
set up in the social sciences is that we often don’t of know what the ceteris paribus 
conditions are. I noted above that there is no consensus about the reasons for the 
purported relationship between democracy and peace. When we do not know why there 
is a relationship between two variables we are unable to specify the ceteris paribus conditions 
that must hold in order for us to build a ‘nomological machine’. We may say that 
democracies do not go to war with each other ceteris paribus, but without specifying the 
content of our ceteris paribus clause this is an empty statement. In effect, we are saying that 
as long as nothing occurs to make this relationship not hold, then it holds.  
Roberts (2004) suggests a more sophisticated understanding of what this might 
mean. Roberts calls laws requiring ceteris paribus clauses ‘hedged laws’, the general form of 
which is “Whenever A happens, B happens, unless there is an interference” (Roberts, 
2004, pg. 163). What matters, in judging the status of such laws is how we understand 
‘interference’. The proposal that he concedes may be viable in the natural sciences is that 
interference is understood as a class of circumstances and, although we can’t precisely 
identify all the constituents of this class, we understand what ‘interference’ means in our 
particular context. Roberts argues that social scientists may not know what interference 
means in a particular case because of the enormous physical complexity, and multiple 
realisability of the underlying physical realisations of social kinds. The general point can 
be made more simply, while sidestepping a discussion of multiple realisability and social 
kinds. Roberts does this when criticising Kincaid’s (2004) discussion of supply and 
demand. Roberts says that while the law of supply and demand may be a useful rule of 
thumb, there are many conditions in which it might be false. These include the imposition 
of price controls, irrationality on the part of customers or suppliers, humanitarian or other 
concerns which over-ride economic concerns, and many others. Roberts says that any 
attempt to specify all the possible conditions is hopeless because these conditions are 
23 
 
diverse, and also have diverse causes. He does not mention this, but we could also add 
that these conditions might interact with each other. In summary, according to Roberts 
even if we concede that in the natural sciences there may be some ambiguity in what 
‘interference’ is, in a particular context, this ambiguity is vastly more significant in the 
social sciences.  
To summarise, although specifying ceteris paribus clauses may be problematic for 
some cases in the natural sciences it is nevertheless often more difficult in the social 
sciences. This is because, firstly, it is often very difficult to know what the relevant factors 
are that need to be controlled for, and secondly, even if we do know what some of them 
are, where they relate to people’s mental states we are unable to know whether they are 
true.  
 
iii. The social sciences use ‘odd’ concepts 
A number of social scientists have also sought to highlight, if not the inferiority, 
then at least a peculiarity of the social sciences because of the concepts social scientists 
use. To cite just a few; Bradburn (2011) describes many concepts that social scientists use 
as Ballung concepts; which he contrasts with “scientific concepts that refer to specific 
features, such as age, minimum wage etc.” (Bradburn, 2011, pg. 53). Ballung concepts are 
not like scientific concepts because these concepts “sort things into categories based on 
a loose set of criteria in which members of the same category do not share a specific set 
of features.” (Bradburn, 2011, pg. 54).  Examples of Ballung concepts include ‘poverty’ 
and ‘disability’. In other words, scientific concepts are associated with precision, whereas 
there are no necessary and sufficient criteria for membership of a Ballung concept, they 
are associated with less precise associations between members of the same category. This 
is clearly a worry for social scientists seeking to find regularities because if we are seeking 
to find a regularity between ‘poverty’ and something else, and ‘poverty’ is a Ballung 
concept, then we will be seeking to find a regularity referring a concept for whose 
members there isn’t a feature that they all share.  
Little (1993) provides a slightly different characterisation of the concepts social 
scientists use. He describes them as ‘cluster concepts’, which he describes as 
encompassing “a variety of phenomena that share some among a cluster of properties” 
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and that concepts like ‘riot’, ‘revolution’, ‘class’, and ‘religion’ are a “class of social entities 
that share a common causal structure”, however, this causal structure is not 
“homogenous”. (1993, 190). The example he discusses in detail is ‘market economies’, 
which have many things in common, but which also have causally significant differences. 
The USA and Japan are both market economies and have many properties in common, 
but the apparent prevalence of longer time-horizons in Japan leads to differences between 
these market economies. Little believes the value in “making use of cluster concepts […] 
in the social sciences is that it permits us to group social entities together in ways that 
emphasise their common features” (1993, 191). There are other ways of defining cluster 
concepts but this chapter will only discuss Little’s because his definition makes for a clear 
distinction with Ballung concepts. For Little, members of a cluster concept have some 
feature in common. In other words, we can give a necessary criterion for inclusion within 
a group. This is in contrast with Ballung concepts, which, following Bradburn’s 
characterisation, do not have any single feature in common, although a subset of members 
of a group may have a feature in common. In other words, it is not possible to give 
necessary or sufficient criteria for inclusion within a Ballung concept. There are different 
ways of demarcating the difference between Ballung and cluster concepts, and it is even 
possible to argue that there is no difference between the two. This will not be discussed 
here because it has no bearing on the subsequent discussion.  
Despite these different ways of thinking about the concepts social scientists use, 
these different ways of describing the concepts that social scientists use are not usually 
seen to be in opposition to one another. This is perhaps because the discussion the 
literature is not about whether, say, ‘poverty’ is a Ballung concept or a cluster concept, but 
on how such concepts are to be used in practical research. For example, Crasnow (2015) 
describes “ordinary use” concepts as “vague and ambiguous” (2015, 7). She notes that 
“Such concepts have been referred to in a variety of ways in the philosophical literature. 
Sometimes they are called ‘cluster concepts’, Nancy Cartwright has called them Ballungen 
concepts […] The idea has similarities as well to Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblance…” (2015, 7). Thereby suggesting that these terms can be used 
interchangeably. The key thing, for her, is that such concepts are ‘vague and ambiguous’, 
and the remainder of her article is devoted to discussion of how to make such concepts 
more precise. Similarly, Adcock and Collier (2001) begin their process for making social 
science concepts more precise by beginning with the category “Background Concept”, 
which is “The broad constellation of meanings and understandings associated with a given 
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concept” (2001, pg. 531). Bradburn also follows his discussion of Ballung concepts with a 
discussion of how these concepts are to be defined more precisely, and measured 
(Bradburn, 2011, pg. 54-57). Although these authors recognise that social science 
concepts are problematic as they stand, rather than spending time characterising them, 
they concentrate the ways in which they can be made more useful for research. I believe 
this is the wrong approach. The following section takes the first step towards 
demonstrating this by showing that, of the three reasons discussed in this section, the 
‘oddness’ of social science concepts is the most important because reflexivity and ceteris 
paribus conditions are a reason for, and a consequence of, the concepts social scientists 
use. 
 
The ‘oddness’ of social science concepts is primary. 
The preceding section introduced the observation that the concepts social 
scientists use are often ‘odd’, or peculiar.  This section demonstrates that the ‘oddness’ of 
social science concepts is of primary importance for understanding the alleged inferiority 
of the social sciences. It demonstrates this by showing that the other two main points of 
difference between the natural and social sciences, which are reflexivity and extensive 
ceteris paribus conditions, are grounded in this ‘oddness’. Reflexivity because it partly 
explains the ‘oddness’ of the concepts social scientists often use, and ceteris paribus 
conditions because these are partly a consequence of the ‘odd’ concepts that social 
scientists use. Specifically, reflexivity is partly responsible for changes that occur in social 
science concepts. Furthermore, if social science concepts are often Ballung concepts then 
the existence of extensive ceteris paribus conditions should be no surprise.  
 
Reflexivity:   
This section demonstrates that reflexivity influences the concepts that social 
sciences use and that this, in turn, partly explains why they are often described as Ballung, 
or cluster concepts. Hacking’s work on autism illustrates how the concepts social 
scientists use change due to reflexivity. He demonstrates that the concepts social scientists 
use evolve because of changing behaviour amongst those who are classified as ‘autistic’. 
This, I will argue, is one reason why such concepts may be described as Ballung concepts. 
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Hacking proposes that classifying people as autistic may change their behaviour, and the 
behaviour of people who interact with them. He argues that people with autism are 
developing ways of describing their condition, for which there are few generally accepted 
descriptions of autism recognised as valid by high-functioning people with the condition. 
This is happening through a combination of diaries written by people with autism, and 
fictional portrayals of autistic characters. This is in turn is leading to greater understanding 
of the condition (Hacking, 2009). Tsou (2007) believes that autism is a difficult example 
for Hacking, because, he says “individuals with such conditions […] are not fully aware of 
their condition or how they are classified” (Tsou, 2007, pg. 332. Italics in original). This 
makes it problematic to see how people with autism can respond to their classification. 
Hacking’s response to these sorts of worries is that it is not only the reaction of an 
individual with autism that is important, but the reactions of the people with whom they 
do interact (Hacking, 1999, pg. 115).  
McGreer (2009) explicitly sets out to assess whether ideas about autism are 
evolving in the ways Hacking suggests, and concludes that, broadly speaking, they are. 
She argues that the way we think about the condition is changing as people with autism 
describe their condition, and that this, in turn, affects the behaviour of people with autism. 
Her methodology is to assess both the extent to which knowledge about autism is being 
transformed by what people with autism are saying about themselves, and the effects 
public discussion of autism and the proliferation of fictional characters with autism are 
having on people diagnosed as autistic.  
This example illustrates how the concepts social scientists use change over time. 
Firstly, the meaning of the concept ‘autism’ changes as experts and the wider community 
understand the condition differently, partly as a result of the behaviour of people with 
autism. The underlying behaviours of people with autism are also changing as they alter 
their behaviour in response to environmental changes. These environmental changes are, 
in turn, partly influenced by changes in understanding the concept ‘autism’. When we 
refer to ‘autism’ at different points in time it is possible both that we mean something 
slightly different by the concept, and that the phenomenon will have undergone changes 
too. With the benefit of hindsight some of these changes may be easy to identify, but they 
are likely to be more difficult to track while they are happening. This is in contrast to the 
natural sciences where concepts do not change dynamically over time. Furthermore, this 
liability to change gives a reason why many concepts may be described as Ballung concepts. 
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The concept, such as autism, is tracking a changing use of the concept, and changing 
behaviour that is described by this concept. These changes are likely to be difficult to 
track as they are happening, so it is natural that the concept refers to social phenomena 
for which it is difficult to specify necessary and sufficient criteria for inclusion within the 
concept. 
 
Ceteris paribus conditions:  
Where the concepts that social scientists use are Ballung concepts, or even cluster 
concepts, the existence of complicated and diverse ceteris paribus conditions should be no 
surprise. This is because these concepts, such as poverty, include a diverse range of 
phenomena. Therefore, when formulating a regularity there are many potential factors 
and situations that we need to exclude from the regularity. Revisiting the democratic peace 
thesis from the ceteris paribus section above illustrates this. The concept of democracy is, 
arguably, a cluster concept rather than a Ballung concept because democracies do have 
features that are common to them all (particularly of we restrict ourselves to modern 
democracies) which are the criteria that the population of a political region have the power 
to change the government. Political scientists may dispute the extent to which this 
happens, or whether this is the only criteria for ‘democracy’, but this is not the central 
concern here. It is arguable that ‘democracy’ is a cluster concept rather than a Ballung 
concept. If we accept that there is something all (modern) democracies have in common, 
this does not mean that there won’t also be many differences between them too. 
Therefore, if we are seeking to formulate a regularity about democracies, then we are likely 
to need a variety of ceteris paribus conditions to exclude other features of democracies, or 
other variables relating to democracies that complicate, interfere, or otherwise render 
obsolete, the generalisation we have highlighted. Extensive ceteris paribus conditions should 
therefore be expected when we are dealing with ‘odd’ social science concepts. 
 
Summary 
The social sciences have often been thought to be inferior to the natural sciences, 
in part because they have failed to find many satisfactory examples of laws. A review of 
the philosophy of science literature suggests that we should discuss ‘regularities’ rather 
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than ‘laws’. Nevertheless, regularities are no easier to find in the social sciences than laws. 
I discussed three reasons that have been given for this inferiority of the social sciences. 
Reflexivity, the preponderance of ceteris paribus clauses, and the use of ‘odd’ concepts, and 
concluded that these do point to significant differences between the natural and social 
sciences. I suggested that the use of ‘odd’ concepts is a particularly important difference 
because reflexivity, as well as illustrating how the social world changes, also shows how 
concepts used in the social sciences can refer to changing aspects of the social world over 
time. This, in turn, leads to different things being discussed when we use these concepts 
over time and makes them more easily describable as Ballung, or cluster concepts. 
Furthermore, when we are dealing with Ballung, or cluster, concepts then the extensive 
ceteris paribus clauses should be no surprise.  
So far, this discussion has not explored the precise sense in which social science 
concepts are ‘odd’. It seems clear that reflexivity is partly responsible, but other 
explanations are discussed in the literature. The following section discusses three possible 
explanations why the concepts social scientists use are ‘odd’. These are: 
i. The social sciences deal with essentially contested concepts 
ii. The concepts social scientists use are vague 
iii. The concepts social scientists use are multiply realisable 
I conclude that these explanations are unsatisfactory, before suggesting a new approach. 
 
i. Do the social sciences deal with essentially contested 
concepts? 
Gallie proposed that some concepts are ‘essentially contested’. The examples he 
gives include ‘work of art’, ‘democracy’ and ‘social justice’. These concepts are essentially 
contested because they are characterised by disputes about what, really, counts as a ‘work 
of art’, or ‘democracy’ (Gallie, 1957, 169). He writes that “there are disputes [… ]which 
are perfectly genuine: which, although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are 
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence” (Gallie, 1957, pg. 
169). In other words, despite dispute, argument, and the presentation of evidence, no 
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agreement is reached. Gallie gives seven criteria for a concept being judged ‘essentially 
contested’. These are; 
1. The concept must represent some kind of valued achievement 
2. The achievement must be internally complex 
3. The achievement is describable in a variety of different ways 
4. The achievement is liable to change as circumstances change 
5. Scholars recognise that their use of the concept is likely to be contested by other 
scholars 
6. The concept is derived from an original example, which is recognised as such by 
all the scholars using the concept. 
7. Continuous competition between scholars “enables the original example’s 
achievement to be sustained and/or developed in optimum fashion”  
(Gallie, 1957, pg. 171-172, 180). 
 
The difference between essentially contested concepts and more scientific concepts 
is that “Competition between scientific hypotheses works successfully largely because 
there are acknowledged general methods or principles for deciding between rival 
hypotheses.” (Gallie, 1957, pg. 179). In other words, Gallie believes that, when using 
essentially contested concepts, debate continues indefinitely without resolution. If social 
science concepts are ‘essentially contested’ this might explain some of the ‘oddness’ of 
these concepts. Continuing contestation might explain why some concepts are ‘Ballung 
concepts’ because continuing debate might lead to changes in what we consider ‘poverty’ 
to be. McKnight (2003) points out that it is impossible to define essentially contested 
concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, which is also the defining 
characteristic of Ballung concepts. Concepts not defined by necessary and sufficient 
conditions will be disputed by scholars who dispute either the particular use of the 
concept, or the particular descriptions of the concept. McKnight says, “The open-
endedness of the concepts concerned means that we cannot lay down in advance laws for 
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their future application and any attempted statement of such conditions will itself be 
disputable.” (McKnight, 2003, pg. 262). It seems, therefore, that Ballung concepts and 
essentially contested concepts have much in common.  
Essential contestation and reflexivity may also be related because one of the 
criteria that essentially contested concepts must meet is that they represent a valued 
achievement, which is describable in a variety of ways. Collier et al in their discussion of 
Gallie suggest that “it is highly plausible that the positive normative valence attached to 
these concepts is important in spurring debates over their meaning.” (Collier, 2006, pg. 
216). Their view is that ‘normative valence’ is, at least in some cases, responsible for 
debates about the meaning of concepts. Freeden argues that essentially contested 
concepts may also be “disapproved and denigrated phenomena” (1996, pg. 56). This 
could lead to changes of the type Hacking describes when people respond to how they 
are described, which in turn affects how they are analysed by social scientists. Similarly, 
the debate over the meaning of ‘poverty’ may well influence the behaviour of people 
judged to be ‘in poverty’ in the ways that Hacking suggests. 
  Despite the immediate appeal of the notion of ‘essential contestation’, this 
account is unsatisfactory. Firstly, because not all concepts that social scientists use have 
obvious normative valence. Ehrenberg (2011) says that despite the importance for social 
scientists of the concept of ‘government’, “it is not illuminating of the concept of 
government to call it essentially contested. We do not usually see the important debate 
over the concept of government as consisting in what a government is, or what counts as 
a government. We do see it with respect to what counts as a just government, that is 
clearly a debate about the meaning of justice (a good candidate for essential contestation 
if ever there was one).” (Ehrenberg, 2011, pg. 215). Secondly, if Ehrenberg is correct, and 
I think that it is plausible that he is, then the critical question is whether the concept of 
‘government’ is like a ‘scientific concept’, characterised by precision. This is because, if 
essential contestation explains why many social science concepts are Ballung concepts, or 
subject to reflexive change, then concepts that are not essentially contested should not 
have these characteristics. It seems clear that this isn’t the case. Even though ‘government’ 
isn’t essentially contested, it may still be a Ballung concept or a cluster concept. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines government as ‘the system by which a state or community is 
governed’. Given the almost infinite variety of ways in which this is done, it is reasonable 
to think that ‘government’ is a Ballung concept, or if we do manage to specify something 
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that all governments share, a cluster concept. Either way, citing Bradburn again, the 
concept ‘democracy’ does not “refer to specific features, such as age, minimum wage etc” 
(Bradburn, 2011, pg.53). Gallie’s essential contestation is therefore an interesting proposal 
for what is going on with social science concepts, but is incomplete because a concept 
with an absence of essential contestation may still be ‘odd’.  
 
ii. Are Social Science concepts vague? 
The second proposal for why the concepts social scientists use are ‘odd’ is that 
they are vague. We saw above that Crasnow describes many concepts that social scientsts 
use as “vague and ambiguous” ((2015, 7). Vagueness seems to work as a general, catch-
all description of what is going on. However, it is unfortunately the wrong word to use 
because this use of the term ‘vague’ is at odds with the way it is used in the philosophy of 
language. 
The usual understanding of vagueness is that it is primarily due to the presence of 
boundary cases. To cite one recent example “Many if not most predicates in natural 
language are vague, meaning that they admit of borderline cases, that is, cases to which 
they neither fully apply nor fully fail to apply” (Douven, 2016, pg. 1). Similarly, the 
Cambridge dictionary of Philosophy begins the entry on ‘vagueness’ with the following 
“a property of an expression in virtue of which it can give rise to a ‘borderline case’” (Audi 
et al, 1999, pg. 945). The standard example of a borderline case is a ‘heap’. One grain of 
sand is not a heap. Two grains of sand are not a heap either. So, if we say that n grain of 
sand is not a heap, then n+1 grains of sand is not a heap. But, this appears to allow us to 
conclude that 50,000,000,000 grains of sand is not a heap (1 billion grains of sand takes 
up approximately one 30cm x 30cm cube). This is called a Sorites paradox.  
 The presence of borderline cases is sometimes a problem in the social sciences, 
as the following examples illustrate. The concept of poverty lacks precise boundaries. It 
is possible, and highly likely, that people will disagree about whether a group of people is 
‘in poverty’. This is regardless of whether just one meaning of ‘poverty’ has been specified. 
For example, we may specify that ‘poverty’ means ‘lacking adequate provisioning of the 
necessities of life’, and specify these even more precisely, such as ‘2000 calories per day’, 
‘accommodation’, and ‘clothes’. A particular person may get 2000 calories most days, but 
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not every day. Do we count them as satisfying this criterion for being in poverty, or not? 
Determining where to draw the boundary between poverty, and non-poverty based on 
the amount of calories consumed per day is similar to the ‘heap’ and ‘non-heap’ example 
in the sense that small, relatively homogenous units (grains of sand or single calories) can 
be added together. Judging where to draw the boundary is a question of how many of 
such units we think are necessary for being a heap, or not in poverty. However, not all 
examples in the social sciences are like this. Sometimes, deciding where a boundary lies is 
not a matter of judging how many, relatively homogenous, units are necessary, but judging 
how many separate factors are present. Not all cases of ‘oddness’ in the social science 
concepts are instances of vagueness like the Sorites paradox. The following example 
illustrates this point. 
Cartwright and Runhardt (2014) write that one of the indicators used to decide 
whether a country is, or is not, experiencing a civil war is the ‘military death count’. The 
‘military death count’ sounds like a precise measure, but in many cases may not be so. 
This is firstly because both sides in such a conflict have incentives to overstate the number 
of deaths on the other side, while understating the level of deaths on their own side. 
Secondly, even if a dead person is found by an observer it is often unclear how to classify 
this. If we find a man fatally shot, wearing civilian clothes, carrying a gun, near a combat 
zone, how do we decide whether he is a military or civilian death? This is not a question 
about what a ‘military death’ means; we are clear that is means the number of military 
personnel who have died. Our problem is determining whether the person is, or is not, a 
member of the military.  
There are a number of factors that determine whether a death counts as a military 
death, which might include carrying a gun, being dressed in combat fatigues, being found 
close to the location of a recent conflict and any number of others. Having none of these 
features clearly means that it is likely not a military death, while having all of them means 
that it is a military death. Even though we can tell these cases apart, this still does not 
make it a simple matter to say whether having, say, four out of five characteristics counts 
as a military death because some characteristics may be more salient than others, and 
salience may vary by context. For example, the importance of gun carrying might vary 
depending on the prevalence of gun carrying among the local population. The military 
death example therefore differs from the sand example because there are a number of 
features that are relevant for judging the boundary between military and non-military 
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deaths, while in the sand example it is just a matter of how many grains of sand count as 
a heap. In principle, it might be possible to weight these features to indicate the extent to 
which a death is military, however, this is problematic because these weightings may vary 
by context. This is not merely a case of not knowing whether someone is a member of 
the military because we lack sufficient information to decide. Even if we have all the 
relevant information, it is a case where it may be indeterminate whether someone is part 
of the ‘civilians’ or the ‘military’. In a civil war, much of the population maybe neither one 
nor the other, so deciding which features are relevant, and which should be judged most 
important in a particular case is difficult to do. It is plausible that that there is “no definite 
answer to the question, ‘How many of which conditions are necessary for the term to 
apply?’” (Audi et al, 1999, pg. 947).  
The idea of ‘vagueness’ as it is discussed in the philosophy of language literature 
does not match what is going on the social sciences very closely. This is because, although 
there are often boundary issues with concepts that social scientists use, these are also 
often more complicated than the examples discussed in the philosophy of language. 
However, the etymology of the word ‘vague’ is interesting. Carney and Miller (2016) write 
that it derives from the Latin verb vagari, which means to wander or roam. The noun 
vague in English means “an indefinite expanse so that a vague, perhaps close to its 
‘wandering’ origin, relates to terrain and is thus immediately connected to considerations 
of space and geography […] Thus a vague, as an indefinite terrain, is the ‘place’ where 
wandering or roving occurs, a place of the nomad” (Carney & Miller, 2016, Ch. 2). This 
idea of undefined space will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, it is 
unhelpful to use a word that has been given such a clear meaning in the philosophy of 
language.  
The quote from Crasnow above also mentions ambiguity. Is it ambiguity that is 
the source of the oddness of many concepts used in the social sciences? I do not believe 
that it is. Ambiguity is when people are unclear about which, of a number of meanings, 
they have in mind when they use a concept. The oft used example is ‘bank’. If I just say 
‘bank’ I may have either a river bank or a financial institution in mind. The discussion of 
civilian deaths illustrates that, however many times social scientists might be unclear about 
whether they should run towards the nearest river or their local high street when told to 
‘head for the bank’, there is more plaguing the social sciences than ambiguity. Social 
scientists are not unclear about what they mean by a military death; even though this 
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concept is unambiguous, they are still unsure whether what they are looking at counts as 
a member of this group. 
  
iii. Are social science concepts multiply realisable? 
 The final proposal for understanding why social science concepts are odd is that 
they are multiply realisable. Roberts, in a debate with Kincaid, argues that the reason that 
the social sciences do not have laws is because social phenomena are multiply realised 
(2004). He takes issue with Kincaid’s assertion that the law of supply and demand is a bona 
fide law. Kincaid formulates this law as follows: 
“Changes in price cause changes in the quantity demanded and quantity supplied. 
Changes in supply and demand curves cause changes in price” (Kincaid, 2004, pg. 
177) 
Roberts writes that all kinds of things could count as a ‘market’ for the purposes 
of assessing the law of supply and demand. When this is the case, it means if we have a 
law stating that “all F-systems in circumstances C exhibit behaviour G” (Roberts, 2004, 
pg. 162) there will be many physical instantiations of F and G and C, some of which will 
not be covered by the law. He argues further that even if we do not know of any such 
instantiations at the moment, the ‘law’ will be fragile because we have no reason to believe 
it is impossible that such instantiations could appear.  
He uses a slightly far-fetched example to demonstrate this point. Suppose that the 
‘F-system’ is currency markets and C is the level of inflation. He considers the case where 
humans undergo psychological changes, such that they become humanitarians and reject 
their previous acquisitive ways (“the sudden widespread imitation of Mahatma Ghandi” 
(Roberts, 2004, pg. 162). These humans, argues Roberts, are a physical instantiation of an 
F system, just as much as more acquisitive humans are. However, the behaviour (G) will 
differ greatly in this case. He summarises: 
“The basic point here is that no matter which social-scientific kinds F, C 
and G are, there are likely to be kinds of physical system that constitute 
social systems that instantiate F and C but, under normal physical 
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evolution, lead to bizarre outcomes, which will not be covered by G” 
(Roberts, 2004, pg. 162) 
He suggests that the sorts of things social scientists often talk about can be 
multiply realised, and the well-known example of ‘money’ demonstrates this. Roberts 
notes that ‘money’ is realizable in very many ways, including letters of credit, precious 
metals, shells, and promissory notes. The multiple realisability of money appears 
uncontroversial and, consequently, his argument works better in abstract form, when it 
refers to F systems in circumstances C exhibiting behaviour G. If ‘F’, ‘C’, and ‘G’ refer to 
things like money, then it is clear that there will indeed be many ways in which each of 
these variables can be realised. When laws include terms that are multiply realisable then 
some of these realisations may not be covered by the law.  
  If social phenomena are multiply realisable, this may partly explain why the 
concepts that social scientists use are ‘odd’. When discussing a ‘market’ or ‘money’ there 
are a wide variety of things we can include within this group. This suggests one reason 
why social science concepts can be described as Ballung or cluster concepts (Ballung 
concepts if there is nothing that all members of a group share, or cluster concepts if there 
are some common features). 
 However, this is an unsatisfactory explanation for the simple reason that not all 
social phenomena are multiply realizable. Tellingly, Roberts does not show that ‘supply’ 
and ‘demand’ are multiply realisable. Kincaid gives a clear specification of the laws of 
supply and demand, and the key concepts he uses are ‘supply’, ‘demand’, and ‘price’. If 
Roberts seeks to show throw doubt on the nomological status of these statements, why 
does he not show that ‘supply’, ‘demand’, or ‘price’ are multiply realised? Indeed, in his 
more abstract formulation of his worry about multiple realisability he says that “all F-
systems in circumstances C exhibit behaviour G” (Roberts, 2004, pg. 162) there will be 
many instantiations of F and C and G. This does not exactly match Kincaid’s formulation 
of the law of supply and demand. Kincaid makes no reference to a ‘system’. Roberts takes 
the relevant system to be a ‘market’ of some sort. Let us grant that this is reasonable. This 
would change the first half of Kincaid’s formulation of supply and demand to the 
following: 




 Let us grant that this is reasonable. Let us also accept that a ‘market’ is multiply 
realisable. Even if we do so, multiple realisability does not pose a significant threat to 
Kincaid’s law of supply and demand. This is because we can accept disagreement over 
what counts as a market, but nevertheless find some examples of markets where we are 
happy to assess the law of supply and demand. In doing so, the other concepts in this 
formulation ‘supply’, ‘demand’, and ‘price’ are not, obviously, multiply realisable. In other 
words, Roberts only shows that multiple realisability is a problem for deciding where to 
assess the law of supply and demand; he does not show that it is a problem for the concepts 
used by Kincaid in his formulation of the law itself. Rather than targeting the terms 
Kincaid uses in his formulation of supply and demand Roberts imports the idea of a 
market to demonstrate multiple realisability. As such, his argument is unconvincing. 
 The law of supply and demand is one of the better confirmed examples of a 
regularity from the social sciences. However, as Roberts discusses above, one of the main 
criticisms of this law is that it requires wide ranging ceteris paribus conditions. Roberts notes 
that some concepts that social scientists use are multiply realisable, but not that ‘supply’ 
or ‘demand’ are multiply realisable. Multiple realisability is therefore a poor explanation 
of the why this law requires so many ceteris paribus conditions.   
 
An alternative proposal 
The discussion above illustrates that understanding why the concepts that social 
scientists use are ‘odd’ is critical to understanding the reasons for the purported inferiority 
of the social sciences. It also showed that the currently available explanations of this 
‘oddness’ are unsatisfactory. However, much of the contemporary discussion of concepts 
in the social sciences sidesteps explanation of this ‘oddness’ in favour of proposing how 
concepts are to be used in research. This section demonstrates why this is the wrong 
strategy. 
As discussed above, philosophers characterise the concepts that social scientists 
use in a variety of ways, and, importantly, they do so using different examples. The 
examples of Ballung concepts include ‘poverty’ and ‘disability’. Hacking’s examples include 
‘teen aged pregnancies’ and ‘autism’. Little’s examples include ‘market economies’. 
Roberts’ uses the examples of ‘a market’ (by which he means a financial market), and 
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‘money’. The use of such varied examples hides one important question, and a number 
of slightly less important questions. The main question is what is it about a concept such 
as ‘poverty’ that means that it can be described as a Ballung concept, and what is it about 
the concept like ‘market economy’ that makes its characterisation as a cluster concept 
appealing, and what is it about the concept ‘money’ that means that it is multiply 
realisable? The related questions are: Is ‘money’ multiply realisable, and a cluster concept? 
Do ‘Ballungness’, or clustering, or reflexivity, come in degrees? Do concepts that are 
multiply realisable all have the same number of realisations? If not, why not? 
Answering these questions is important because currently, philosophers of social 
science write that some concepts are ‘not the right ones’ for analysis, while some are, 
without providing any principled way of distinguishing between them. In other words, 
they proceed in a piecemeal fashion, concept by concept, with no structured way of 
thinking about the work a particular concept can do for us in a particular case. For 
example, Cartwright says that nomological machines need “parts described by special 
concepts”. She says that everyday concepts like “irritability and inaccuracy will not do” 
(2005, pg 57). It is intuitively clear that ‘irritability’ won’t feature in most nomological 
machines. But Cartwright provides nothing over and above the immediate and obvious 
appeal of this statement in its support. What, exactly, is it about ‘irritability’ that means it 
won’t do, while ‘perfect information’ will do? 
Woodward (2016) largely agrees with the need to take a structured approach to 
choosing which concepts to use. He begins by acknowledging that philosophers are 
familiar with the idea that some variables are bad, or unhelpful, for philosophical analysis. 
He illustrates this with the obvious example of ‘grue’. Woodward rejects the idea that 
‘bad’ variables need no further analysis, that it is enough that we can recognise that they 
are bad, because there is no obvious way of telling ‘good’ and ‘bad’ variables apart. This 
is consistent with the argument above. Despite this, I will show that Woodward’s 
approach is not the correct one.  
 Woodward’s analysis in this 2016 paper relies on his manipulationsist account of 
causation (outlined in detail in Woodward, 2003). This will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, so will be taken for granted here, particularly as it has little bearing on his 
comments about variable choice, except in his description of what scientists seek to 
achieve with variables. Woodward’s criteria for good variable choice are: 
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1- “Choose variables that are well-defined targets for (single) interventions in the 
sense that they describe quantities or properties for which there is a clear 
answer to the question of what would happen if they were to be manipulated 
or intervened on. […] Possible candidates for variables failing to meet this 
criteria […] include ‘age’, ‘gender’ and ‘obesity’.” 
2- “Choose variables that have unambiguous effects on other variables of 
interest under manipulation, rather than variables that have ambiguous or 
heterogeneous effects” 
3- “Choose variables that are defined in such a way that we can in principle 
manipulate them to any of their possible values independently of the values 
taken by other variables. […] This excludes, for example, variables that are 
logically or conceptually related.”  
4- Choose variables that “are relatively sparse in the sense that they postulate 
relatively few causal relationships among variables, rather than many.” 
5- “Choose variables that allow for the formulation of cause-effect relations that 
are as close to deterministic as possible or at least relations that exhibit strong 
correlations between cause and effect.” 
6- “Look for variables that allow for the formulation of causal relationships that 
are stable in the sense that they continue to hold under changes in background 
conditions”. 
7- “In general, look for variables such that the resulting graph accurately 
represents dependency relations, avoids unexplained correlations in 
exogenous variables, structure in residuals, and causal cycles with no obvious 
empirical rationale or interventionist interpretation.”  
(Woodward, 2016, pg. 1054-1055, italics in original) 
 
These criteria are practical in the sense that they highlight the role that variables 
should perform in scientific analysis. They should be good ones for manipulation, for 
example. Woodward is explicit about this, saying that what we consider to be a ‘good’ 
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variable depends on the work we want that variable to do (2016, pg. 1057). Woodward 
rejects an a priori approach because, he says, such an approach commits us to using 
variables that are either the fundamental categories of physics (or an as yet specified 
perfect physics), or variables that are reducible to these fundamental categories. I will 
firstly provide a reason for thinking that his criteria are unsatisfactory before showing that 
these worries suggest that we do, in fact, need an a priori analysis of variables. 
The problem with these criteria, at least as far as they relate to the social sciences, 
is that we need to know the work that they do, before knowing that they do in fact do 
this work. For example, we need to know that ‘obesity’ is not a well-defined target for 
intervention, and that it doesn’t have unambiguous effects on other variables. Woodward 
does not say how we know this. In advance of attempted, and failed, attempts to use 
‘obesity’ in analysis it is difficult to see how we are to know whether ‘obesity’ has these 
characteristics. Given this, the criteria seem redundant in cases like this; we will simply 
settle on the variables, or concepts, that have yielded successful analysis. My central 
concern is that Woodward does not explain why ‘obesity’ is a bad variable, and specifically, 
what it is about ‘obesity’ that makes it a bad variable. If we know this, then we are much 
more likely to be able to avoid other ‘bad’ variables without first trying to use them and 
finding them wanting. 
Woodward does comment on the social sciences specifically, he says that causal 
analysis in the social sciences of often plagued by heterogeneous effects of causal 
variables. He also writes that this is exacerbated by the fact that, often, the variables that 
social scientists use are proxies for the actual variables they want to analyse. The example 
he discusses is ‘education’, for which we might use years spent in school as a proxy. 
However, as Woodward correctly notes, the quality of schools varies widely, which results 
in unstable effects of ‘education’ as it is measured. The obvious suggestion is that we 
should work on measuring ‘education’ better, but, Woodward writes that “there are 
obvious practical limits on our ability to do this and so we may be stuck with 
heterogeneous or ‘ambiguous’ variables” (2016, pg. 1070). This, I believe, is precisely the 
question that needs answering. What is it about ‘education’ that makes it heterogeneous?  
While Woodward is correct that we need a way to differentiate bad from good 
variables, or concepts, his focus on how these variables perform in a particular analysis is 
unenlightening because it relies on knowing which variables are, in fact, successful for 
explanation. As he correctly notes, the heterogeneity of many social science concepts, 
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such as education, makes it difficult to judge whether this is a good variable in advance of 
attempts to use it. Furthermore, Woodward takes it for granted that it is clear whether a 
variable is a ‘well-defined target’, or has ‘unambiguous effects’. The heterogeneity he 
points to may make it a matter of heated debate whether smaller class sizes improve 
education, for example- some social scientists may fervently believe that this is true, while 
others may equally fervently believe the opposite. 
In summary, Woodward is entirely correct to suggest that social scientists need a 
way to distinguish between good and bad variables. His emphasises how well those 
variables perform in causal analysis. As he realises, heterogeneity is a particular problem 
in the social sciences, and this is a problem that needs explanation. What is it about 
‘education’ that means that it is heterogenous? Once we have answered this question, 
social scientists will be in a better position to assess whether ‘education’ is a ‘good’ 
variable, and how best to work with it. 
Chapter 2 sets out a framework that attempts to unify the various strands of 
discussion in this chapter, with the aim of providing an a priori way of thinking about 
whether concepts are more, or less, useful for social science research. Drawing on the 
historic meaning of the word ‘vague’ as a place where wandering or roaming occurs, social 
science concepts will be described as Nomadic. Chapter 2 therefore sets out the different 
ways in which concepts social scientists use roam, or wander, through the social 
landscape. One way in which they do this is through reflexivity, which leads them to 
occupy shifting areas over time. This nomadic behaviour will be shown to explain why 
the social sciences are often plagued by extensive ceteris paribus clauses, and why they have 









Chapter 2: Nomadic Concepts 
 
Chapter 1 argued that understanding why many concepts used in the social 
sciences are ‘odd’ is of primary importance for understanding why the social sciences have 
struggled to find regularities. This chapter sets out a framework for thinking about this 
‘oddness’ in a systematic way. Concepts that are often used in the social sciences will be 
described as Nomadic. The word ‘Nomadic’ is intended to convey the shifting and 
changing path of a concept across the social landscape. As with a nomadic tribe, or group, 
the boundaries of this tribe change over time. The landscape thorough which these 
nomads roam should be thought of as representing the social world, in other words, all 
phenomena that might be of interest to a social scientist. This chapter discusses the ways 
in which concepts used in the social sciences are Nomadic, before outlining two 
implications of adopting this approach. Firstly, it explains why the social sciences have 
found so few examples of regularities and secondly, it suggests that proposals made by 
Crasnow (2015), Cartwright & Bradburn (2011) and Goertz (2006, 2008) and Adcock & 
Collier (2001) for making concepts more precise are unsatisfactory. 
 
The role of the Nomadic Concepts framework 
Describing the concepts used in the social sciences as Nomadic allows social 
scientists to bring together the discussion in Chapter 1 into a coherent whole. Chapter 1 
argued that the concepts used in the social sciences have been described in a variety of 
ways, but that there is no way of deciding, for example, whether a concept is a ‘good’ one 
for analysis, or not. The following framework allows this to be done.  
The central aim of this approach is to demonstrate why social scientists can 
disagree about whether some specific aspect of the social world falls under the scope of 
a particular concept (for example, whether a particular political system is ‘democratic’), 
and also why they can disagree about which parts of the social world fall under the scope 
of a particular concept (for example, which political systems fall under the scope of the 
concept ‘democracy’). The first is a bottom up approach because it begins with a particular 
political system and asks whether it is ‘democratic’, while the second is a top down 
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approach which begins with the concept of ‘democracy’ and searches for political systems 
to which this concept applies. Where concepts are Nomadic, both of these tasks are 
contentious because social scientists can potentially include a lot of the social world within 
the scope of such concepts. As such, these disagreements are not easily resolved. This 
contrasts with concepts that are more precise; when a concept is precise social scientists 
focus on the same aspects of the social world when using this concept. In other words, 
social scientists agree about which aspects of the social world fall under the scope of a 
particular concept. The following section describes the characteristics of Nomadic 
concepts, which are unclarity of boundaries, change over time, and many possible 
meanings. These characteristics demonstrate that there are a number of ways in which a 
concept can be Nomadic, and that concepts may be more or less Nomadic.  
  
 What is a Nomadic concept? 
Nomadic concepts are defined by the following criteria: 
1- A wide variety of social phenomena can be included within the scope of the 
concept. This results from these concepts having many possible meanings, 
unclear boundaries, and changing over time. These characteristics are not an 
all or nothing matter because these concepts can vary in the number of 
meanings they have, how unclear their boundaries are, and the extent to which 
they change over time. 
2- The characteristics outlined in criteria 1 mean that disagreements about 
Nomadic concepts, and arguments making use of them, are difficult to resolve 
with academic analysis. Over time, analysis of a Nomadic concept leads to the 
incorporation of different social phenomena. 
‘Social exclusion’ is an example of a Nomadic concept. Criteria 1 is satisfied because a 
wide variety of social phenomena can be included within the scope of the concept ‘social 
exclusion’. There are many things ‘social exclusion’ can mean. Amongst other things, it 
can mean an inability to participate in economic life, a lack of interaction with the 
community (as in the case of the house bound elderly), or a refusal by other people to 
interact with the people in question in a constructive way (as in the case of children bullied 
at school), and a lack of access to normal means of communication. Following Sen (2004), 
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we might also argue that people are excluded from society if they do not have access to 
certain capabilities. In this case technological capabilities are important. Each of these 
meanings does not have precise boundaries; for example, how little interaction do we 
need with the community in order for it to count as a ‘lack of interaction’? Or, how little 
access to technology counts? We might agree that someone is socially excluded if they 
have no internet access and no phone. But what if they have a shared mobile and access 
to the internet at a local library, or their neighbour’s house? We could argue this either 
way. Furthermore, these meanings can be expected to change during the time period of 
our analysis. We would not have considered children socially excluded if they lacked 
access to the internet in 1995, but we would arguably consider them so today. Some 
aspects of the concept of social exclusion have changed significantly over a relatively short 
period of time.  
‘Social exclusion’ meets condition 2 because academic analysis has not resulted in 
agreement about what social exclusion is. For example, Axford writes that “the concept 
is used indiscriminately to describe myriad phenomena, from unemployment to being 
sexually abused, with some commentators even arguing that children as a class are 
excluded” (2010, 738). Over time, new ideas have been brought to bear on the concept, 
as illustrated by Sen’s capabilities approach. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, in the 
future, social scientists will find new ways in which people are ‘socially excluded’. Indeed, 
see Richardson & Le Grand (2002) for a paper outlining modifications to academic 
definitions of social exclusion based on discussions with people who are socially excluded. 
This is not to say that there is anything about ‘social exclusion’ that means that, in 
principle, it is impossible to reach agreement about the phenomena relevant to 
understanding this concept. In the future there might be such agreement. However, this 
would require agreement that ‘social exclusion’ has only one meaning, which has clear 
boundaries, and does not change over time. Were this to happen, then the concept would 
no longer be Nomadic. The following section discusses the characteristics of Nomadic 






Nomadic concepts have unclear boundaries 
The meanings of ‘social exclusion’ have unclear boundaries because it is difficult 
to decide, for example, how much social interaction is needed for children to feel socially 
integrated. Chapter 1 discussed another way in which boundaries can be unclear, which 
was because a Sorities Paradox can be generated. The Nomadic concept framework is not 
being proposed just to add another descriptive term to the philosophical literature, and 
to be successful it must be able to incorporate the sorts of boundary issues discussed in 
Chapter 1. The following section illustrates how to do this. The advantage of this is that 
it allows for discussion of concepts that appear very different to one another within a 
single framework. 
Characterising concepts as Nomadic is a different way of describing boundary 
problems. To see this, we need to think about the analogy with a Nomadic tribe. Firstly, 
consider a tightly bunched tribe that has put up a fence around its camp. In this case, the 
boundary issues will be almost non-existent. People living within the boundary are part 
of the tribe, and people living outside, are not. Once we remove the fence, things become 
more complicated. Members of the tribe may leave for periods of time, sometimes living 
within the tribe, and sometimes living elsewhere. In such a case, we might specify a 
number of days spent with the rest of the tribe as necessary for being a member of this 
group. In this case, we can describe the boundary as vague, in the philosophy of language 
sense. We are trying to draw a boundary around the tribe and adding, or subtracting, units 
that are identical for the purposes of this analysis. To make this precise a Sorites Paradox 
can be generated. 
A person who spends 2 nights per year with the tribe is not a member of the tribe. 
A person who spends 3 nights per year with the tribe is also not a member of the tribe. 
So, if we say that n number of nights per year spent with the tribe does not denote 
membership of the tribe, then n+1 nights per year spent with the tribe does not denote 
membership of the tribe. But, this appears to allow us to conclude that 365 nights per 
year spent with the tribe does not denote membership of the tribe either. 
Continuing with the current metaphor, there is clearly more to membership of a 
tribe than the number of nights per year spent with other members. Other criteria for 
membership may include biological descent, adoption of social practices, and proximity 
to the main tribe. For example, we may find people living at some distance from the main 
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tribe, judging whether they are members of the same tribe will involve considering a 
variety of factors such as, for example, what both groups of people tell us, whether they 
appear to act in similar ways, whether they have similar beliefs, and the degree to which 
they interact. This is like the difficulty with judging whether a child is socially excluded, 
where we are no longer simply drawing a boundary between identical units, but attempting 
to come up with a list of criteria that help to decide whether or not someone is a member 
of a group. Where concepts that social scientists use have unclear boundaries in either of 
the senses outlined above, this contributes to them being Nomadic and increases the 
potential for disagreement about which aspects of the social world fall under the scope of 
the concept.  
 
Nomadic concepts change over time 
The concept of ‘social exclusion’ has changed over time; for example, through the 
inclusion of access to technological capabilities. This change is due to social scientists 
reflecting on the concept and finding new ways in which people might be ‘socially 
excluded’. This is not the only way in which concepts can change. Chapter 1 discussed 
reflexivity, which is a different way in which concepts can change. As a brief reminder, 
the example of ‘autism’ illustrated that the meaning of concepts changes as people reflect 
on the concepts used to describe them, which leads them to change their behaviour, and 
this, in turn, leads to changes in the concepts used by social scientists to understand this 
behaviour. This can be illustrated by the description of Nomadic concepts. In the section 
on boundaries above, the landscape on which the tribe is placed was unimportant. This 
section illustrated how the landscape is critical to understanding how Nomadic concepts 
work.  
The concept ‘autism’ tracks changing behaviour over time, which can be 
represented as the concept (or tribe) moving across the landscape, where the landscape 
represents the social world. This movement may be fast, or slow. Over time, the aspects 
of the social world to which the concept ‘autism’ applies change, and this should be 
understood as the concept moving across the landscape. Furthermore, the movement of 
the concept also changes the landscape itself as people with autism change their 
behaviour, and, through interaction with medical professionals and wider society, alter 
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the social world. In other words, the concept moves over the landscape, but in doing so 
changes the landscape which, in turn, changes the concept. 
There is one further way in which concepts that social scientists use change. We 
describe many things as games today, including diplomacy and tiddly winks. However, 
perhaps, in the future people will just use the word to refer to games played at home. 
There need be no particular reason for this, just a change in language and culture. 
Nevertheless, in the future, the link with our current understanding of the word ‘game’ 
remains, and we see this as a change in the use of the concept, rather than the invention 
of a new concept. This can be characterised as a situation where the concept moves across 
the landscape, but where there is little or no interaction between this movement and the 
landscape itself. The movement of the concept leaves the landscape unchanged.  
To summarise, a concept can move across the landscape, and in doing so 
incorporates different aspects of the social world over time. Where this movement results 
just from the changing use of a concept, the concept and the landscape do not interact. 
Where there is reflexivity, the concept changes the social world, which, in turn leads to 
changes in the concept. This interaction between a concept and the landscape is not an 
all or nothing matter, and may happen to greater or lesser degrees. Where concepts change 
over time, this contributes to them being Nomadic because they move across the 
landscape (which is the traditional way of understanding a nomadic tribe). The changes 
in the aspects of the social world that are seen to fall under the scope of the concept over 
time increases the potential for disagreement between social scientists about what ‘really’ 
does fall under the scope of the concept. In a very basic sense, they are arguing about a 
moving target. 
 
Nomadic concepts have many meanings 
Many concepts that social scientists use have many different meanings. The 
concept of ‘social exclusion’ illustrates this. Other concepts used by social scientists also 
have many possible meanings; for example, Adcock and Collier note that ‘background 
concepts’ (which are the headline, pre-analysis, concepts, such as ‘poverty’) “routinely 
include a variety of meanings, the formation of systematized concepts often involves 
choosing among them” (Adcock & Collier, 2001, pg. 532). Similarly, Woodward writes 
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that there are a number of different things that ‘being female’ can mean, for the purposes 
of analysing disparities in pay between males and females (2003, pg. 115). One further 
example is the concept of ‘poverty’, which may mean falling short of some minimum 
income, some shortfall versus society at large, or related to heath, education, or any 
number of other factors. 
Where a concept has many meanings, this should be understood as different areas 
of the landscape falling under the scope of a concept. A concept with many meanings is 
like a tribe that exists in a number of locations. When using a concept with many 
meanings, social scientists need to specify which meaning they have in mind. However, 
in some cases this may not be possible because social scientists may not always be aware 
that they are using the same concept to refer to different parts of the landscape. The two 
following examples illustrate how this can happen. 
Steel (2008, pg. 102) describes ambiguities in the meaning of ‘ceteris paribus law’. 
He says that “A striking feature of the philosophical literature is the variety of types of 
generalisation that are referred to by that label” (Steel, 2008, pg. 102). Citing Schurtz he 
divides ceteris paribus laws into two main types—exclusive and comparative. “An exclusive 
[ceteris paribus] law indicates an absence of factors that would produce exceptions to the 
law, whereas a comparative [ceteris paribus] clause asserts not that interfering factors are 
absent but that they are distributed identically between groups that differ with respect to 
the putative cause” (Steel, 2008, pg. 102). What he then describes is the debate between 
philosophers and economists using different meanings of ‘ceteris paribus’ without 
awareness of this difference. The comparative meaning of ceteris paribus entails that some 
types of generalisations are relatively unproblematic. Philosophers subscribing to this 
meaning react incredulously to suggestions that ceteris paribus laws are meaningless or 
untestable. Steel cites a variety of literature to illustrate his point, including Earman and 
Roberts (1999) for arguments that ceteris paribus laws can serve no legitimate scientific 
purpose due to their open ended ‘escape clauses’ and Persky (1990) for an example of an 
economist dismissing such arguments as “foolish”. Steel illustrates that different 
economists have a particular meaning of ceteris paribus in mind and their lack of awareness 
about other, potential, meanings of this term results in their incredulous reaction to 
economists who assume a different meaning. This is why they are so dismissive of the 
arguments of philosophers who have, without realising, a different meaning in mind. They 
think they are discussing the same thing, but in reality are not.  
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A further example is provided by McCauley, who argues that there are “at least 
six” different meanings of ‘equilibrium’ in finance and economics (2004, pg. 155). These 
are the idea of equilibrium fluctuations about a drift in price, the idea that market averages 
describe equilibrium quantities, the idea that the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) 
describes equilibrium prices, prices of options described by the Black and Scholes 
equation, the absence of arbitrage opportunities, and the idea that the market, and models 
of markets, define sequences of temporary price equilibria (McCauley, 2004, pg. 76). All 
of these differ from the way in which physicists understand ‘equilibrium’. This is a concern 
because although many of the models used in finance and economics (in particular the 
Black and Scholes equation and some models of markets) apply models developed by 
physicists, McCauley argues that in various respects advocates of this approach to finance 
and economics are unaware of important differences between the use of ‘equilibrium’ in 
physics as compared to economics and finance. These differences are potentially 
important in understanding the extent to which the models apply to financial cases. The 
different meanings of concepts that social scientists use are not always transparent, even 
when we are dealing with concepts that have benefitted from intellectual refinement. 
‘Ceteris paribus’ is not a concept used in ordinary discourse, in the way that ‘poverty’ is.  
To summarise, the concepts that social scientists use often have many meanings. 
In some cases, the different meanings a concept can have are transparent. In this case, the 
social scientists have a relatively clear picture of how a concept sits on the landscape and 
specify which meaning, or which aspects of the social world, they intend to discuss when 
using this concept. A more complicated case is when different social scientists are unaware 
that they are using a concept which inhabits different locations on the landscape.  
Regardless of whether social scientists are aware of these different meanings, these 
meanings many be closer, or further apart on the landscape. For example, ‘happiness’ can 
mean a number of things, including economic security, satisfaction with family life, joy 
when thinking about a specific event, or general satisfaction with life. It is difficult (for 
me) to think about what all these meanings of ‘happiness’ share. They seem relatively 
unrelated to one another. Happiness in one area doesn’t seem to relate to happiness in 
other areas. This can be represented as a case where the concept sits in different locations 
on the landscape. The aspects of the social world that we are directed towards when 
analysing ‘economic security’ are different from those we analyse when looking at 
‘satisfaction after a specific life event’, such as marriage, or divorce. In the case of 
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economic security this will include financial data, and attitudes towards this. In the case 
of event-specific satisfaction it will include self-reporting of mental states and 
expectations. This is not to suggest that there will be no overlap between these cases, in 
fact, we could be analysing the same people in each case, but that each meaning directs 
us towards different aspects of the social world.  
This is in contrast with a concept like ‘school leavers’. ‘School leavers’ can mean 
those leaving school having passed their compulsory exams, or those who, despite leaving 
school, are still receiving some form of education until they meet the required standards 
in English and maths. Both these meanings are closely related; in each case, we are talking 
about 16-year-old children leaving schools. Consequently, we can conclude that the 
concept ‘school leavers’ inhabits parts of the landscape that are closer together than does 
the concept ‘happiness’.  
Nomadic concepts can have many meanings, social scientists may all agree about 
what these meanings are, or they may not. Additionally, these meanings may be far apart, 
or close together on the landscape. There are two other complications relating to the 
different meanings that concepts used in the social sciences. The first is that there are 
many things we can mean, when we say that a concept has a particular meaning. To 
introduce a concept that will be discussed at length later in this chapter, we may argue 
that one of the things ‘democracy’ can mean is ‘contestation’, (in other words that there 
is competition and openness in the electoral process). However, there are also many 
things that ‘contestation’ can mean. For example, we might take it to mean that there are 
a number of candidates standing for political positions, or that there are a certain 
minimum number of political parties, or that the agendas of the political parties are 
sufficiently different, or that the media is independent of political parties, or any number 
of other things. A concept that is Nomadic because it has many meanings, like 
‘democracy’, may have meanings that are themselves Nomadic for the same reason. 
The second complication is that social scientists may be interested in the 
behaviour of individuals, as opposed to concepts like ‘democracy’ or ‘poverty’. This is a 
problem of determining what the meaning of an action is. Taylor gives the example of 
‘the act of voting’ which, depending on context, can mean “saving the honour of my 
party, or defending the value of free speech, or vindicating public morality, or saving 
civilisation from breakdown” (Taylor, 1971/1994, pg. 190). In other words, while we can 
observe a certain behaviour—somebody raising their hand during a vote— this action 
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may mean any number of things. Without understanding what the action meant for the 
actor, or even what it meant for observers of the action, we are unlikely to get to grips 
with what is really going on. This situation can be represented in the Nomadic framework, 
as follows. When observing some behaviour social scientists may be unsure of which 
concepts this behaviour should fall under the scope of. Specifically, is the man raising his 
hand ‘saving the honour of his party’ or ‘following orders’. Social scientists may disagree 
about whether these concepts, or a number of others, include this behaviour within their 
scope. 
 In conclusion, when concepts are Nomadic because they have many meanings 
this increases the potential for social scientists to disagree about whether specific aspects 
of the social world fall under the scope of this concept, and which aspects of the social 
world the concept covers. Specifically, when a concept has many meanings, which are 
agreed upon by social scientists they can usually just specify which meaning they have in 
mind. In other cases they might not agree about the different meanings the concept can 
have, or may even not be aware that other social scientists have a different meaning in 
mind. In the first case the concept is less Nomadic than in the second case, this is because 
there is greater potential for disagreement about which aspects of the social world fall 
under the scope of the second concept. These different meanings, regardless of whether 
they are agreed upon or not, may be further away, or closer together on the landscape. 
Additionally, each of these meanings may itself have a number of meanings. Finally, where 
it is possible to question what some specific behaviour means, this can be represented as 
a case where social scientists can disagree about which concepts this behaviour falls under 
the scope of.  
 
Higher order/ methodological Nomadic concepts. 
Social scientists do not just argue about concepts like ‘social exclusion’. Social 
scientists also use other concepts that attempt to specify relationships between concepts, 
such as ‘causation’, and ‘correlation’. These concepts can also be fitted into the Nomadic 
framework, and can be more, or less, Nomadic. Correlation is specified precisely in 
mathematical terms, whereas considerable debate surrounds the concept of causation. 
Correlation can therefore be represented as located at a single part of the landscape, with 
few boundary issues. The concept ‘causation’ is a different matter entirely, because there 
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are many things that ‘causation’ can mean. Kim (2009, pg. 126) lists four approaches to 
analysing causation: the regularity analysis, the counterfactual analysis, the manipulation 
analysis and the probabilistic analysis. The regularity analysis began with Hume and Mill 
and sees causally connected events as instantiating general regularities between kinds of 
events. For example, an apple falling to the ground instantiates a more general regularity 
that objects fall to the earth. The counterfactual approach (Lewis 1973, 2005) says that a 
caused b if it is the case that had a not happened, b would not have happened. 
Counterfactual analysis will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. The manipulation 
analysis (Woodward 2003), which will also appear again in Chapter 3, says that causation 
should be understood as an ability to change, or manipulate something to produce a 
specific effect. In other words, a caused b if doing a brings about b. The probabilistic 
analysis says that a is a cause of b if the probability of b is greater when a has occurred 
than when a has not occurred. 
Causation can mean a number of things, so has multiple locations on the 
landscape. It is also possible that new ways of understanding causation will be proposed, 
and that the meanings above will change as debate continues within the philosophy of 
science community. Concepts that can be described as Nomadic therefore include 
concepts that social scientists analyse, such as ‘democracy’, or ‘poverty’, and concepts that 
they use to understand connections between these concepts, such as ‘causation’. 
 
 How is the Nomadic Concepts framework helpful? 
The following section shows how social scientists can use this framework to think 
about concepts in a systematic way. The salient features of Nomadic concepts were 
discussed individually above, but in practice they will need to be considered together. The 
ways in which concepts used in the social sciences were described in Chapter 1 are that 
they are Ballung concepts, cluster concepts, essentially contested, multiply realisable, and 
vague. The following section demonstrates how these can be subsumed within the 






Ballung concepts “sort things into categories based on a loose set of criteria in 
which members of the same category do not share any specific set of features.” (Bradburn, 
2011, pg. 54). In other words, members of such categories have loose resemblances to 
one another and there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for membership of these 
categories. The examples cited in Chapter 1 were ‘poverty’ and ‘disability’. Ballung 
concepts can be understood as being located in different places in the landscape (one for 
each of the things that these concepts can mean), these locations may overlap in some 
cases, but no location is shared by all meanings of the concept. Deciding on the exact 
boundary of each location is also likely to be difficult (because, for example, judging 
whether someone is, or is not, in ‘economic poverty’ will be contentious). Such concepts, 
and the different meanings associated with them may, or may not, change over time.  
 
Cluster concepts 
According to Little (1993), cluster concepts share some cluster of properties. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, one of his examples is ‘market economies’, which have many 
things in common, but which also have causally significant differences. Cluster concepts, 
according to this definition, differ from Ballung concepts because the different locations 
that the concept ‘market economy’ inhabit on the landscape overlap. The overlap 
represents that aspects of the social world that are shared by all meanings of ‘market 
economy’ (Little’s common features include the existence of private companies, and well-
developed corporate law). A cluster concept is likely to have boundary issues in many 
locations (for example, judging whether corporate law is ‘well-developed’ is likely to be 
contentious). Cluster concepts, and the meanings associated with them, may, or may not, 
change over time.  
 
Essentially Contested Concepts 
Essentially contested concepts can be represented as ones which have many 
meanings (as outlined in Chapter 1, Gallie describes this as being describable in a variety 
of different ways), and therefore have different locations on the landscape. However, it is 
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unclear whether these locations overlap, or how far apart they are; is likely to differ 
depending on the specific concept. The concept must represent some kind of valued 
achievement. The concept changes over time, which indicates that it moves over the 
landscape and, additionally, there may be interaction between the concept and the 
landscape. Boundary issues are likely to be present. Essentially contested concepts may 
be Ballung concepts, or cluster concepts.  
Essentially contested concepts are those which are subject to constant 
disagreement about what ‘democracy’, or ‘social justice’ mean. Seeing these concepts as 
Nomadic allows us to see why this is. When trying to specify what ‘democracy’ is (as 
described in Chapter 1, Gallie’s examples of essentially contested concepts include 
‘democracy’, ‘social justice’ and ‘work of art’), social scientists can direct their attention 
towards a variety of locations in the landscape (which may, or may not, overlap), each of 
which is likely to have boundaries which are difficult to draw. As Gallie describes, social 
scientists, while recognising the validity of other points of view about what ‘democracy’ 
is, nevertheless argue persuasively for their own point of view. These concepts are also 
likely to change over time, meaning that the locations shift (for example, as the idea of 
democracy develops in the future). This means that it is possible to, reasonably, disagree 
about whether about the aspects of the social world that are subsumed within the concept 
of ‘democracy’.  
 
Multiple realisability 
Concepts that are multiply realisable exist in different locations. For example, the 
concepts ‘money’, and ‘market economy’ are multiply realisable. In the case of ‘money’ 
this can include sea shells, fiat currency, currency backed by precious metals, letters of 
credit, bank deposits, and a number of other things. Some of these meanings, or locations 
may overlap (as in the case of letters of credit and bank deposits which both require a 
banking system), and others may not (as is the case between sea shells and bank deposits). 
These different meanings appear not to have significant boundary issues, at least as 
compared to other examples in this chapter, such as ‘economic poverty’. Once social 
scientists have specified that, when they are talking about money, they really mean bank 
deposits, then it is relatively uncontroversial to determine what counts as a bank deposit. 
Some concepts which are multiply realisable may have boundary issues.  Where a concept 
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is multiply realised, but everyone agrees about what these realisations are, and each of 
these realisations is precise, and also do not change over time, then this concept is not 
Nomadic. This is best described as a case of ambiguity, where we just need to specify 
which of a number of things we intend to pick out when we use a concept. 
 
Vagueness 
In the philosophy of language, vagueness relates just to boundary issues of the 
kind where a Sorites Paradox can be generated. These are cases where it is difficult to 
draw a boundary between thing like heaps and non-heaps, or bald men and non-bald men. 
Nomadic concepts may have boundary issues of this sort as in the case where we are 
trying to determine whether a group of people are receiving an adequate number of 
calories per day.  
 
Using the framework to think about concepts 
The Nomadic concepts framework can be used to think in a more systematic way 
about the concepts that social scientists use. To demonstrate this ‘social exclusion’ will be 
contrasted with ‘demand’, and show that ‘social exclusion’ is more Nomadic than 
‘demand’. This is because there is more potential for disagreement about which aspects 
of the social world fall under the scope of the concept ‘social exclusion’ than ‘demand’. 
‘Social exclusion’: As decribed above, ‘Social exclusion’ has many different 
meanings, many of which do not have precise boundaries. The concept of ‘social 
exclusion’ has also changed over time, and can reasonably be expected to change further 
in the future. This concept can be described as Nomadic, and it is Nomadic in a variety 
of ways. These characteristics mean that analysis of social exclusion hasn’t resolved what 
this concept ‘really is’. 
Now consider the rather different concept of demand, from economics: This is a 
more rarefied concept, which has benefitted from some degree of intellectual refinement. 
Recall from Chapter 1, Kincaid (2004) uses the law of supply and demand to justify his 
view that there are laws in the social sciences, so let us compare ‘social exclusion’ to 
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‘demand’ to see whether there is something different about these two concepts that 
justifies greater faith in generalisations about ‘demand’ than ‘social exclusion’. With the 
analysis in the first portion of this chapter it is now possible to see how the concept of 
‘demand’ differs from ‘social exclusion’. The concept of demand in economics is the 
amount of a good or service that a customer is willing to buy at a particular price. Now, 
admittedly, some imprecision results from the notion of ‘willing to buy’. I may be willing 
to buy 400 T-shirts at £5 each, but I may, due to time, transport, or other constraints only 
buy 200 T-shirts. Is my demand for T-shirts 400 or 200 at £5? In other words, do we 
mean actual demand, or potential demand? However, these two meanings are closely 
related because both apply where people are buying and selling something, and just 
measure, in different ways, the amount they want at a certain price. So, although the 
concept ‘demand’ may have different locations, these are close together, if not 
overlapping. Both meanings are also themselves well defined, although taking demand as 
the actual amount bought is the better defined of the two—it is synonymous with the 
number of T-shirts bought at a certain price. Determining a ‘willingness’ to buy at a certain 
price is harder to gauge, but, in principle is roughly determinable by asking people. The 
concept of ‘demand’ is unlikely to change over time. ‘Demand’ is not as Nomadic as 
‘social exclusion’. Consequently, there isn’t extensive debate about what ‘demand’ is. 
The implication of this is that, when social scientists discuss ‘demand’ they largely 
agree about the aspects of the social world that are relevant to analysing ‘demand’. The 
concept occupies are relatively clear location on the social landscape. Social scientists are 
much less likely to agree about the aspects of the social world that are relevant when 
analysing ‘social exclusion’ because this concept is more Nomadic.  
 Before moving on, it is important to note that the framework outlined above is 
intended to help social scientists think about the concepts they are using in a systematic 
way. It is not intended as a tool to determine, once and for all, the structure of social 
science concepts. It is unlikely that social scientists will agree on this. For example, it is 
possible to disagree with the characterisation of ‘social exclusion’, or ‘demand’ sketched 
out above. However, with this framework in hand, it is possible to discuss this 
disagreement in a structured way by discovering how different social scientists specify a 





The following section discusses two implications of accepting this framework. 
The first is that it explains why the social sciences have had so much difficulty finding 
regularities; and the second is that it suggests that current proposals for making concepts 
more precise are unsatisfactory. 
 
i. Making generalisations 
Where there is the potential to include a wide variety of phenomena within the 
scope of a concept it is more difficult to formulate generalisations using such concepts. 
‘Generalisations’ mean generalisations that are widely accepted by a heterogeneous group 
of social scientists. Tucker (2009) provides criteria that are helpful in explicating this idea; 
these are lack of coercion, heterogeneity (acceptance by social scientists from different 
backgrounds, who have few connections with one another, and who use different 
academic approaches), and size (Tucker, 2009, pg. 27-36). In other words, a generalisation 
can be seen as ‘widely accepted’ when this acceptance is uncoerced, comes from 
heterogenous social scientists and reflects the views of a sufficiently large number of social 
scientists.  Tucker notes that judgements about whether a sufficiently large number of 
social scientists accept a generalisation will have to be made on a case by case basis.  
Given this, how do we think about the statement ‘High income inequality makes 
revolutions more likely’? Firstly, ‘more likely’ is a methodological concept that is Nomadic 
because there are many things this can mean. We can interpret this statement in a number 
of ways. We could interpret this statement as saying that ‘High income inequality makes 
revolutions more likely than not’. In other words, that revolution is more likely than not 
having a revolution. A different interpretation can be taken from Northcott (2008), who 
argues that contrast classes are critical to making sense of causal claims. In other words, 
‘c causes e’ should often be understood as meaning ‘c rather than C* causes e rather than 
E*’ (Northcott, 2008, pg. 112). The evaluation of counterfactual claims is central to his 
argument, which will not be addressed in detail here because Chapter 3 is devoted to the 
analysis of counterfactuals. Nevertheless, Northcott’s wider point is relevant here. 
Northcott writes “often, at least in the special sciences, we have a choice of generalisations 
or models with which to analyse a case. This may impact in turn on choice of contrast 
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class and thus, sometimes, make all the difference to causation” (Northcott, 2008, pg. 
122). Later he says that linguistic stress and choice of vocabulary can “disambiguate which 
contrast classes are appropriate” (Northcott, 2008, pg. 122). Illustrating this with the 
current example suggests the following; when assessing the statement ‘High income 
inequality makes revolutions more likely’ we are implicitly contrasting ‘revolution’ with 
something else. This could just be ‘not a revolution’, or it could be something like ‘seeking 
redress through political means’, or even ‘emigration’, the potential contrast classes are 
numerous and will depend on context. In one case, we might be concerned with the 
reasons for revolution rather that peaceful protest, in another, with revolution rather than 
migration. The significance of this is that when social scientists are faced with a statement 
such as ‘High income inequality makes revolutions more likely’ there are a number of 
ways they can interpret ‘more likely’. Furthermore, these different interpretations will 
affect whether they judge this statement to be true, or false.     
Settling aside worries with ‘more likely’, as far as the generalisation as a whole is 
concerned we can, probably, off the top of our heads, think of a number of revolutions 
where income inequality appears to have been an important factor. However, are we 
willing to endorse this as a general statement? Probably not, and part of the reason why 
is that the concepts included in this generalisation are Nomadic; they have many 
meanings, which are not closely related to one another and lack precise boundaries.  
The relevant concepts here are ‘income inequality’ and ‘revolution’. Both of these 
terms can mean different things. Does ‘income inequality’ mean the actual difference 
between the highest and the lowest, the perceived income inequality, how rich the richest 
are, or one of a variety of other possible things, none of which are particularly well 
defined. ‘Revolution’ can mean political, violent, drastic democratic change, and a variety 
of other things, none of which are particularly well defined either. This means that when 
we think about this generalisation we can conceive of the relationship between the 
concepts ‘income inequality’ and ‘revolution’ being located on the social landscape in a 
wide variety of ways, all of which point us towards different conclusions regarding the 
plausibility, and strength, of this relationship. Anyone considering this generalisation can 
consider wide ranging and, possibly contradictory, interpretations. Even if analysis is 
limited to the consideration of past revolutions, different social scientists will disagree 
about whether specific historical events were, or were not ‘revolutions’ and whether 
‘income inequality’ was, or was not, present. Of course, different social scientists may 
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propose that this statement is true, or false, but it is unclear how we are to choose between 
them. Assuming that they both present well-chosen examples and argue them well we are 
unlikely to be able to come down conclusively on one side or the other. The opposing 
social scientists may be focusing on different aspects of the social world, all of which fall 
under the scope of the relevant broad concepts. The conclusion to the debate may 
therefore be ‘sometimes yes and sometimes no’. Neither side in the debate is ‘wrong’, 
because what appears to be a debate is actually not about exactly the same things. 
In contrast, we are happier to endorse the generalisation ‘If the price of good X 
rises, then demand will fall’. The relevant concepts here are ‘price’ and ‘demand’. The 
concept of ‘price’ is located more exactly on the social landscape. Admittedly, there is 
room to argue about differences in prices in different locations, or, if it is changing rapidly, 
which measure of price to use. ‘Demand’, as argued above, is also not very Nomadic. It 
is possible to focus on meanings and definitions of these concepts that make them 
synonymous with their numerical measure. Although we may dispute the strength of the 
relationship between price and demand, note the exceptions to it (as when price is taken 
to indicate the quality of a good), and argue about what social phenomena are relevant to 
the specific case in hand. For example, when assessing whether demand for a certain good 
will fall if the price rises, it may be debatable whether we also need to include price changes 
in substitute goods in our analysis. Neverthelesss, the generalisation is less controversial 
than the generalisation about income inequality and revolutions. The aim of this chapter 
has been to explain why this is true. While we may say that the concepts ‘income 
inequality’, ‘revolution’ and ‘demand’ all belong to the ‘odd’ concepts that social scientists 
use, the Nomadic framework allows us to see that they are not all ‘odd’ on the same way. 
These concepts are more or less Nomadic. The concept of ‘demand’ is less Nomadic than 
‘income inequality’ and ‘revolution’. These differences allow for greater disagreement 
about what social phenomena are to be reasonably included within the scope of the 
concepts ‘income inequality’ and ‘revolution’ than within ‘demand’.  
 
ii. Increasing precision 
The second implication of this is that this framework allows us to understand 
when proposals for making concepts more precise are likely to succeed, or not. Much of 
the recent social science literature focuses on the methodological problem of how social 
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science concepts should be made more precise (for example, see Crasnow (2015),  
Cartwright & Bradburn (2011) and Goertz (2006, 2008) and Adcock & Collier (2001)). 
This takes it as given that the concepts the social sciences deal with are ‘odd’ in some way, 
but sidesteps further analysis of this oddness by focussing on practical issues. It is often 
suggested that social scientists just stipulate which meaning of a concept is relevant. 
Consider ‘disability’, which may “mean different things depending on whether we are 
talking about particular individuals, about a policy goal, a variable in a psychological 
theory, or a characteristic of a group of individuals” (Bradburn & Cartwright, Discussion 
paper, pg. 3). Later, they say “whether a feature counts as in or outside the concept, and 
how far, is context and use dependent” (Bradburn & Cartwright, Discussion paper, pg. 
4). And later, “If we want to turn the […] concept of poverty into a precise and 
unambiguous one, poverty concepts are bound to proliferate” (Bradburn & Cartwright, 
Discussion paper, pg. 7). In other words, depending on the purposes of our research, we 
focus only on certain aspects of a concept such as poverty, perhaps ‘income per person 
below £15,000 per annum’, and therefore consider features such as income and 
expenditure, rather than educational level or ethnic background. In any particular case, 
the features that interest us will differ. The suggestion is not that ‘income per person 
below £15,000 per annum’ is what ‘poverty’ is, but that this is the meaning of poverty that 
is relevant in this situation. In other situations we will use other aspects of poverty.  
However, this is not always possible. As we saw above, there may be fundamental 
disagreement about which meaning is appropriate in a particular context. Bradburn and 
Cartwright do suggest an alternative approach that may work in these sorts of situations. 
They suggest using a table of features which lays out “the dimensions along which the 
family resemblances in question lie” (Bradburn & Cartwright, Discussion paper, pg. 10). 
An example of this the EU measure of ‘social exclusion’ which is a three-tiered measure. 
The first-tier lists seven or eight factors that pick out aspects of social exclusion in Europe, 
such as inequality. The second tier has a larger number of factors intended to make the 
characterisation more comprehensive. The third-tier lists society specific features 
(Bradburn & Cartwright, Discussion paper, pg. 7). In other words, we are interested in 
‘social exclusion’, but there is no precise definition that satisfies our interest in this case. 
We are interested in ‘social exclusion’ as a whole. There are many things that this can 
mean but there appears to be nothing that all instances of ‘social exclusion’ share. We 
therefore must use a multi-faceted set of data to try to capture what we mean by the 
concept. In theory, this set of data should incorporate what most people think are the 
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relevant similarities between instances of ‘social exclusion’, up to some sensible limit set 
by data gathering and computational constraints. This would allow for the inclusion of 
many different meanings but this does not quite solve the problem where people 
fundamentally disagree about whether something really is an aspect of poverty, because 
they would simply disagree about whether something should be included within the list 
of factors or not. I will now discuss an example from Crasnow (2015) in more detail to 
illustrate my worry with this overall approach for making social science concepts more 
precise. The worry is that it is not sufficient to just consider which meanings of a concept 
we might be interested in because these meanings are often Nomadic concepts 
themselves, so the aspects of the social world that can be included within the scope of 
these meanings may still be large enough to give rise to disagreement.  
Crasnow advocates pluralism in the measurement of concepts, writing that “one 
standard may not be desirable and the sort of accuracy such a measure implies may not 
be appropriate” (2015, pg. 1). In other words, there may be no definitive answer to the 
question ‘What is the best measure of democracy?’ Instead, there may be a variety of 
measures that are appropriate in different contexts. While this is relatively uncontroversial, 
the rest of her paper illustrates that the process of determining how to measure democracy 
is more complicated than it appears. Crasnow notes that “ordinary use” concepts are 
described as “vague and ambiguous” (Crasnow, 2015, pg. 8). As Chapter 1 pointed out, 
the use of the word ‘vague’ is unfortunate because it has a very specific meaning within 
the philosophy of language, nevertheless, for the ease of expositon, it will be used here 
because this is the word that Crasnow uses. However, it should only be taken to mean a 
general uncertainty, or unclarity. The approach she discusses takes a concept, like 
‘democracy’ or ‘peace’ and narrows it down to make it more precise. In other words, 
because these concepts are ‘vague and ambiguous’ we need to specify exactly what we 
mean, and the work we intend the concept to do. The suggestion is that social scientists 
need, somehow, to make the concepts less vague, taking into account the research they 
intend to do. There are a number of proposals for how to do this (see Goertz (2006, 
2008), Crasnow (2015), Adcock & Collier (2001), Bradburn & Cartwright (2011)) but all 
aim to make the concept clearer so that it can be used for the purposes of research. In 
their differing ways, these philosophers suggest how to break the concept down into a 
number of levels. Most of the authors use three levels, but Adcock and Collier use four. 
This multi-level process is an attempt to refine the concept to make it clearer. The process 
is as follows. 
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At the first level is the ordinary use concept. This is the pre-analysis, everyday use 
of the word. At the second level, researchers think about which meanings of the concept 
are relevant, given what they want to research. For example, the concept of ‘democracy’ 
has many meanings. A democracy may mean the presence of ‘political liberties’, or 
‘popular sovereignty’, or ‘contested elections’, or ‘competition’, or a variety of other 
things. The number of meanings of ‘democracy’ that are relevant in a particular context 
is likely to vary. For example, if we are concerned with ancient democracies we may focus 
on different meanings than if our interest is on post 1945 democracies.  
At the third level, once we have decided which meanings are relevant for our 
purposes, we can decide on indices, or datasets, that allow researchers to establish the 
presence or absence of the attributes of democracy with which we are concerned. Adcock 
and Collier (2001) note that working out these levels is an iterative process, rather than a 
one-off exercise. Goertz (2006, pg. 8-9) provides a number of examples of how the 
concept of ‘democracy’ has been analysed. The key concept we begin with is ‘democracy’; 
using Arat’s framework the second level meanings in which we might be interested are 
‘participation’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘coerciveness’, while at the third level the data 
representing these second level meanings include ‘competitiveness of nominations’, ‘party 
legitimacy’, and ‘party competition’. An alternative analysis of democracy, which Goertz 
takes from Coppedge and Reinicke, has one second level meaning, which is ‘contestation’, 
and the third level data are indices or datasets that show the extent of ‘free and fair 
elections’, ‘freedom of expression’, ‘freedom of organisation’ and ‘pluralism of the media’. 
Examples might include the number of parties standing for election, or the number of 
independent media sources. (Goertz, 2006, pg. 8-9).  
In other words, we begin with a pre-analytic, concept such as ‘democracy’. Then 
we think about what we mean, in our particular context, when we use this concept. Once 
we have specified what we mean we can look for indicators, or datasets, which may be 
qualitative or quantitative, to gauge the presence or absence of the things in which we are 
interested. For example, we may specify that in a particular context ‘democracy’ means 
‘contestation’- that the political process is contested. Then, we need data that evidences 
the presence of absence of contestation. Following Coppedge and Reinicke we can use 
‘freedom of expression’ and ‘free and fair elections’. We then analyse any data we have 
access to, including the number of candidates standing in elections, and the number of 
independent media sources, and aggregate these, yielding a quantitative measure of the 
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extent to which a political process is ‘contested’. In this way, we have moved from the 
initial concept ‘democracy’ to a more specific set of data, such as the number of 
independent media sources and the number of candidates standing for election. This 
allows us to compare the extent to which countries or states are democratic and to look 
for explanations, or connections with other concepts. 
This process appears sensible, but unfortunately, there are two problems. Firstly, 
the process of narrowing down the concept by specifying what is meant in a particular 
context appears to have settled what we mean by our concept. We say ‘By ‘democracy’ I 
mean ‘contested elections’’. It appears therefore that we have settled what we mean by 
democracy by using other terms whose meaning is clear, or at least, more clear than 
‘democracy’. However, this is not the case. We could just as easily have ‘contestation’ or 
‘contested elections’ at the first level and specify what we mean by ‘contestation’. This 
proposal takes it as given that the concepts used at the second level are, in fact, less ‘vague 
and ambiguous’ than the first level concepts, when there is no reason why this should be 
so. ‘Contestation’ may be an aspect of ‘democracy’, but this does not mean that it is, 
necessarily a more precise concept. At the outset, it is important to reiterate how precision 
should be understood within the Nomadic framework. When a concept is precise there 
is little, or no, potential for disagreement about the aspects of the social world fall under 
the scope of a concept. The concept of ‘demand’ is more precise, or less Nomadic, than 
the concept ‘poverty’. The following section illustrates the worries with Crasnow’s 
approach. 
Consider Crasnow’s discussion of ‘democracy’ (2015). She describes ‘democracy’ 
as follows:  
“With any latent concept—which is an abstract concept—the appropriate 
concrete attributes to associate with that concept need to be specifically 
identified. These attributes will either be observable themselves or linked to 
subcomponents which will be observable and serve as indicators.” 
(Crasnow, 2015, pg. 4).  
This illustrates her three-level approach—at the first level is the abstract latent concept, 
at the second level are the relatively more concrete attributes, and at the third level are the 
data, in her words ‘indicators’. Crasnow says, “it is generally agreed that there are two 
main sets of attributes through which democracy should be identified: competitiveness 
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(contested elections) and participation (inclusiveness of the electorate)” (Crasnow, 2015, 
pg. 4).  
For Crasnow, democracy implies competitiveness and participation. It appears 
that we have settled what we mean by ‘democracy’ by breaking it down into two 
constituent attributes—competitiveness and participation. This does not follow because, 
just as ‘democracy’ has multiple meanings, so do ‘competitiveness’ and ‘participation’. 
‘Competitiveness’ could mean the number of candidates standing, the ease with 
which candidates can put themselves forward for election, or the extent to which 
candidates’ platforms differ. Crasnow offers two other potential meanings: the right to 
form political parties and freedom of the press (2015, pg. 5). Unfortunately, there are also 
a variety of potential meanings of ‘freedom of the press’. This process of narrowing down 
a concept only works when we are not narrowing our concept down with other concepts 
that have multiple meanings. Crasnow is aware of this problem, for she says that:  
“Even if the concepts are seemingly well-specified questions of their 
consistency across context can arise. The term ‘universal suffrage’ does not 
mean the same thing in 1890 that it means in 1973. Questions may also 
arise about whether the concept is used in the same way for cross country 
comparative research” (2015, pg. 6). 
 I do not believe that democracy is well specified when we identify it with 
‘participation’ and ‘competitiveness’. It is not well specified because ‘participation’ and 
‘competitiveness’ have multiple meanings. It is this poor specification which results in 
terms like ‘participation’ applying inconsistently over time.  
When a concept has many meanings we can specify which meaning we have in 
mind. However, a concept cannot be made more precise with a concept that, although an 
aspect of the original concept, also has many meanings, especially when these meanings 
also have boundary issues, and change over time. This is because, as in the discussion of 
poverty, different social scientists may have different things in mind when they use such 
a concept. A natural reply is that Crasnow describes, if not the way, then at least one way 
that democracy can be measured. So, as long as we are clear about what she means, we 
can follow the logic of the proposal for measuring ‘democracy’. Unfortunately, if the 
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meaning Crasnow focuses on does not match our idea, or anyone else’s idea about what 
‘participation’ means, then the resulting analysis will have limited applicability.  
The importance of this is illustrated by Crasnow’s example distinguishing between 
‘universal suffrage’ and ‘universal male suffrage’. She says, citing Paxton, that a number 
of conclusions about democracy no longer hold if ‘universal suffrage is treated as universal 
male suffrage’ (2015, 6). Depending on whether we mean ‘universal suffrage’ or ‘universal 
male suffrage’, our conclusions about ‘democracy’ change. For example, our classification 
of a country as ‘democratic’ may differ depending on whether male suffrage is sufficient 
for a positive classification, or whether we need wider suffrage. Crasnow concludes that 
determining when we have the process of conceptualisation ‘right’ is an iterative process. 
However, recognising that the problem of what we mean reaches through all levels of 
conceptualisation suggests that there is no ‘right’ answer. 
A natural reply is that this is only a concern when we use our concept over 
extended time. It is clear that ‘universal suffrage’ does not mean the same thing in 2016 
as it did in 1890. Can this issue not be sidestepped by focussing only on one time-period? 
The following example suggests not. Crasnow describes how Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi 
and Przeworski focus on contestation, rather than participation, in their analysis of 
democracy. Crasnow says that “According to Munck [they] argue that this is a legitimate 
preference since their concerns are really about the post-1945 era and so universal 
participation (universal suffrage) can be assumed” (Crasnow, 2015, pg. 4). In other words, 
there are two things that democracy can mean—contestation and participation. The 
authors focus on just one of these—contestation, because the other meaning—
participation, is taken to be present in all the democracies under consideration in this 
study, because they have universal suffrage. This is only valid if ‘suffrage’ and 
‘participation’ mean the same things, but it isn’t clear that they do.  
We can have universal suffrage in a population, but if certain groups within the 
population feel alienated from the political process, leading to their non-participation in 
elections, then ‘participation’ may be low, despite universal suffrage. This sub-group has 
the right to vote, but because they don’t see their interests represented by any party, they 
don’t participate in the political process. For me, ‘participation’ is not equivalent to 
‘universal suffrage’; it means not only the right to vote, but a belief that the political 
process is responsive to, and reflective of, the views of the population. If you agree with 
me about these different meanings, then Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski are 
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wrong to focus just on contestation in their analysis of ‘democracy’. They have used a 
concept with many possible meanings without an awareness of this. Consequently, their 
research is problematic for someone not sharing their views about what participation 
means. For example, an alternative approach, motivated by the idea that participation 
does not just mean suffrage, would include participation in an analysis of post-1945 
democracies. This example illustrates that it is possible to disagree about the relevant 
meaning of a concept, even when the focus is on a fixed time period. 
The problem with Crasnow’s proposal for refining social science concepts is that 
a solution is sought in specifying meanings of a concept in a particular context. This is 
taken to solve the problem of what a concept means. But, as I have argued, it has not 
done so. The concepts used at the second level, or, in other words, the aspects used to 
specify what concepts mean are in many cases no more precise than the initial concept. 
The implication of this is that the conclusions of research are limited, and sometimes 
unconvincing, for anyone who has other meanings of these concepts in mind. This 
becomes clearer if we think about the ways in which these concepts are Nomadic. 
The concept ‘democracy’ has been discussed throughout this chapter, which has 
suggested that it is very Nomadic, the concept has many meanings which have different 
locations on the social landscape, these meanings are changing over time and are subject 
to boundary issues. Furthermore, many of these meanings are themselves Nomadic.  
A natural reply is that, while this problem may apply to the analysis of ‘democracy’ 
by certain authors, it does not apply universally. This is true, but is not an objection. Just 
because ‘democracy’ is Nomadic, this does not mean that social science concepts are 
equally so. It is a mistake is to believe that all social science concepts are Nomadic in the 
same way, and to apply the same methodology for making them precise to them all. The 
following paragraph discusses an example from Ragin, which suggests that some concepts 
can be made more precise by using other concepts that do not have multiple meanings. 
Ragin (2008) aims to show how social scientists can quantitatively assess the 
degree to which some phenomenon fits into a set. The degree of inclusion in a set can 
range from 0 (full exclusion) to 1 (full inclusion). His contribution to the debate is that 
social concepts can be characterised as fuzzy set relations. For example, we can think 
about developed countries as a subset of democracies, rather than just analysing the 
correlation between development and democracy. Thinking about relationships in terms 
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of set relations can often reveal relationships that are not apparent from pure correlation 
data. This is a useful insight, but is not the concern here. What is of interest is the process 
by which Ragin establishes which countries count as developed, and to what extent.  
In one of Ragin’s examples ‘high per capita national income’ is used as an indicator 
for being a developed country’. In this example, he calculates the degree of membership 
in the set of ‘developed countries’ using per capita national income data (Ragin, 2008, pg. 
86-90). However, the concept of interest is ‘developed country’, which can mean a 
number of things, of which high ‘per capita national income’ is only one. Given the wider 
spirit of Ragin’s proposal he would no doubt agree with this, but his example is used only 
to motivate the following point. Other meanings of ‘developed’ could include a 
democratic political system, a relatively equal distribution of income, a high level of 
healthcare provision, or high educational standards. In this respect, his approach is the 
same as Crasnow’s—this example concentrates on one of many possible meanings of the 
first level concept. In this case, it is debatable whether we are actually still talking about 
‘developed countries’ as opposed to merely ‘countries ranked by their level of per capita 
national income’. If per capita national income is what matters in our particular situation 
this is fine, but if we really are trying to talk about ‘developed countries’ it is unclear that 
just fixing on one meaning, and defining this relatively precisely, helps us to understand 
the wider concept.  
Nevertheless, there is an important contrast with Crasnow. Setting aside our 
worries about the extent to which ‘developed’ means ‘high per capita national income’, 
the advantage of using ‘high per capital national income’ is that this concept is not plagued 
by multiple meanings in the way that ‘participation’ is. Doubtless we can still argue about 
what should be included in ‘income’, and even about whether ‘per capita’ should include 
transient populations, so the meanings of these terms are not totally fixed; however, we 
can, with some margin of error, calculate ‘per capita national income’ for most countries. 
The methodology for doing so is relatively clear. The contrast with ‘participation’ is that 
whereas ‘participation’ can mean a number of very different things (such as suffrage, or 
engagement with the political process), ‘per capita national income’ can mean a number 
of closely related things. ‘Per capita national income’ is a concept that is more synonymous 
with its numerical measure. The difference, of course, is a matter of degree. 
There is something different, therefore, between the concepts ‘democracy’, 
‘contestation’ and ‘per capita national income’. This difference is important because when 
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making the concept ‘democracy’ more precise we do not succeed in doing so by using an 
alternative concept, ‘contestation’ which is also Nomadic. But we do succeed in making 
the concept ‘developed country’ more precise when taking it to mean ‘per capita national 
income’. ‘Per capita national income’ is not Nomadic in the way that ‘participation’ is. 
This is important because if social scientists want to make concepts more precise, then 
understanding the different ways in which concepts can be Nomadic allows social 
scientists to assess when particular methodologies are appropriate, or not. It is 
unacceptable just to say that social concepts are ‘vague’ and note that they can be 
understood in a variety of ways. This illustrates the difference between Crasnow’s 
suggestion that ‘democracy is understood in terms of ‘participation’ and ‘contestation’ and 
Ragin’s suggestion that ‘development’ is understood in terms of GNP. A Nomadic 
concept can be made more precise by focusing on one or two meanings, or aspects, of a 
concept but only when these meanings are themselves not just other Nomadic concepts. 
Furthermore, when a concept is Nomadic partly because there is nothing that all instances 
of it share, different social scientists may not even agree that the chosen aspect, or 
meaning, of the concept really is a meaning of this concept. Understanding the structure 














Chapter 3. Counterfactuals 
 
Introduction 
Counterfactuals are used in a variety of contexts. Tetlock and Belkin (1996) note 
that historians have been using counterfactuals for at least two thousand years. They say, 
“Counterfactuals fuelled the grief of Tacitus when he pondered what would have 
happened if Germanicus had lived to be Emperor” (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996, pg. 3). In 
more recent times, Fearon suggests that “When trying to argue or assess whether some 
factor A caused event B, social scientists frequently use counterfactuals” (1996, pg. 39). 
Tetlock and Belkin go further, suggesting that counterfactual analysis is “unavoidable in 
any field in which researchers want to draw cause-effect conclusions but cannot perform 
controlled experiments” (1996, pg. 6). Nevertheless, historians are suspicious of 
counterfactual analysis, believing that it is often speculative. Many of the attempts to make 
counterfactual analysis less speculative involve making use of evidence in assessing 
counterfactual claims, or making the terms used more precise. While this is a worthwhile 
endeavour, this chapter argues that there is an additional problem faced by those wanting 
to use counterfactual analysis in the social sciences. This problem is that counterfactual 
analysis is particularly problematic when dealing with Nomadic concepts. When dealing 
with Nomadic concepts, advice to be more precise is beside the point. The following 
section illustrates this problem in general terms, before moving on to a more detailed 
analysis of counterfactuals in the remainder of the chapter. 
Yuen Foong Khong discusses the counterfactual: ‘If Britain had confronted Hitler 
with the threat of war over Czechoslovakia, Hitler would have backed down.’ This is 
coupled with the further consequent that ‘World War II might not have happened’. 
(Khong, 1996, pg. 95). Britain’s Prime Minister, Chamberlain, was hesitant to risk war 
with Germany in 1938. According to Khong, he had three reasons for this; firstly, the 
memory of World War I was still fresh, secondly, Britain was militarily unprepared for 
war in 1938, and thirdly, Chamberlain had a high belief in his own ability to find a 
diplomatic solution to Hitler’s expansionism. Khong notes that Churchill advocated a 
much stronger response to Germany, a view that was shared by other politicians- Eden 
and Cooper. He concludes that it was very possible for Britain not to have appeased Hitler 
at Munich (Khong, 1996, pg. 99-105).  
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This counterfactual is therefore one that can reasonably be asked, because Britain 
might not have appeased Hitler in 1938. This is in contrast to counterfactuals that are less 
possible, such as those asking what would have happened at Waterloo if Napoleon had 
had bombers. The counterfactual about British appeasement is not just an interesting 
academic exercise; the belief that this counterfactual is true, that Hitler would have backed 
down if he had been confronted, influenced US foreign policy post World War II. Khong 
writes that “A recurrent theme on post-World War II American foreign policy is the 
necessity of avoiding another Munich”. Examples include debates over US policy towards 
Korea, Vietnam and Bosnia. Khong writes: 
“From Harry Truman’s equating inaction over North Korea’s 
invasion of South Korea to a mistake of Munichlike proportions, to 
Lyndon Johnson’s portraying the Vietnam War as a war to prevent 
future Munichs, to recent US mutterings about the need to distance 
itself from the Munichlike policies of Britain and France towards 
Bosnia, the Munich analogy has served as a major script of the likely 
course of events if the United States failed to do X.” (Khong, 1996, 
pg. 96) 
Asking whether Hitler would have backed down, and whether World War II 
would not have happened, is a question that it makes sense to ask because the antecedent 
could plausibly have happened. Moreover, deciding whether this counterfactual is true or 
false has important consequences for the political landscape post-World War II. The 
belief that appeasement would have led Hitler to back down, and possibly avoided World 
War II has influenced US foreign policy, and may do so again in the future. 
Counterfactual analysis remains controversial, however. Fearon argues that, in 
many cases, we simply cannot know what would have happened in counterfactual cases. 
He advocates restricting counterfactuals where the antecedent and the consequent are 
close to one another in time, and linked by a few, well understood, causal links (Fearon, 
1996, pg. 66). Speculating about the occurrence of World War II following a 
confrontation at Munich does not obviously meet this criterion. There is no well specified 
causal link between the events at Munich and World War II. However, in this case, 
analysing this counterfactual is useful, despite our inability to decide what would have 
happened. Khong outlines three counterfactual scenarios following an imagined 
confrontation with Hitler at Munich:  
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i. Hitler would have started a war in 1938. 
ii. Hitler would have started a war in 1938, but Hitler’s enemies within 
Germany, specifically those in the military, would have deposed him. 
iii. Hitler would have backed down. 
Khong concludes that it is unclear which of these scenarios would have occurred (1996, 
pg. 116). He is in agreement with Fearon that we cannot know what would have 
happened. Nevertheless, although we cannot pick between these scenarios, they are 
important because, he argues, acknowledging the existence of more than one scenario is 
sufficient to throw some doubt on the uncritical assessment of this counterfactual by post 
war political actors. He writes, “This claim raises serious questions for those—scholars 
and policy makers—wont to advocate standing firm as a general rule of diplomacy 
because history “teaches” that a more resolute England in the 1930s would have 
“certainly” caused Hitler to back down.” (Khong, 1996, pg. 116). It seems therefore, that 
even when it is impossible to judge whether a counterfactual claim is true or false, giving 
reasons for thinking it true or false may be useful in and of itself, if only to reduce 
confidence in the truth of any particular counterfactual scenario. 
To summarise, Khong suggests that there are three possible counterfactual 
scenarios following a counterfactually more confrontational Chamberlain. He also gives 
reasons for thinking that the plausibility of these different scenarios has implications for 
US foreign policy, because US foreign policy has often relied on a simplistic understanding 
of this counterfactual. These implications take some of the heat out of Fearon’s worry 
that we simply cannot know what would have happened; it is sufficient to know that a 
number of different things might have happened, not all of which support more 
aggressive foreign policy in this, or other, situations. Counterfactual analysis may therefore 
be a useful exercise. In this particular case, the existence of a number of possible 
counterfactual scenarios is a virtue, because it throws doubt on a simplistic analysis of this 
counterfactual.  
This chapter will show that generating multiple counterfactual scenarios is 
possible for many counterfactuals, not just the counterfactual about confronting Hitler. 
Specifically, when social scientists analyse counterfactuals which include Nomadic 
concepts, it is possible to include a wide variety of social phenomena in the scope of a 
concept, and thereby generate a large number of plausible counterfactual scenarios. While 
this is a virtue in the Munich example, in many other cases social scientists do want to 
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determine what the truth value of a counterfactual is; particularly when they seek to apply 
Woodward’s (2003) manipulationist account of causation to the social sciences.  
Khong specifies three scenarios, but it is possible that there are many more 
plausible counterfactual scenarios because the concept of ‘confronting’ Hitler is a 
Nomadic concept. There are numerous ways in which a person can be confrontational. 
Even just restricting ourselves just to the situation stipulated in this counterfactual, the 
concept is Nomadic. Khong writes that there were three men who were willing to 
confront Hitler in 1938; Eden, Churchill and Cooper. The antecedent of the 
counterfactual requires just that “their recommendations fall on receptive ears and have 
a chance of being implemented.” (Khong, 1996, pg. 113). This is most easily achieved if 
one of these three were Prime Minister, but can also be achieved if two of the three had 
been members of the cabinet in 1938. There are many things that confrontation can mean 
in this case. One of Churchill, Eden or Cooper becoming Prime Minister, or any two of 
them being in the cabinet and thereby influencing policy. Khong writes as if these two 
options are intersubstitutable. He discusses the option of two of them being in the 
cabinet, as opposed to one being Prime Minister, as an alternative formulation of the 
antecedent to allay worries that making one of the three Prime Minister is too great a 
change to make to the historical record. He is right that these are both ways of satisfying 
the antecedent of the counterfactual because Hitler would have been ‘confronted’. He 
writes, “Had one of them been prime minister in September 1938, England would most 
probably have confronted Hitler with war over the Sudetenland” (1996, pg. 112) and later 
“Had two or more of the Churchill-Eden-Cooper trio been members of the Chamberlain 
cabinet in September 1938, the chances of Britain’s confronting Hitler would have been 
greatly increased.” (1996, pg. 113-114). However, depending on which of these options 
occurs, and which of the three are involved, Hitler may have been ‘confronted’ with war 
in different ways, which may have had further counterfactual consequences.  
For example, De Mesquita suggests that, even in 1939, Hitler doubted that Britain 
and France were prepared to fight to protect Poland. Hitler believed not only that 
Chamberlain’s government lacked the resolve, but that Britain’s military was unprepared. 
An important factor in understanding the counterfactual is therefore not only a verbal 
‘confrontation’ but another meaning of ‘confrontation’ suggested by military readiness for 
war. De Mesquita suggests that more rapid rearmament would have been a consequence 
of Churchill becoming Prime Minister, and that this would have affected Hitler’s estimates 
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of the likelihood of war. (1996, pg. 221). What is less clear is whether this rearmament 
would have happened, had two of Churchill, Eden or Cooper been members of the 
cabinet; or whether Cooper or Eden would have rearmed to the extent that de Mesquita 
believes Churchill was prepared to; or whether Churchill would have succeeded in his 
plans for rearmament in 1938. These different options may give rise to different 
counterfactual scenarios resulting from ‘confrontation’. Each of these possible scenarios 
are compatible with a ‘confrontation’ occurring in 1938, because this concept is Nomadic 
and can encompass a wide variety of social phenomena, even within the context of this 
example. These different counterfactuals may each suggest that the counterfactual is true, 
or false.  
De Mesquita also illustrates the potential that, apparently small details, have for 
the historical record. Chamberlain did confront Hitler in 1939. He made a statement in 
the House of Commons on March 31st, 1939 with which he intended to demonstrate his 
resolve to support Poland militarily. De Mesquita argues that it was unlikely to do so 
because Chamberlain referred to the threat to Poland’s independence, rather than its 
territorial integrity. Indeed, de Mesquita cites Speer as writing that Hitler did not believe 
that Britain and France would fight, even after the official declaration of war (de Mesquita, 
1996, pg. 219-220). Both de Mesquita and Khong provide evidence that Hitler viewed 
Churchill, Eden and Cooper in a different light to Chamberlain, and believed that they 
were willing to fight a war. Nevertheless, this example illustrates the importance of 
considering not only what is done: a ‘confrontation’, but how the confrontation is carried 
out. In other words, whether by ‘confrontation’ we mean a show of force that was 
unambiguous, or one that left room for doubt in Hitler’s mind.  
The concept of ‘confronting’ Hitler is therefore one that can be understood in a 
variety of ways, even just within the context of just this example. It is a Nomadic concept 
because it can mean many things. It can mean a confrontation of the kind Chamberlain 
gave in 1939, which might have made very little difference to Hitler’s actions. De Mesquita 
highlights the importance of readiness for war in Hitler’s calculations. This suggests that 
‘confrontation’ may mean not just diplomacy, but more rapid rearmament. It is also 
plausible to think that if it had been Eden or Cooper in the cabinet the confrontation 
might have occurred in a different way than had it been Churchill. This is important 
because these differences lead to differences in the counterfactual scenarios that we 
believe possible. In turn, these different scenarios suggest that the counterfactual is true, 
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or false. Nomadic concepts also appear in the possible counterfactual scenarios that 
Khong proposes. Specifically, they refer to a ‘war’, and that Hitler would have ‘backed 
down’. There are, once again, a number of things that these concepts can mean, within 
the constraints of this example.  
The remainder of this chapter outlines the problems Nomadic concepts pose for 
counterfactual analysis in the social sciences in more detail. Unlike in Khong’s example, 
social scientists often want to know what the truth value of a counterfactual is. I will argue 
that, often, attempting to determine the truth value of counterfactuals leads to multiple, 
contradictory conclusions, which means that it is impossible to assign truth values to many 
counterfactuals in the social sciences. These multiple, contradictory, conclusions are, I 
will argue, enabled by the Nomadic nature of many social science concepts. This is a 
problem, insofar as social scientists seek to apply Woodward’s account of causation to 
analyse causal claims in the social sciences. In order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to 
first review the philosophical background to counterfactual analysis and how it has been 
applied to the social sciences.  
 
Outline of the remainder of the chapter 
I begin by introducing Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuals and two frequently 
discussed problems that counterfactual analysis faces—judging closeness, or similarity of 
possible worlds, and backtracking4. I argue that backtracking is not a problem for 
counterfactual analysis in the social sciences per se but that the Nomadic nature of many 
social concepts enables us to fill in backtracking scenarios in a variety of different ways. 
Following Reiss (2009), I argue that differences in how we decide to backtrack make 
assessing the truth value of a counterfactual difficult. However, extending this analysis, I 
argue that this flexibility is problematic even in cases where we do not need to backtrack 
because the same flexibility exists in assessing the consequences of a counterfactual 
change. I apply this to Woodward’s (2003) social science examples and argue that they do 
                                                          
4 Backtracking describes the changes we need to make prior to a counterfactual change 
to enable that counterfactual change to happen. For example, when considering the 
counterfactual that I drank orange juice rather than whiskey with breakfast, I need to 
imagine going back in time and changing the historical record prior to breakfast, such as 




not all work in the way he believes they do. Finally, I present a disagreement between two 
historians about a counterfactual to illustrate the significance of the Nomadic nature of 
concepts for real debates in the social sciences.  
 
The standard interpretation of counterfactuals. 
Most contemporary discussions of counterfactual theories of causation begin with 
Lewis, who observes that we think causation has something to do with making a 
difference. This difference is best thought of as what would have happened if a particular 
cause had not operated. For example, a rock hitting a window caused it to break. We relate 
the rock hitting the window with the window breaking as cause and effect, and we do so, 
at least partly, because we believe that had the rock not hit the window the window would 
not have broken. A rock hitting the window makes a difference to a world in which no 
rock hit the window. (Lewis, 1973, pg. 557). Lewis aims to show how this type of analysis 
works to distinguish causes and effects. At the outset, he limits his analysis to causation 
among events, such as “flashes, battles, conversations, impacts, strolls, deaths” (1973, pg. 
558) etc. These are exactly the types of things that social scientists are often interested in. 
 
Lewis’s two analyses of counterfactuals 
Lewis (1979) provides two analyses of counterfactuals. Most of the discussion of 
Lewis focusses on his second analysis, which is the more general treatment. However, I 
think it is worth reviewing his first analysis because he believes that it works for a large 
number of cases. Specifically, these types of cases are very like the types of cases that 
historians, and many other social scientists, consider.  
 
Analysis 1 
“These types of counterfactuals take the form ‘if it were that A, then it would be 
that C’, where A is entirely about affairs in a stretch of time tₐ. Consider all those possible 
worlds w such that: 
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1 A is true at w. 
2 w is exactly like our actual world at all times before a transition period beginning 
shortly before tₐ.  
3 w conforms to the actual laws of nature at all times after tₐ 
4 during tₐ and the preceding transition period, w differs no more from our actual 
world than it must to permit A to hold. 
The counterfactual is true iff C holds at every such world w.” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 
462)  
In Analysis 1 we take the actual past up until just before we want to consider a 
counterfactual occurrence and make a few changes in this transition period to enable the 
counterfactual to occur. In doing this we avoid “gratuitous difference from the actual 
present” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 463). Then we make the counterfactual change and let the 
situation evolve according to the actual laws of nature. Lewis also notes that there may be 
a “variety of ways” in which the transition period can be filled out, so there may be no 
true counterfactuals that “say in any detail how the immediate past would be if the present 
were different” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 463). Analysis 1 fits a wide range of cases, but it does 
require details of a particular time.  
 
Analysis 2  
Analysis 2 is preferable because of its greater generality, but “…needs to agree 
with Analysis 1 over the wide range of cases for which Analysis 1 succeeds” (Lewis, 1979, 
pg. 464). The explicit references to particular time periods in Analysis 1 mean it can’t be 
generalised to consider counterfactuals like ‘had more countries been democracies in the 
twentieth century then there would have been fewer wars during that time’. This is a 
counterfactual that has been much discussed in political science. In this case there is no 
clear candidate for tₐ. We might try to make tₐ the whole of the twentieth century, however 
this poses problems for us in specifying the transition period. This is because creating a 
possible world in which more countries had been democracies requires multiple transition 
periods. We could try to reduce it to type 1 counterfactuals by saying ‘had country x been 
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a democracy at t there would have been fewer wars, and had country y been a democracy 
at t there would have been fewer wars, and had country z been a democracy…’. However, 
it isn’t clear that this makes it any easier to assess because there are still multiple 
interventions and multiple transition periods. Furthermore, the countries involved affect 
each other so it isn’t possible to assess each counterfactual in isolation. Had country x 
been a democracy at t, then this might affect the plausibility of country y being a 
democracy, as well as the likelihood of conflict between them, and other countries. In 
whatever way we choose to assess this counterfactual, it is problematic using Analysis 1. 
Analysis 2 makes this easier to assess because it replaces the ‘transition period’, with a 
miracle that changes the world in the ways we need without considering how this miracle 
came about. 
Analysis 2 is based on comparative similarity of possible worlds. “A counterfactual 
‘if it were that A, then it would be that C’ is (non-vacuously) true if and only if some 
(accessible) world where both A and C are true is more similar to our actual world, overall, 
than is any world where A is true but C is false” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 465). 
A can be any supposition we want. Taking the example above, we get ‘If it were 
that more countries were democracies in the twentieth century, then it would be that there 
would be fewer wars’. There is no transition period and we just ‘assume’ more 
democracies, or, in other words assume some miracle has taken place that turns a number 
of non-democracies into democracies. This gets us around the problem of specifying tₐ 
for a general counterfactual claim. This counterfactual is true only if all the possible worlds 
in which there are more democracies and fewer wars is more similar to our actual world 
than any world in which there are more democracies and not fewer wars.  
‘Accessibility’ imposes two restrictions; nomological and historical. 
Nomologically accessible worlds are those which are subject to the same laws as our 
world. Historically accessible worlds are those which share the same history with our 
world up until a particular point in time. So, a “nomologically or historically accessible 
world is similar to our world in the laws it obeys, or in its history up to some time” (Lewis, 
2009, pg. 8). This is important because it restricts the number of worlds that are 
considered ‘possible’. In the assessment of these possible worlds the question of 
‘similarity’ arises. Lewis notes that the idea of overall similarity is vague and that this can 
be understood in different ways in different contexts. Therefore, this is just a skeleton 
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analysis until it is supplemented with the appropriate notion of similarity in a particular 
context. I will discuss problems with judging similarity later in this chapter. 
 
Historical counterfactuals and Analysis 1. 
Analysis 1 only applies when we are dealing with particular time periods, but this 
is often the case with the counterfactuals that historians analyse. In addition, historians 
largely follow the same outline as Lewis’s Analysis 1, but do not cite him as a source for 
their methodology. What, therefore, are the requirements for the successful analysis of a 
counterfactual using Analysis 1? Lewis says that “Analysis 1 is built for a special case. We 
need a supposition about a particular time, and we need a counterfactual taken under the 
standard resolution of vagueness.” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 464). Lewis describes counterfactuals 
as “infected with vagueness, as everyone agrees” (1979, pg. 457) and believes that different 
ways of resolving the vagueness are appropriate in different contexts. Lewis’s standard 
resolution of vagueness is based on the observation that we normally want to preserve 
the intuition that counterfactual dependence is asymmetric; that counterfactual changes 
affect the future but not the past. If true, then this suggests that backtracking is not 
permitted because when we backtrack, changes are made to the past because of a 
counterfactual change in the present. Analysis 1 preserves this asymmetry of causation 
because changes to the past are restricted to the transition period. Lewis says, “Analysis 1 
guarantees the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, with an exception for the 
immediate past […] We have the counterfactuals whereby the affairs of later rimes depend 
on those of earlier times” (1979, pg. 463). He describes Analysis 1 as an “Asymmetry-by-
fiat strategy” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 464).  
How we treat this transition period is critical for historians, and they impose strict 
conditions about what can happen in the transition period. Tetlock & Belkin (1996) give 
examples of counterfactuals that have been considered in historical and political debates.  
CF 1: ‘If Yeltsin had followed Sachsian fiscal and monetary advice in 
early 1992, Russian inflation in 1993 would have been a small fraction 
of what it was.’  
78 
 
CF 2: ‘If the US had not dropped two atomic bombs on two Japanese 
cities in August 1945, the Japanese would still have surrendered roughly 
when they did.’  
CF 3: ‘If all the states in the twentieth century had been democracies, 
there would have been fewer wars.’ (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996, pg. 4) 
The first two of these clearly refer to counterfactual occurrences at specific 
times—early 1992 and August 1945. We can therefore use Analysis 1 in these cases. 
However, we need Analysis 2 to assess his third example. Tetlock and Belkin call 
counterfactuals taking the form of his third example ‘nomothetic’ [i.e. law-giving] because 
they apply to well-defined theoretical or empirical generalisations, such as between 
democracy and war. However, the majority of the historical counterfactuals that are 
discussed in the literature are not general because they refer to specific hypothetical 
changes at specified times. I will therefore spend the rest of the chapter discussing the 
first kind of historical counterfactuals. 
Tetlock and Belkin list six criteria that they believe encourage more rigorous 
thinking about counterfactuals. These are:  
1 Clarity: the hypothesised antecedent and consequent must be clearly 
specified and unambiguous.  
2 Logical Consistency: hypothetical events linking the antecedent and 
the consequent should be specified, and be consistent with each other 
and with the antecedent.  
3 Minimal Rewrite Rule: antecedents should require altering as few ‘well-
established’ or agreed upon historical facts as possible.  
4 Theoretical consistency: connecting principles should be consistent 
with ‘well-established’ theoretical generalisations that are relevant to 
the hypothesised antecedent-consequent link.  
5 Statistical Consistency: connecting principles should be consistent with 
‘well-established’ statistical generalisations relevant to the antecedent-
consequent link.  
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6 Projectability: testable implications of the connecting principles should 
be used to test whether the hypotheses are consistent with additional 
real-world observations. (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996, pg. 18).   
The main criterion of interest here is the ‘minimal re-write rule’ because it 
addresses how historians should think about the transition period. It stipulates that 
antecedent conditions should alter as few ‘well established’ facts as possible. Setting aside 
Tetlock and Belkin’s implied worry about what ‘well established’ facts are, there is 
ambiguity in how we are to understand the minimal re-write. Given a choice, are we better 
off changing one big fact, or lots of small ones? Which of these options is ‘minimal’? 
Furthermore, how do we count the ‘size’ of a historical fact? For example, do we look at 
the consequences of a fact, or do we just focus on the point in time when a change is 
made? Historians are likely to disagree in the same way that philosophers are likely to 
disagree about similarity judgements. However, the distinction becomes clearer if we 
contrast a ‘lesser re-write’ with a ‘greater re-write’, as follows: 
Consider the application of Tetlock & Belkin’s methodology to counterfactual CF 
2: ‘Had the US not dropped two atomic bombs on two Japanese cities in August 1945, 
the Japanese would still have surrendered at roughly the same time’. We will hold actual 
history constant until just before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. The way 
this counterfactual is phrased glosses over the fact that it is referring to two distinct events: 
There were two flights to Japan, which happened on different days. We have two options 
here: Either to treat them as one event, or to see them as two, closely related, events. I 
prefer the second approach because the absence of the first flight would, probably, have 
affected the likelihood of the second flight occurring. However, this complication does 
not really affect the analysis here, so I will refer to the counterfactual change regarding 
the ‘first flight’ and leave the second flight as part of the hypothetical, counterfactual, 
scenario. Depending on how we see the counterfactual playing out this flight may, or may 
not, happen. 
There are various ways in which we can set up this counterfactual. Perhaps we 
consider the counterfactual situation in which a decision was made to cancel the first flight 
to Japan at the last moment. Or perhaps we consider the counterfactual situation in which 
the plane carrying the bomb did fly to Japan, but was called back at the last minute. Either 
way, we make as few changes to the historical record as possible (lesser re-writes). This is 
in contrast to the case where we consider a counterfactual in which there was a war 
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between the US and Japan, but in world in which planes had not been invented (a greater 
re-write). This would require considerably more re-writing and should, according to 
Tetlock and Belkin, be avoided. They note that possible worlds should begin with the real 
world, as it was, before asserting a counterfactual turn of events.   
They suggest not re-winding long stretches of history, because if the antecedent 
and the consequent are separated by large stretches of time, or a host of alternations to 
the historical record, it is difficult to see how they can be linked as cause and effect. For 
example, we could make changes to Japanese foreign policy going back to, say the 1890’s, 
and then try to assess whether, in this counterfactual world, the US and Japan would have 
gone to war. However, in this case, the link between the purported cause- Japanese foreign 
policy, and the consequent- the Second World War, is convoluted and passes through 
several possible ‘branchings’, or events that could have been affected in a variety of ways 
by the earlier changes to the historical record. In such cases it is difficult to make a clear 
causal link between the first change in foreign policy and the final outcome of war. 
Additionally, there are many things we can take ‘Japanese foreign policy’ to mean so, using 
the analysis of Nomadic concepts presented in Chapter 2, we could go further and say 
that to suggest the ‘Japanese foreign policy caused the Second World War’ is not a precise 
claim at all. Tetlock and Belkin’s minimal re-write criterion is therefore best seen as a 
stipulation of what not to do, rather than a way of discovering the scenario with the fewest 
re-writes amongst a selection of scenarios that do not make use of ‘major re-writes’. This 
suggestion is clearly unsatisfactory as there will be some crossover point between lesser 
and greater re-writes; it is unclear how we can move beyond this. Tetlock and Belkin set 
out criteria for counterfactual analysis, but their stipulation that historians should only 
minimally re-write history in the transition period is difficult to implement in any precise 
way. 
Ferguson (1997) imposes stricter limits on counterfactual analysis that constrain 
what can happen in the transition period even further. He suggests that counterfactuals 
in history should focus on alternative courses of events that were considered by actors at 
the time. He says, “We should consider as plausible or probable only those alternatives which 
we can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries actually considered” (Ferguson, 
1997, pg. 86. Italics in original). Later, he supplements this with the requirement that “we 
can only legitimately consider those hypothetical scenarios which contemporaries not only 
considered but also committed to paper, (or some other form of record)…” (Ferguson, 
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1997, pg. 87). This considerably restricts the possible worlds that are considered accessible 
because it essentially just involves considering a decision or course of action that someone 
could have executed in a number of ways. Assuming that the people in question have an 
accurate view of their circumstances, these are the alternative scenarios are seen as 
possible, given their, current, state of affairs. Ferguson’s justification for this is two-fold. 
Firstly, historians need to construct “plausible alternative pasts”, for him, and alternative 
past is only ‘plausible’ where it is based on “historical evidence” (Ferguson, 1997, pg. 87). 
In the main, historical evidence is written record. Secondly, he believes that historians 
should give greater weight to outcomes that contemporaries considered possible than to 
those present-day historians think possible. His constraints are an attempt to limit 
counterfactual analysis by using evidence and giving weight to the expectations of 
historical figures. I will discuss one of these types of counterfactuals later in this chapter. 
So, at least some of the counterfactuals considered in history are of the type that 
is successfully analysed using Analysis 1. The ‘transition period’ in Lewis’s analysis is the 
period historians alter in the light of their ‘minimal re-write rule’. In other words, it is the 
timeframe in which changes need to be made to the historical record to make the 
counterfactual possible. Historians are at pains to make as few changes as possible during 
the ‘rewrite’. How well does Analysis 1 do the job? 
Let us pick up the US-Japan counterfactual again. Stating it in exactly the same 
way as Lewis does (“If it were that A, then it would be that C” where A is entirely about 
affairs in a stretch of time tₐ) we get: 
‘If it were that the US had not dropped two atomic bombs on two Japanese cities 
in August 1945 then it would be that the Japanese would still have surrendered at roughly 
the same time.’ The time period in this case is entirely about a few months in 1945.  
 
1. A is true at w. 
Suppose that w is a world such that ‘The US did not drop atomic bombs 
on two Japanese cities’ is true at w. 
2. w is exactly like our actual world at all times before a transition period 
beginning shortly before tₐ.  
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This condition holds if we postulate that the first plane was recalled at the 
last minute. 
3. w conforms to the actual laws of nature at all times after tₐ 
There is no reason to suppose that this would not hold. If we speculate 
that the first plane was recalled, so no bomb was dropped. Consequently, 
the second plane also does not fly so it also does not drop a bomb. The 
alternative future of the US and Japan obey the laws of nature. 
4. during tₐ and the preceding transition period, w differs no more from our 
actual world than it must to permit A to hold. 
Under the filling out of the scenario above this condition holds. We have 
rewritten as little as possible to enable the counterfactual to happen.  
5. The counterfactual is true iff C holds at every such world w.  
We may decide the counterfactual is true, or not, depending on how we 
judge the consequences of the antecedent of the counterfactual. The 
precise difficulties in doing this will be the subject of the second half of 
this chapter. For now, let me just note that, at first sight, this outline 
suggests that Analysis 1 is a good fit for the way in which historians think 
about some counterfactuals.  
 
However, we have glossed over what Lewis calls the ‘immediate past’. He says 
that the immediate past does not depend on the present in any ‘definite way’. Lewis 
advocates leaving what happens in the transition period vague5. He says,  
“There may be a variety of ways the transition period might go, hence 
there may be no true counterfactuals that say in any detail how the 
immediate past would be if the present were different. I hope not, since 
if there were a definite and detailed dependence, it would be hard for me 
                                                          
5 Lewis is not using the word ‘vague’ in the sense that it is used in the philosophy of language but, as 
Crasnow does, to indicate a lack of clarity, or uncertainty about what happens in the transition 
period. Where the word vague is used in this chapter it is used in the same way as Lewis does. 
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to say why some of this dependence should not be interpreted- wrongly, 
of course- as backward causation over short intervals of time…” (Lewis, 
1979, pg. 463) 
In other words, the transition period may be fleshed out in a variety of ways. What Lewis 
seems to be saying here is just that, if we leave it unclear what happens in the transition 
period, with no specifics on how the transition period is filled out, then we avoid pointing 
to anything of which it could be said that it is being caused by our counterfactual change. 
This seems odd, for the very basic reason that although we may leave the transition period 
unclear, this does not mean that we don’t have various alternative events in mind. Was 
the flight carrying the first bomb to Japan prevented from leaving US airspace due to 
technical failure, or was it cancelled, or was the plane recalled over the Pacific? If we opt 
not to choose, then, although the transition period is unclear, it still contains events which, 
potentially, could be seen as instances of backward causation. This is because we specify 
the counterfactual change at t, and then make changes because of this change at t-1, to 
enable the change at t. The remedy doesn’t work because ignorance of what is happening 
in a transition period does not mean that we are not assuming, implicitly, that something 
specific did in fact happen. Furthermore, if we do not choose, we can’t determine future 
consequences exactly. For example, if Truman changed his mind at the last minute and 
ordered the bomb not to be dropped, then the Japanese might have thought that Truman 
was losing his nerve and attempted to press on with the war more fiercely than before. 
Whereas, if the flight was cancelled due to bad weather, that isn’t possible. When we turn 
to the critique advanced by Reiss, below, we will see that different ways of filling in the 
transition period do, in fact, make a difference to how we assess the truth value of a 
counterfactual. 
Lewis’s Analysis 1 fits many of the counterfactuals that historians consider, 
however, there are two clear problems illustrated by the discussion above. The first is 
judging closeness, or similarity, and the second is transition periods. The following section 






Judging closeness of worlds 
One clear question that arises even just with the definition of Analysis 2 is the 
difficulty in judging degrees of similarity between possible worlds, and between possible 
worlds and the actual world. This implies that we are able to compare possible worlds to 
our own and judge how much possible worlds differ from the actual world. Comparing 
worlds and judging their similarity to one another is an explicit component of Analysis 2, 
but is also a necessary, if implicit, component of Analysis 1. Point 4 above states that the 
transition period “differs no more from our actual world than it must to permit A to 
hold”. We are asked to avoid making gratuitous changes to the actual world. In other 
words, the changes we make should keep the counterfactual world as close as to the actual 
world as possible.  
How do we judge which changes during the transition period are closest to our 
actual world? We can think of cases where this is obvious. It is obvious when 
reconsidering the window example outlined on page 70 above. The counterfactual in this 
case is ‘If a rock had been thrown, then the window would have broken’. Who do we 
think would have thrown the rock? A possible world in which I throw a rock at a particular 
window is closer to the actual world than a possible world in which a dinosaur throws a 
rock at a particular window. This is because we have to think of things being only slightly 
different to enable me to throw a rock at a window whereas we have to think of many 
things being different to enable a dinosaur to throw a rock at a window.  
But this assumes that the number of changes we need to make determines 
similarity between worlds. If I throw a rock it seems that we just need to make me do 
something, while if a dinosaur is to throw the rock we need to make a number of changes 
to the history of life on Earth. This sounds intuitively true, but it depends entirely on how 
we describe the situation. At first sight we do only need to make one change to enable me 
to do the throwing—I just need to throw the rock. But I don’t throw rocks. I have never 
thrown rocks and I struggle to think of anything that would make me actually throw a 
rock at a window. The seemingly small deviation from actuality turns out to be a very 
large change indeed. Perhaps we need to change aspects of my character. Perhaps we need 
to postulate some extreme event that would make me throw a rock. Civil unrest? A threat 
to my life? Sometimes, purportedly small deviations from the actual world may actually 
involve surprisingly large deviations. That said, we might still be confident that however 
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many changes we need to make to my character, the possible world in which I throw a 
rock is closer to the actual world than one in which a dinosaur throws a rock, but I have 
suggested that such judgements depend partly on our description of a scenario. If we 
describe the scenario in terms of a person (me) who is capable of throwing rocks it appears 
that only a small change is required. On the other hand, if we describe the scenario 
including aspects of my character then many more changes will need to be made. The 
number of changes we need to make is not obvious. Furthermore, historians, and social 
scientists in general, are not often asked to assess scenarios involving as obvious a contrast 
as between a human and a dinosaur. A more realistic comparison is between me, or Person 
X, throwing a rock at a window. The discussion above is intended to illustrate that 
determining which scenario involves the fewest, or smallest, changes is difficult and may 
very well depend on our description. Person X might be a criminal, and therefore, at first 
sight, fewer changes will be needed to the actual world to enable Person X to throw the 
rock than would be required to enable me to do so. However, what if Person X, despite 
their violent criminality, hates breaking glass?  
Lewis’s use of miracles in Analysis 2 avoids this problem, because we simply 
assume that a counterfactual event happened, without describing a state of affairs that 
makes this reasonable. However, in the cases historians consider, the use of miracles isn’t 
a viable strategy. The reasons for this will be discussed in more detail below. Lewis is 
aware of the difficulty in judging similarity but takes the idea of “comparative over-all 
similarity among possible worlds” as primitive (1973, pg. 559). He means by this that we 
are familiar with these sorts of relations of all over similarity between two possible worlds 
and the actual world. We make these sorts of judgements, according to Lewis, all of the 
time, such as in judging similarity between people (Lewis, 1973, pg. 559). Again, this is 
intuitive and obvious, when considering the breaking window example. We say that a 
world in which the window partially breaks (perhaps it cracks but the glass stays in place) 
is closer to the real world, in which the window is left alone, than a possible world in 
which the window breaks completely. However, how we extend this to slightly more 
complex situations is unclear. In the window case the counterfactual change relates just 
to the extent of a crack in a window pane. The larger the crack the further away from the 
actual world the possible world is. This is a measurable change. Judging similarity between 
people is not, obviously, measurable and involves comparisons between a large number 
of variables, which is considerably more difficult.  
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To illustrate this, take Lewis’s example of judging similarity between people—am 
I more similar to my brother than my sister? My hair and eye colour are the same as my 
brother’s but not my sister’s, some aspects of my character are more similar to one of 
them, some with the other. With whom do I share more experiences? When many features 
(eye colour, character, hair colour) are involved and where differences in these features 
are not easily measured, judging similarity poses two problems. Firstly, which features are 
the salient ones and secondly, once we have decided which are salient, how do we weight 
them? Lewis is well aware of the ‘vagueness’ in the idea of similarity and says this will “not 
be entirely resolved. Nor should it be” (1973, pg. 560).  
Lewis is right that we often do make similarity judgements between people. The 
fact that we can make any old similarity judgement doesn’t help though. Lewis agrees, 
saying, “Do not assume that just any respect of similarity you can think of must enter into 
the balance of overall similarity with positive weight” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 465). His advice 
is that we should find the right sort of similarity judgement that combines with Analysis 
2 to yield the proper truth condition of a particular counterfactual. But how do we decide 
which is the right similarity judgement? What if there is disagreement? I may decide that 
I am more similar to my sister, but my mother may judge that I am more similar to my 
brother. Which similarity judgement is right? It doesn’t matter if we are just discussing 
similarity of people, but when we are trying to judge which transition period is closest to 
the actual world, or which possible world is closest to our own, we need our similarity 
judgement to be right. Even if we agree what the right metrics are for judging similarity, 
we may disagree about the aggregation of these. Indeed, Lewis explicitly rejects the 
possibility of quantifying similarity. This is because, in doing so, we are likely to assume 
that the degree of similarity of A to B is the same as the same as the degree of similarity 
of B to A. This would be unjustified if, in each world A and B, different things count 
more for the purposes of making similarity judgements. The example Lewis gives is 
colour, which may weight moderately highly in our world, but may weight very highly in 
another world (1973, pg. 50-52). In summary, Lewis provides little way of deciding 
between similarity judgements. 
He does delve into the similarity problem by considering a historical example 
raised by his critics. ‘If Nixon had pressed the button there would have been a nuclear 
holocaust’. We have a strong intuition that this counterfactual is right, and therefore want 
an account of counterfactuals to yield this conclusion. The problem with this 
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counterfactual is that given any world in which the antecedent and consequent are both 
true it will be easy to imagine a closer world in which the antecedent is true and the 
consequent false. Lewis notes that there may be all sorts of worlds where Nixon presses 
the button. We must consider which of these differs least, under the appropriate similarity 
relation, from our world. He says that a tiny miracle (he describes this as a violation of 
the laws of nature) takes place that makes Nixon press the button. 
The worlds following the pressing of the button by the insertion of a small miracle 
in the timeline should turn out to be more similar to our world, under the right similarity 
relation for this case, than any of the other worlds in which Nixon pressed the button. In 
other words, they should be more similar than other possible worlds which have a large 
amount of backtracking prior to the pressing of the button by the counterpart Nixon. 
Lewis says that “a lot of perfect match of particular fact is worth a little miracle” (Lewis, 
1979, pg. 469). Similarly, worlds in which the counterpart Nixon pressed the button but 
which did not end up in holocaust also need to be less similar to the actual world than the 
world in which the counterpart Nixon presses the button and holocaust results. Initially, 
these worlds might appear to be very similar to the actual world; Nixon has pressed the 
button but nothing happens, perhaps because the button has faulty wiring. But Lewis 
thinks that this similarity could not last because some of the tiny differences, such as 
Nixon having had the intention to begin nuclear war, would lead to big differences as 
time goes by. Lewis says that many things would be different if Nixon pressed the button, 
but the wiring was faulty. Nixon’s finger print would be on the button, Nixon would be 
agitated, the pressing of the button might be recorded, and Nixon might write his 
memoirs differently, at a later point. Lewis concludes that “I should think that the close 
similarity […] could not last” (1979, pg. 470).  
There is a further possibility—that the counterpart Nixon presses the button but 
that a second miracle restores the world to the same state as the actual world. All the 
traces of the button pressing are removed through this miracle. This possible world also 
needs to turn out not to be more similar to the world in which Nixon presses the button 
and causes a holocaust. In summary, under the similarity relation we are after, the possible 
world in which there is a small miracle, Nixon presses the button and nuclear holocaust 
follows, must be closer than any of the other possible worlds. This includes those in which 
there is no holocaust, and those where other miracles occur.  
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This illustrates how determining the right judgement of similarity is critical. It also 
illustrates that the similarity judgement should be made with the aim of vindicating the 
conclusion we seek. Lewis says we are seeking “a similarity relation that combines with 
Analysis 2 to give the correct truth conditions for counterfactuals…” (1979, pg. 472). In 
other words, the truth conditional of the counterfactual that we seek, drives what we 
consider to be the appropriate similarity judgements. However, what if the purpose of the 
analysis is to determine the truth value of a counterfactual? Lewis compares the possible 
world in which Nixon presses the button and nuclear holocaust results, and the possible 
world in which he presses the button and no holocaust results, with the real world, and 
judges that the first is closest to the real world. His justification for this is that tiny 
differences, such as Nixon’s intention to start war, would lead to large differences in the 
future. But how do we know this, really? It depends largely on our ability to think about 
differences in the possible paths of history stretching well into the future. But can we not 
also think about a world in which Nixon presses the button, a nuclear bomb does go off, 
but a few years down the line we think this world is actually pretty close to the actual 
world in 2016. Perhaps the bomb lands in a relatively uninhabited place so the effects of 
the nuclear explosion are limited, perhaps the bomb only partially exploded, perhaps we 
suppose that no other country would have retaliated. We can think about either possible 
world in a variety of ways and just like judging closeness or similarity between people, it 
isn’t clear which features are relevant, or how we are to weight them. Further, different 
people may do this differently, and without a pre-existing commitment to a particular 
truth value of the counterfactual there is little way to choose between them. 
In conclusion, judging similarity between possible worlds is difficult, especially 
when we have no pre-existing commitment to a particular truth value of a counterfactual. 
Difficulties with judging similarity complicate Analysis 1 because it is difficult to judge 
how different to the actual world alternative transition periods are. Tetlock and Belkin 
suggest re-writing the transition period ‘minimally’, but while it is unclear how we are to 
judge similarity between alternative transition periods and the real world it is unclear how 
‘minimal’ various alternative transition periods are. Furthermore, in the cases that 
historians often consider, Analysis 2 is not a good model because they do need to consider 






Backtracking also poses a problem for counterfactual analysis. Lewis notes that 
the way the future is depends counterfactually on the way the present is. If I make changes 
in the present, I can affect the way the future turns out. However, if I make changes in 
the present I won’t usually affect the past. Counterfactual dependence therefore usually 
works in one direction, but not the other. Lewis then describes a case where we do think 
that if the present were different the past would have to have been different to enable the 
present to be as it is. This is a backtracking argument, and in such cases we do think that 
if the present were different the past would be different too.  
His example is from Peter Downing: 
“Jim and Jack quarrelled yesterday, and Jack is still hopping mad. We 
conclude that if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would not help him. 
But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He never would ask for help after such a 
quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack for help today, there would have to have 
been no quarrel yesterday. In that case Jack would be his usual generous 
self. So if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would help him after all” 
(Lewis, 1979, pg. 456) 
In other words: If Jim had asked Jack for help today, there would have had to have 
been no quarrel. Backtracking counterfactuals are characterised by a particular way 
of speaking. They are usually characterised by phrases of the form “If it were 
that… then it would have to be that…” (Lewis, 1979, pg. 458). As in ‘if Jim had 
asked Jack for help today it would have to be that there had been no quarrel’. They 
arise because we think that in order to make the antecedent of the counterfactual 
possible, changes need to be made to the past to enable the change to be made. 
We saw this above with the US Japan example. If the US is not to drop nuclear 
bombs on Japan, then we need to make changes to the historical record to bring 
this about, even if these changes are sometimes very small. Backtracking 
counterfactuals of this sort are common in historical analysis.  
Why do we need to do this? Why don’t historians just assume some sort of miracle 
that stops the bombs being dropped? Because it isn’t clear how we can assess the truth of 
a counterfactual without this backtracking. Suppose that our counterfactual is ‘Had 
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Margaret Thatcher not been Prime Minister of the UK then the unions would be a much 
stronger political force today’. We can take Margaret Thatcher out of the situation, 
perhaps we assume she was never born, but what now? Can we think about the UK in a 
political context without a Prime Minister? We need to put someone else in her place. 
Can we assess the strength of the unions without any idea of who might have been in 
charge during the 1980s? In order to assess the truth of this counterfactual we need, at 
the very least, some sort of coherent picture of the UK political situation and this is not 
what is left just by miraculously subtracting Margaret Thatcher from it. So, we need to 
backtrack to fill in the alternative scenario before we can assess the truth of the 
counterfactual. Despite the seeming necessity for these types of counterfactuals Lewis 
says that he has analysed them “only so that I can ask you to ignore [them]” (1979, pg. 
458). As I will argue below, ignoring them is difficult in many social science situations. 
The real worry with backtracking is that how we fill out the transition period affects how 
we assess the consequent. Reiss (2009) is one of a number of authors who have pointed 
this out. When backtracking is needed, and it often is, then how we fill out the transition 
period affects the assessment of the consequent. 
Reiss begins by noting that historians’ analysis of counterfactuals bears some, 
superficial, resemblance to Lewis’s scheme. However, he says that in Lewis’s analysis an 
antecedent is implemented by a miracle “a minimal incision that breaks all causal laws that 
have the antecedent event as effect and brings about the event without itself having causal 
antecedents” (Reiss, 2009, pg. 718). This, as we have seen above, is only the case if we are 
using Analysis 2. He further notes that historians are concerned with the reasonableness 
of antecedent conditions including the rewrites that need to be made to enable the 
counterfactual change. In other words, the changes historians make when they backtrack 
should be ‘reasonable’. We will see below some suggestions historians have for 
understanding ‘reasonableness’. 
He says that almost all the historical counterfactuals he has analysed do backtrack. 
He discusses a counterfactual relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In July 1962, Krushchev 
and Castro agreed to construct missile bases in Cuba, precipitating a crisis that brought 
the world to the brink of nuclear war. Krushchev was emboldened to pursue this strategy 
partly by Kennedy’s lack of resolve during the US Bay of Pigs invasion and the Berlin 
Crisis, both in 1961. An interesting counterfactual to consider is: Had Kennedy shown 
greater resolve prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Krushchev would not have sent missiles 
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to Cuba. Citing Lebow & Stein, he says it does not make sense to just consider an 
alternative world in which Kennedy issued a warning, thereby showing resolve, prior to 
the missile build-up in Cuba because we need to consider “what conditions in the 
antecedent’s past would have had to be in place in order for the counterfactual antecedent 
to appear possible or likely” (Reiss, 2009, pg. 717). In other words, we need to consider 
what conditions would need to have been present in order for Kennedy to have been 
‘more resolved’.  
Backtracking is a problem for counterfactual analysis because once we do it there 
is considerable flexibility in how we change the past to enable the difference in Kennedy’s 
attitude. Lewis accepts that there are a variety of ways in which the transition period can 
be filled out. But, as Reiss notes, differences in the way we think about this counterfactual 
scenario make the consequent either true or false. Lewis suggests that the transition period 
can be vague, but we have seen why it is difficult to assess historical counterfactuals 
without making the transition period specific. Reiss suggests that how, exactly, we decide 
to do this can make the counterfactual either true or false.  
For example, if Kennedy issued a warning because he received advanced 
information of Soviet plans we might conclude that Krushchev would not have altered 
his plans because he saw this as a one-off, given Kennedy’s lack of resolve in 1961. 
Alternatively, if we fill in more detail about how knowledge of the plans was obtained we 
might conclude that the realisation that the US had that level of access to Soviet plans 
would have led Krushchev to change his strategy. In other words, changes in the way we 
set up the counterfactual situation lead to changes in the conclusions we draw from the 
counterfactual analysis. Reiss notes that Lebow & Stein see this as a reason to reject the 
viability of this counterfactual.  
The same argument goes for our Japanese example. If our counterfactual scenario 
is that the US did not drop the first atomic bomb on Japan because of a technical failure 
with the flight, or the bomb, then we may conclude that Japan would still have 
surrendered at the same time because, we might think, they thought that if they didn’t 
surrender they would be bombed. The mere threat of atomic bombs, in this scenario, is 
sufficient to cause the Japanese surrender. If our counterfactual is instead that the US 
government changed its mind and cancelled the flight, we might conclude that the 
Japanese surrender would have occurred much later, if at all. Our reasoning in this case is 
that the Japanese were given no reason to surrender, and may even have seen the 
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cancelling of the flight as a sign of US weakness. As with Reiss’ example, the specifics of 
how we fill in the transition period affect the conclusions we draw from the 
counterfactual. 
The backtracking problem is therefore not that historical counterfactuals 
backtrack per se because we can use Analysis 1, rather than the miracle as required by 
Analysis 2, and ensure that our transition period makes as few modifications to reality as 
possible. In theory, using Analysis 1 we can fill in the counterfactual history using the 
guidelines from Tetlock and Belkin, or Ferguson. The problem with backtracking is that 
this counterfactual history can be filled in in a variety of ways. I argue that Lewis is not 
correct in thinking that we can leave this vague because, depending on how we decide to 
specify this alternative scenario, we may alter the results of the analysis. This would not 
be a problem if we could decide which alternative transition period is closer to the actual 
world, or, which is ‘more likely’ (to use the historians’ terminology) but as the discussion 
above has shown, there seems little way to decide this. 
Woodward (2003) accepts these problems with transition periods and similarity 
judgements and believes that his idea of an ‘intervention’ overcomes these problems. This 
extends Lewis’s analysis in important ways. Dealing firstly with transition periods. 
Woodward agrees that transition periods are problematic, and thinks that they are 
problematic for the reason argued for above. He says, “…once transition periods are 
countenanced at all, there may be a large number of possible transitions, none obviously 
closer to the actual world than any other.” (Woodward, 2003, pg. 144). Secondly, as far 
as similarity judgements are concerned, he begins by noting that the criteria Lewis 
provides for judging similarity are relatively imprecise. He says:  
“Lewis is explicit that his standards for similarity are adopted simply 
because they make those counterfactuals come out true that we think, 
pretheoretically, ought to be true. The standards themselves are complex 
and not particularly intuitive” (2003, pg. 137).  
For example, Lewis suggests that small miracles are preferred to large miracles, but 
Woodward notes that it is unclear how one should count miracles, or what counts as a 
small versus a large miracle.  
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Woodward proposes the idea of an intervention which overcomes these worries. 
His central thesis is that the concept of causation should be understood in terms of our 
ability to change things, or to make a difference. He claims that we can think about the 
differences we make through our manipulations in terms of counterfactuals—we assess 
the effects of our manipulations by considering counterfactuals like ‘Had I not pulled the 
lever, the weight would not have changed position’. If this is true, then we have 
highlighted a cause of the weight’s changing position. A manipulation breaks the causal 
chains leading up to the point at which an intervention is made, which means that there 
is no need for a transition period. We simply pull the lever. It is no longer relevant to ask 
how it came to be possible that we pulled the lever, we simply do so. This sounds almost 
like a miracle, and, in fact, Woodward believes that, in the cases where miracles are 
successfully invoked, these miracles work “like the notion of an intervention” (2003, pg. 
135). The puzzling notion of ‘similarity’ is unnecessary because Woodward asks us to 
consider what would happen if we made a counterfactual change; similarity between 
possible worlds is not a consideration. Woodward applies his analysis to social science 
cases, and in the following section I argue that the use of counterfactual analysis in the 
social sciences is problematic because the problems presented by backtracking apply even 
in cases where we do not need to backtrack. Social scientists often make use of Nomadic 
concepts which enable the construction of multiple, plausible, and often contradictory 
counterfactual scenarios which we have no principled way of deciding between. 
 
Counterfactuals and social science 
Chapter 2 provided a framework for understanding how many concepts used in 
the social sciences are Nomadic. Nomadic concepts allow for a wide variety of social 
phenomena to be included within their scope. If the counterfactuals we consider use 
concepts that allow for the inclusion of a wide range of social phenomena, then there are 
many ways in which we can see the counterfactual playing out. These alternative 
counterfactual scenarios are often equally plausible, but contradictory, therefore making 
it impossible to assign a truth value to these counterfactuals.  
Woodward (2003) explicitly rejects the suggestion that subjectivity is involved in 
assessing the consequences of counterfactual scenarios. Why is this? He says that in 
judging which counterfactuals to consider we need something like an idea of ‘serious 
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possibility’ (Woodward, 2003, pg. 89). For example, we want to reject saying things like 
“the failure of a large meteor to strike me as I write these words will count as a cause of 
me writing them, and so on.” Woodward counters the objection that the phrase ‘serious 
possibility’ is “unclear and subjective” by saying that, although it is true that an 
investigator’s interests and purposes influence which possibilities are taken seriously, at 
least some of the considerations that go into such decisions are based on facts about the 
world and “seem perfectly objective” (2003, pg. 89). He says: 
“Once we fix which possibilities are serious […] there is no further sense 
in which the counterfactuals about the outcomes of the hypothetical 
experiments associated with typical causal claims are in some way 
dependent on human attitudes or beliefs.” (2003, pg. 118)  
In other words, subjectivity may be involved in judging which possibilities are ‘serious’, 
but, nevertheless, many of the judgements about what a ‘serious possibility’ is, are 
objective. Once we have decided which possibilities are ‘serious’, then there is no further 
subjectivity involved in assessing a counterfactual. We can think about the process of 
judging the consequences of a counterfactual change as a hypothetical experiment. He 
then (2003, pg. 119) asks us to consider the hypothetical experiment in which he steps in 
front of a speeding bus and assess whether he will be injured. Whether he will be injured 
does not depend on his beliefs and desires, as it is facts about the world that determine 
what happens to him.  
As far as the social sciences are concerned, the claim that assessing the 
consequences of a counterfactual change is like a hypothetical experiment is largely 
mistaken. This mistake results from a failure to appreciate the differences between the 
concepts used in Woodward’s example and the concepts used in many social science 
examples. In assessing the consequences of ‘stepping in front of a bus’ we are restricted 
to solely considering physical events and attributes. Woodward steps in front of a 
speeding bus. We have access to data from accidents and crash test dummies that enable 
us to identify a range of impact forces, and a range of damage he may suffer, given the 
speed of the bus, his weight, previous medical history, and so on. While we cannot be 
certain what injuries Woodward will suffer—whether he breaks his spine or suffers brain 
damage, we can be reasonably sure about the probabilities of various levels of injury he 
will suffer as a consequence of the collision. 
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By contrast, in the social sciences, we have issues about meanings to disentangle, 
meanings which may be unrelated, with unclear boundaries, and which change over time. 
This allows greater subjectivity in how we construct the counterfactual scenario under 
consideration. In the following, I argue that, for this reason, there are two related 
problems for counterfactual analysis in the social sciences. Firstly, that, despite 
Woodward’s remarks to the contrary, it really is difficult to judge what counts as a ‘serious 
possibility’. Secondly, that even when we fix what a ‘serious possibility’ is in a particular 
context, these ‘serious possibilities’ often involve Nomadic concepts which make difficult 
to judge the consequences of a counterfactual change. Given this, it is hard to see how 
we can find a principled way of choosing between divergent counterfactual scenarios 
identified as “serious possibilities”. There are a variety of ways for people to be ‘less 
ambivalent’, or ‘more resolved’, and many different political set-ups can count as a 
‘democracy’. These ways need not be vastly different, but they can be different enough to 
significantly affect our assessment of a counterfactual. 
 
 What does a counterfactual claim mean? 
I will use an example from King, Keohane and Verba (1994) to illustrate these 
two problems. They consider the effect of being an incumbent vs not being an incumbent 
Democratic candidate for the US House of Representatives, calculated in terms of the 
proportion of votes received. The difference between the votes received by the 
Democratic candidate as incumbent and non-incumbent gives us the proportion of the 
vote that is attributable to ‘incumbency’ status. They discuss re-running a specific election 
in New York in 1998, but I am interested in the more general process underlying their 
use of counterfactual analysis.  
The reason for picking this example is that it appears, on first reading, to be a 
clear and precise counterfactual. We are asked only to consider the effect that switching 
one feature of a candidate (being the incumbent candidate) had on the number of votes 
they received. However, although it is clear that being the ‘incumbent candidate’ just 
means the candidate is the existing holder of the office, the concept of ‘voting for’ the 
incumbent candidate is Nomadic. The following paragraph will show why this is the case, 
and the consequences this has for assessing this counterfactual.  
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The counterfactual under consideration is ‘what proportion of votes would the 
incumbent candidate have received, were they not the incumbent candidate?’. In assessing 
this counterfactual, we are asked to consider the effect on voter’s behaviour of switching 
the candidate’s incumbency status. In other words, would the proportion of voters voting 
for the candidate be different? The language used here is ‘voting for’, but it could just as 
easily be ‘preferring’, or ‘supporting’. The analysis below applies equally well to any of 
these terms because they are all Nomadic concepts. Firstly, there are a number of things 
that ‘voting for’ the incumbent candidate can mean. In Woodward’s language, there are a 
number of ‘serious possibilities’. Taylor suggests that, as previously discussed, in voting 
for a proposal, a person may be saving the honour of their party or defending the value 
of free speech or any number of other things (1971/1994, pg. 190). This applies to the 
present case. Prior to beginning the analysis, we need to be clear that we understand what 
is really going on this situation. Voting for the incumbent candidate could reflect a simple 
preference for a particular candidate who has performed well, wanting to keep an 
alternative candidate out of office, a preference for the status quo, a lack of interest in 
politics, a fear of recrimination, or habit.  
One response is that this is primarily definitional. Clearly, we can say that ‘voting 
for an incumbent’ can mean a variety of things but, once we have decided what the right 
interpretation is, we can move ahead with our analysis. This is Woodward’s view. As 
discussed previously, in the discrimination case Woodward accepts that causal claims in 
the social sciences can mean many things and that therefore it is unclear which the relevant 
counterfactual is. As a brief reminder, the claim that “Being female causes one to be 
discriminated against in hiring and/ or salary” (2003, pg. 115) can mean a number of 
different things. As it stands, Woodward describes the statement as “unclear”. However, 
when claims such as this are unclear we can either try to make the claim clearer, or, simply 
consider a number of interventions.  
In the voting case, we may even be able to settle what we mean empirically by 
surveying the population to establish why they voted for the incumbent candidate, for 
example. This response is reasonable, but suggests that in many situations counterfactual 
analysis, prior to any empirical research that establishes the meaning of an action, is 
unenlightening. In any event, this is only a partial response because empirical evidence 
may not be available, or at least not easily attainable. Differences in how we understand 
what a ‘more resolved’ Kennedy means might lead to differing conclusions regarding the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis but it is unclear how we could clear up what ‘more resolved’ means 
empirically. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 2, specifying a meaning of a Nomadic 
concept in order to make it more precise only works when we do so using other Nomadic 
concepts. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find fault with the suggestion that we simply 
consider all the possibly relevant counterfactuals. Despite this, the following section 
shows that, even when we have fixed what we mean (or which counterfactual we need to 
evaluate a causal claim), or which scenarios are serious possibilities, there are still many 
ways of filling out these counterfactual scenarios.  
 
Filling in counterfactual scenarios 
Continuing with our analysis of the King et al example, suppose that research has 
determined that ‘voting for the incumbent candidate’ really does just mean that voters 
don’t care about elections, or politics in general, and vote for whoever is currently in 
office. The reasoning behind this might be that voters don’t pay that much attention to 
political issues and assume that whoever is in office must be doing an acceptable job. We 
can describe this as a lack of political engagement. The original counterfactual was ‘would 
the proportion of voters voting for the candidate be different?’. But, after empirical 
investigation, social scientists have determined that ‘voting for the incumbent candidate’ 
doesn’t mean that voters are giving the candidate their active and well considered support, 
but that it really means voters just aren’t politically engaged.  
This means that the answer to the question ‘Would the proportion of voters 
voting for the candidate be different if they were not the incumbent candidate?’ Is ‘Yes, 
it would have been very much smaller’. However, given that it is lack of political 
engagement that is driving this voting behaviour, this doesn’t tell us very much. There is 
no sense in which switching the incumbency status differentiates between differing levels 
of support for the candidate. It is simply that whoever is the incumbent gets the vote. 
Further analysis would yield a fuller picture of what is going on. To do this, the relevant 
counterfactual is ‘Would the proportion of voters voting for the candidate be different, if 
voters were more politically engaged?’. We began with a Nomadic concept ‘voting for’, a 
particular candidate, which can mean many things, and, in this instance we have settled 
that it means lack of ‘political engagement’. However, this is also a Nomadic concept. The 
following paragraph illustrates this. 
98 
 
Let us suppose that our hypothetical intervention in the case of voters who aren’t 
politically engaged is requiring them to attend a short course on politics. Following this, 
how we see our voters behaving depends on what we take ‘political engagement’ to mean. 
Do they actively participate in political debates, do they perform thorough research on 
the main candidates, or do they care about some types of issues more than others? 
Entertaining this counterfactual state of the world is, primarily, an exercise in judging how 
a population that cares more about elections, and politics, might behave. Could we find 
out empirically what this population might look like? Empirical research might provide 
us with a range of possible forms of political engagement, but it is also likely to confirm 
the great variety of forms that political engagement can take. So, in this case, it isn’t clear 
that we can be certain what our alternative state of the world looks like. Social scientists 
can include a wide variety of social phenomena in a counterfactual that uses the concept 
‘political engagement’. This allows us to draw different conclusions from the analysis.  
To simplify this, consider the following two alternative states of the world. In the 
first scenario, voters are more engaged with the political process because (following their 
short Introduction to Politics course) they read all the material that candidates post to 
them, they watch the news, they have more nuanced political views and assess their local 
candidates’ suitability on the basis of their positioning on these wider issues. In the second 
scenario, although they are aware of these wider issues, voters care much more about local 
issues, perhaps whether a hospital will be closed, or whether new houses will be built. 
Consequently, they care much less about how their candidate will vote on issues such as 
defence or foreign policy. Both these scenarios are plausible, and are, furthermore, 
plausible fillings-out of the notion of greater political engagement following our imagined 
intervention. In order to assess the implication of these counterfactual situations on votes 
for an incumbent let us suppose that we check his attendance record, voting record, 
history of supporting local issues, and so on, and find that he has a history of fighting 
local issues but often misses key votes on national and international issues. 
In this case he is clearly likely to lose votes under the first understanding of greater 
political engagement, but this is less clear under the second understanding. The way in 
which we construct the counterfactual situation leads us to different conclusions and there 
seems little reason to endorse one conclusion over another, or to see one as more likely 
than another. Furthermore, it is difficult to specify what we need to do to choose between 
the two, given that both are equally plausible. 
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What, though, is the worry with this choice? Recall that, for Woodward, 
counterfactual analysis supports causal claims. If a counterfactual is multiply realised, as 
in the way envisioned above, can we still use it to support causal claims, such as that 
greater political engagement causes a population to vote for an incumbent candidate? Yes, 
we can, but only if each of the realisations points to the same conclusion, and there is no 
reason to think that this will be the case. As we saw above, although we might look for 
help from the idea of closeness or similarity to the real world this isn’t much help because, 
given their equal plausibility, there isn’t anything that can tell us which is further from our 
own world. And insisting that a ‘fully specified’ description of the situation really will 
enable us to judge which is the closest possible world is a reply that only a philosopher 
could love.  
The assumption so far has been that we have two, easily distinguishable 
counterfactual scenarios that we can compare. But this is highly unrealistic. A more 
realistic cashing out is that social scientists would incorporate many ways in which a 
population might be more politically engaged. In this case, assessing the counterfactual 
scenario will involve balancing various conflicting consequences, which two social 
scientists are likely to do in different ways. They could conclude that the incumbent would 
get more votes, the same number of votes, or fewer votes. In this case, it will also be 
difficult to specify exactly how they have come to their differing conclusions. Without 
neatly distinguishable scenarios it is hard to see how we can begin to judge their closeness 
to each other, let alone their closeness to our world. This is very much like the problem 
of judging similarity between people. We can have information on as many dimensions 
of similarity as we like but we have nothing with which to decide between two opposing 
judgements about similarity.  
The problem is this: A social scientist might think about a counterfactual situation 
in which voters are more politically engaged. They may think about this in a rigorous way, 
considering exactly how the population will change, and the effects this will have on the 
proportion of votes the incumbent will receive. However, ‘political engagement’ is a 
Nomadic concept. There are many things it can mean, and a great deal of social 
phenomena that can reasonably be included in the analysis of a ‘politically engaged’ voting 
population. In constructing a detailed, and plausible, alternative state of the world 
different social scientists are likely to construct a variety of possible, and equally plausible, 
alternative worlds using the same information. These alternative plausible worlds exist 
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because of the latitude that the concept ‘political engagement’ gives us in including social 
phenomena. Where there is evidence, social scientists are likely to disagree on what 
evidence is relevant, and how it is to be weighted. If these alternative counterfactuals point 
to different outcomes we have plausible but contradictory conclusions. In this case it is 
difficult to see what we can conclude from the counterfactual. 
 
A minimal social science example 
Does this really apply to all social science examples? Can we think of one that is 
closer to Woodward’s bus example in the sense that no conflicting ways of assessing the 
consequences of the counterfactual exist? Some have thought so. Tucker (2009) provides 
an interesting example of a counterfactual for which we are almost certain of the 
consequent. “Had George Bush Sr died in 1990, Vice-President Dan Quayle would have 
become the 42nd president of the United States” (2009, pg. 230). Let us suppose that 
George Bush Sr stepped in front of a bus while taking a stroll outside the White House, 
and died. This counterfactual appears relatively unproblematic because Quayle was Vice 
President, the rules of the constitution stipulate the Vice President should take over if the 
President is unable to perform the functions of his job, and there is evidence that the 
political elites were acting in accordance with the constitution at the time. Tucker’s 
example is very different from our voting case because the outcome is determined by 
prior existing constitutional rules, which are intended to be clear and unambiguous. In 
this case, the concepts are precisely specified by constitutional rules. Furthermore, these 
rules are explicitly intended to determine the outcome of this type of event, because 
uncertainty at such a critical time could lead to political unrest. This is what makes it 
purportedly similar to Woodward’s bus example. Both counterfactuals ask us to inspect 
regularities—either regularities relating to the effects of impact injuries on humans, or 
regularities of behaviour when it follows the rules of the US constitution. In this case 
Woodward is right; once we establish that the counterfactual is a serious possibility we 
can run our thought experiment and see, with a high degree of confidence, what happens. 
However, is Tucker’s counterfactual of any interest in the form presented here? 
Probably not, because it gives us no new information over and above inspection of the 
rules of the US constitution. As it stands, it just illustrates the rules. Furthermore, if we 
alter the example only slightly, the possibility of conflicting counterfactual scenarios re-
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emerges. Perhaps Bush survived the impact but sustained slight brain damage. The 
medical verdict might be that Bush ‘should’ function normally but that there is a chance 
that evidence of cognitive impairment will present itself over the coming months. How 
do we assess whether Quayle will become the 42nd US President now? Section 4 of the 
25th Amendment states that “Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress […] 
submit their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, the Vice President shall [become] Acting President” (see 
www.constitutionus.com) Does slight brain damage with possible cognitive impairment 
count as inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office? There are a variety of 
ways we can see this counterfactual playing out, based on what we think other politicians 
and civil servants think the constitution really means in this context. Depending on how 
we decide this, Dan Quayle does, or does not, become the 42nd President (or acting 
president).  
The relevant concept in this case is the ‘ability to discharge the powers and duties 
of the office’. There are a number of things that this can mean. We could consider it to 
reflect a basic capability to fulfil the requirements of the job, or we could take it to mean 
the ability to fully deliberate on the problems facing a country. In other words, depending 
on what we think this means, we are happy with different degrees of help with the 
different aspects of the President’s job. These meanings are relatively closely related 
because they just reflect differences in degrees of ‘ability’; they do not reflect fundamental 
disagreement about what ‘ability to discharge…. means’. However, these meanings don’t 
have precise boundaries because it will be difficult to judge, in any particular situation, the 
extent to which he did ‘discharge the powers and duties of his office’. The thought process 
leading to actions is not transparent—so it will be difficult to be sure of the extent to 
which the President really did ‘discharge the powers and duties of his office’. Change over 
time is also relevant because our judgement of the President’s ability is unlikely to remain 
constant as the months pass. So, in assessing the consequences of the President’s injury 
we are free to consider a wide range of possible phenomena. It is not just ‘we’ who 
consider these things. Assessing the counterfactual depends on considering how other 
significant political players assess Bush’s ‘ability to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office’. The ways in which we think about these give us different conclusions about 
whether he would be replaced. This contrasts with Tucker’s example where Bush dies. 
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Death is, as far as this example is concerned, an all-or-nothing matter and we are much 
more constrained in the social phenomena we can consider. 
Whereas the unproblematic counterfactual wasn’t illuminating, this version of the 
counterfactual is potentially interesting because it asks us to consider the consequences 
for the US political system of George Bush Sr’s mental impairment. We can debate 
whether this really is interesting, but considering the implications of a mentally impaired 
US President is much closer to the work social scientists do than the unproblematic, first 
version, of this counterfactual. In other words, what is of interest to social science in cases 
like this is not just inspection of the rules, but consideration of what happens when the 
application of the rules is, potentially, unclear. 
To summarise, Woodward argues that assessing the consequences of a 
counterfactual does not involve subjectivity and can be understood as a hypothetical 
experiment, which his bus example illustrates. However, this example is very different to 
most social science cases. We saw one social science counterfactual that works in the same 
way as the bus example, but it is also uninformative. As soon as we enrich the scenario 
with concepts that are Nomadic, we reintroduce the problem that there are multiple 
possible paths the counterfactual scenario can take, about which there is likely to be little 
agreement. These different paths affect what we conclude from the analysis.  
The following example illustrates the problems introduced above in more detail. 
In this example two historians disagree about the truth value of a counterfactual. I argue 
that, in this case, no backtracking is required, and it is clear what the counterfactual claim 
means. It is clear, therefore, what the causal claim we are interested in is. Furthermore, 
the intervention is unambiguous. In this example, as far as possible, all complicating issues 
have been removed. This example illustrates that even when we have fixed which 
possibilities are serious, it is not the case that there is “no further sense in which the 
counterfactuals about outcomes of hypothetical experiments associated with typical 
causal claims are in some way dependent on human attitudes or beliefs’ (Woodward, 2003, 






Real historical counterfactuals 
Historians, when they make use of counterfactual analysis, are at pains to 
demonstrate that the counterfactuals they consider rely on evidence. On the face of it, 
this focus on evidence should make counterfactual analysis less problematic. However, 
the following example illustrates that, even where considerable evidence exists, two 
historians can reach different conclusions from counterfactual analysis.  
Adamson (1999) considers the counterfactual scenario in which Charles I of 
England did not decide to open negotiations with the Covenanters (Scottish rebels) in 
June 1639 but engaged them militarily. He argues that had Charles I engaged the Scottish 
militarily he would have won and the Civil War would not have happened. The two armies 
were ready for battle by June 4th & 5th in 1639. There is evidence that Charles considered 
both possibilities—military engagement and negotiation. Evidence also exists suggesting 
that, had a military conflict taken place, Charles would probably have won. For example, 
one of Charles’ commanders overestimated the size of the opposing army, morale was 
failing in the Scottish forces, and they were struggling to feed and provision their army. 
In assessing the consequences of this counterfactual, Adamson aims to ground the 
construction of his alternative world in documentary evidence, which is clear as far as the 
short-term military consequences are concerned, but becomes less so the further into the 
‘alternative future’ his scenario stretches. Still, the counterfactual scenario itself and the 
immediate consequences do seem well supported. Here, therefore, is Adamson’s 
counterfactual: 
Adamson’s counterfactual: Had Charles I engaged the Covenanters (Scottish 
rebels) militarily in June 1639, rather than negotiating with them, he would have won, and 
the Civil War would not have happened. 
This counterfactual is precise in a number of ways: 
Meanings: It is clear what we mean. The two armies were prepared for battle, so a ‘military 
engagement’ simply means a physical conflict between these two armies. The Civil War is 
a real event, which is comprised of various events on various dates, and we are clear about 
the main actors involved in these events. The counterfactual claims that had a military 




Manipulation: The manipulation required is also relatively clear. Charles just needs to 
make a different decision; to fight rather than negotiate. This was an option he was already 
considering.  
Backtracking: Backtracking is minimised, if not eliminated. Everything was in place for 
engagement or negotiation so the only manipulation required is a change in Charles I’s 
decision and the historical evidence suggests that he considered both possibilities and that 
his decision could have gone either way.  
Despite this, the two historians do disagree about this counterfactual: 
Adamson believes that: Had Charles fought, he would have won, and there would have 
been no Civil War. 
Tucker believes that: Had Charles fought, he would have won, but there would still have 
been a Civil War. 
Tucker argues that Adamson underestimates the extent of the rifts in society 
which meant that “something similar to the Puritan Revolution” would still have 
happened (Tucker, 1999, pg. 235). Tucker and Adamson do agree that, had a military 
conflict taken place, Charles would probably have won. They agree about this based on 
the evidence about the relative strengths and capabilities of the armies. How we see a 
military conflict playing out is constrained by evidence of problems in the Scottish forces, 
amongst other things, which make it highly unlikely that Charles I would have lost. 
Furthermore, Jones analyses the history of warfare and argues that “Victors traditionally 
experienced less attrition (the casualties suffered) and the seriously disorganised 
vanquished more” (1987, pg. 639). This makes it sensible to assume that the larger army 
would probably have won. The role of evidence in this case brings us closer to the 
examples of Woodward and George Bush Sr colliding with buses. Just as there is a small 
chance that Woodward could walk away from the collision without injury, there is a small 
chance that Charles I would have lost, but data about collisions on the one hand, and 
evidence which we place in the context of previous military engagements make these 
possibilities unlikely. 
What they disagree about is the consequences of this victory. As soon as we move 
away from this evidence, different interpretations of what the victory means lead to 
conflicting conclusions. There is an unhelpful ambiguity in Tucker’s argument when he 
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says that something ‘similar’ to the Civil War would still have happened. What counts as 
something ‘similar’ is difficult to specify—do we require full scale battles across the 
country, does it need to happen within a certain number of years, and so on. However, I 
think it is defensible to strengthen Tucker’s position to mean that had Charles won the 
battles then the Civil War, the actual, real, historical event, would still have happened. This 
takes him to mean that had Charles won the battle it would have made very little 
difference, which I take to be in the spirit of his disagreement with Adamson. 
They disagree about the consequences of the victory because Adamson believes 
that “looking beyond a hypothetical royal victory in 1639, the chances of Charles I being 
coerced by domestic rebellion or being forced to summon Parliament against his will 
would have been small” (1997, pg. 109). He points, amongst other things, to evidence of 
the declining influence of militant Catholicism, and the old age of many of Charles I’s 
opponents. Tucker, on the other hand, argues that there were several independent causal 
chains leading to the revolution. A military victory would have made little difference to 
the occurrence of a revolution in England, it would just have been brought about in a 
different way. In other words, Tucker and Adamson can look at the same evidence and 
assess the consequences of the victory in very different ways. Even when we consider 
relatively simple counterfactuals, involving small manipulations that don’t require 
backtracking, and where at least some of the consequences are supported by evidence, it 
is still possible to reach opposing, but plausible, conclusions which assign different truth 
values to the counterfactual.  
To make this precise: This counterfactual asks us to consider the consequences 
for English history of Charles I winning a battle against the Scottish rebels on a particular 
day. Tucker and Adamson agree about the outcome of the battle, had Charles decided to 
fight, but disagree about the implications of this victory for English history. For Adamson, 
the victory would have meant that the opposition to Charles I had been defeated, while 
for Tucker, the opposition remained viable.  
This is because in judging what winning the battle, and the subsequent military 
victory mean, the two historians can look at many aspects of the counterfactual social 
world. They consider such things as whether certain people would still have been 
motivated to rebel, or whether Charles would still have been coerced or forced to 
summon Parliament, or whether certain people would have been disinclined to demand 
more power for Parliament by the victory. ‘Winning’ is a Nomadic concept, because there 
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are many things it can mean. Additionally, to the extent that the historians disagree about 
people’s motivations and mental states, there seems little way to settle such disagreements 
empirically. For example, let us suppose that we disagree about whether a particular group 
of nobles would have been less willing to voice opposition to Charles, had he won the 
battle. Evidence often exists, about their economic circumstances, their parliamentary 
leanings, their fear of imprisonment, but the question of interest is whether a military 
victory for Charles would have led them to see these circumstances differently.  This can 
be evaluated in any number of ways. Adamson’s counterfactual about the consequences 
of Charles I winning a battle against the Scottish rebels benefits from clarity in what the 
claim means, it does not require backtracking, and the manipulation needed is clear and 
unproblematic. Despite this, the two historians disagree about the consequent. This does 
not seem at all like the hypothetical experiments that Woodward has in mind, because 
there is significant scope for in judging the consequences of a manipulation in different 
ways. Even when evidence exists, the historians disagree about what evidence is most 
relevant in constructing the counterfactual scenarios. 
Why, then, do Adamson and Tucker agree about the outcome of the battle? Is 
this not similarly indeterminable? When they restrict themselves just to the question of 
military victory there is a rough rule, or pattern, that applies. The army with the most 
people is likely to win. This restricts the possible outcomes of the battle. However, 
although Adamson and Tucker agree about the likelihood of Charles’s’ victory it is 
arguable that this narrow, military meaning of ‘winning’ is more Nomadic that they 
suppose. For example, there are many ways of winning a battle and it might make a 
difference whether, for example, Charles’s army slaughter every Scottish rebel they find 
and then go on a murderous rampage through the surrounding area. Or, alternatively, 
whether Charles wins narrowly and leaves much of the opposing army alive. Adamson 
and Tucker are not explicit about how they understand the military ‘winning’, but this 
may, in fact, mean various different things that might plausibly make a difference to the 
assessment of the counterfactual too. For example, had Charles’s army gone on a 
murderous rampage we might think the Civil War would have been hastened. This 
suggests that there are even more ways in which we can assess the likelihood of the 
consequence of the counterfactual than the two presented by Adamson and Tucker.  
In conclusion, this example is set up in ways that are similar to an experiment. 
The meaning of the antecedent and consequent of the counterfactual are clear. No 
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backtracking is required. The manipulation is clear and unambiguous. Despite this, the 
two historians ‘run’ this hypothetical experiment and reach opposing conclusions because 
assessing the likelihood of the consequent involves a Nomadic concept ‘winning’. These 
sorts of concepts allow social scientists to include a wide range of social phenomena in 
their scope. The two historians are therefore both able to construct plausible, but 
contradictory counterfactual scenarios.  
 
Saving Woodward 
It is possible to try to save Woodward’s approach by questioning firstly, whether 
this counterfactual really does deal with a causal claim and, secondly, whether Adamson 
and Tucker are just assessing different causal claims, rather than disagreeing about the 
same causal claim, and thirdly, whether some of Woodward’s later comments go some 
way towards accepting the criticism above. The response to the first worry is that, 
unhelpfully, Adamson and Tucker do not explicitly discuss causation, but instead discuss 
the contingency of historical events. Adamson’s motivation for assessing this 
counterfactual is that people often assume that historical events were inevitable. He says, 
“the belief that Charles’s experiment in government without Parliament was inherently 
unviable continues to enjoy currency” (1997, pg. 93). Adamson seeks to show that this 
was not the case, that “the critical moment was 1639.”, and that Charles’s failure to defeat 
the Scottish in 1639 “initiated the disastrous sequence of events which flowed from that 
failure.” (1997, pg. 94). It seems reasonable therefore to take Adamson as saying that the 
failure to defeat the Scottish in 1639 was a, if not, the cause of the Civil War because he 
sees it as the initiator of a chain of events leading to the Civil War. Tucker’s disagreement 
can also, therefore be taken to indicate a rejection of the causal claim that the events of 
1639 did cause the Civil War.  
The second worry with this historical example is therefore whether Tucker really 
is disagreeing about this causal claim, or assessing a different one. Are Adamson and 
Tucker just assessing different causal claims? It seems difficult to argue this, in this case. 
This is because they do not disagree about the set-up of the counterfactual. Tucker does 
not argue that Charles could not have fought, or that the manipulation needed is 
ambiguous, or about what the counterfactual means. Tucker accepts Adamson’s set up, 
accepts that a military victory for Charles was probable, but disagrees about the 
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consequences for the Civil War. This seems very much like two historians running the 
same hypothetical experiment and reaching different conclusions. To the question of 
whether A caused B, Adamson says ‘yes’ and Tucker says ‘no’.  
However, Tucker does not agree with Adamson about the causes of the Civil War. 
This does not mean though, that when assessing Adamson’s counterfactual that they are 
assessing different causal claims. Tucker believes that, had Charles won the battle then 
this would have had little real impact because much of the actual historical record would 
have remained unchanged and that, therefore, other things would have led to the Civil 
War. Adamson believes that had Charles benefitted from a military victory, none of those 
other causes, nor anything else, would have let to Civil War. When there is disagreement 
about whether A caused B it seems reasonable to run an experiment where A is 
manipulated and to observe the resulting change (if any) in B. The problem with this 
historical example is that the historians can agree to the set-up of the experiment, but 
disagree about whether there is a resulting change in B. In a real experiment, whatever my 
initial views about what causes B, if I observe it changing in response to changes in A I 
will have to accept this. In the historical example, regardless of the strength of Adamson’s 
argument, if I am committed to another interpretation of the Civil War, then this 
hypothetical experiment will not change my mind. I will always be able to argue that 
changing A really doesn’t make any difference.  
One further objection is that Tucker’s and Adamson’s counterfactuals aren’t 
equally plausible; Tucker’s is surely more plausible. This is a natural reading of the 
situation. However, although Tucker’s counterfactual does seem more plausible this 
results from an asymmetry between Tucker and Adamson’s alternative histories. This 
asymmetry makes it easier for us to think about Tucker’s alternative historical timeline, 
but have nothing to do with the greater plausibility of his analysis.  
In considering Adamson’s views we need to imagine a world in which Charles 
wins a battle, then we have to imagine a world without a Civil War, while attempting to 
keep the rest of the historical record somewhat like the real historical record. In order to 
endorse Tucker’s position we need to make the same counterfactual change to enable 
Charles to win the battle, but then we return to the actual historical record. It is easier to 
imagine Tucker’s position because he is, essentially, saying that Charles winning the battle 
would have made little difference to the actual historical record. If Adamson is right, we 
need to think about a counterfactual world that differs greatly from the actual world. The 
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English Civil War was an important event in English history so considering what the 
history of England might have been like without it is difficult. It is easier to mentally 
construct a counterfactual scenario in which Tucker is right because we need to do very 
little mental work. 
Finally, this discussion elaborates on the criticism in Chapter 1 of Woodward’s 
(2016) attempt to outline some criteria for successful variable choice. In this paper, he 
appears to concede that some variables are better than others for counterfactual analysis, 
and hypothetical experiments, than others. He suggests seven criteria that should 
influence the choice of variables. The first two are important for the current discussion; 
these are: 
“Choose variables that are well-defined targets for (single) interventions 
in the sense that they describe quantities or properties for which there is 
a clear answer to the question of what would happen if they were to be 
manipulated or intervened on” (2016, pg. 1054)  
“choose variables that have unambiguous effect on other variables of 
interest under manipulation, rather than variables that have ambiguous 
or heterogeneous effects” (2016, pg. 1054).  
If we take Woodward’s advice seriously and only use variables for which there is a clear 
answer about what will happen if we manipulate them, this suggests that Adamson and 
Tucker’s historical example is a poor example of a hypothetical experiment because the 
consequences of manipulating the battle are unclear. However, as argued in Chapter 1, in 
order for someone to select variables for which the results of manipulation are clear and 
unambiguous they must know that the results of the manipulation really are clear and 
ambiguous. The historical example illustrates that this is not often the case. Adamson 
believes that there is a clear answer to the question of what would happen if the decision 
to fight, or not fight, is manipulated, and that these effects are unambiguous. Tucker, on 
the other hand, believes that it is clear that Adamson’s answer is not the right one. In 
other words, social scientists may think that Woodward’s criteria are satisfied, but this 
doesn’t guarantee that they are. Woodward is right to focus on the importance of 
choosing the right variables, but articulating this in terms of clear and unambiguous 
knowledge of the consequences is, I believe, not the right strategy. The preferable strategy 
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is to understand exactly how variables differ, and how these differences make a difference 
to the viability of using counterfactual analysis. Chapter 2 has attempted to outline this. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that counterfactual analysis is problematic in the social 
sciences. Problems arising from the need to judge similarity and backtracking have been 
well discussed. Woodward largely takes his analysis to have solved these problems, and 
believes that assessing the consequences of a hypothetical manipulation is like running a 
hypothetical experiment. However, this chapter has given reasons for thinking that the 
flexibility we have in filling in transition periods also applies to judging the consequences 
of manipulations. This problem arises from the use of Nomadic concepts with which 
social scientists often deal. As described in Chapter 2, when social scientists work with 
Nomadic concepts a wide range of social phenomena can be included within the scope 
of these concepts. When assessing the consequences of a hypothetical manipulation social 
scientists can construct multiple, but plausible, alternative counterfactual worlds which 
incorporate different social phenomena. Furthermore, there seems little principled way to 













Chapter 4: Intentions, Nomadic concepts, and 
predictive behaviour 
 
The social sciences are usually concerned with understanding intentional 
behaviour. This is because a distinction is made between reflexive behaviour, and 
intentional actions. Purely physical responses, such as reflexes, are usually considered to 
be the subject of biology, or physiology, not the social sciences. It is no surprise that we 
might be able to formulate generalisations about the dilation of pupils, for example. But 
these are usually uninteresting from a social science perspective. However, taking an 
intentional perspective on behaviour often involves the use of Nomadic concepts. This 
chapter therefore begins with a discussion of the problem that Nomadic concepts pose 
for understanding intentional behaviour, before outlining the structure of the remainder 
of the chapter. 
The standard analysis of agency and intentions stems from Davidson (1963/2002) 
and Anscombe (1957/2000), their view is that agency is just the performance of 
intentional actions. Further, that when people act intentionally, they act for a reason. A 
reason should be understood as a set of beliefs and desires that rationalise an action. For 
example, suppose that I go for a walk today. I usually assume that this is an intentional 
action, or, in other words, that I intended to go for a walk. In support of this, I can point 
to my beliefs, such as that walking is good exercise, and my desire to do some exercise 
today, and say that my belief and my desire caused me to go for a walk. It is important to 
note that this understanding of agency and intentional action is the ‘standard’ view and, 
although influential, is not universally accepted. However, there is no need to assess 
complications and concerns here (although later in this chapter some alternative analyses 
of intentional action will be reviewed) because the current claim is just that when social 
scientists take an intentional stance, this frequently requires the use of Nomadic concepts. 
Furthermore, social scientists frequently ask questions such as ‘Why did those people do 
x?’ and accept an answer of the form ‘Because they wanted x, and believed that by doing 
y they would achieve x.’. Usually, such explanations are accepted without first requiring 
an analysis of agency, or intentional action, from a philosophical perspective. 
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To summarise, when trying to understand behaviour that we believe is intentional, 
we often seek to understand it in terms of beliefs and desires. However, once we elaborate 
on what these beliefs and desires are, we are likely to use Nomadic concepts. The problem 
is that these concepts allow for the inclusion of a great deal of social phenomena so social 
scientists are likely to find it difficult to agree about whether explanations given in terms 
of beliefs and desires are, in fact, explanatory. The following example illustrates this. 
Suppose that Bill spends his family’s savings on a sports car. His wife, Mary, is less than 
impressed. One social scientist might explain this behaviour in terms of Bill’s desire to 
enhance his status among his friends. His friends all own sports cars, so, they say, he 
believed that buying a sports car would improve his status. Another social scientist might 
explain his behaviour in terms of his desire to annoy Mary, because he suspects her of 
having an affair, and his belief that buying a sports car would annoy her. Bill’s behaviour 
can fall under the scope of a number of Nomadic concepts, in this case, ‘annoying’ Mary, 
and ‘enhancing status’. In other words, there are a number of possible intentional 
explanations of his behaviour. 
We could ask Bill why he did it, and he might say that he did it purely to annoy 
Mary. However, the first social scientist might ask why he bought a car when he could 
have bought many other things that would also have annoyed Mary? Buying a sports car 
does enhance his status, so even if Bill doesn’t give this as an explanation of his action, it 
really does explain it. Similarly, Mary might say that Bill couldn’t have bought the car to 
annoy her because Bill believed her when she said she wasn’t having an affair. Mary thinks 
Bill bought the car because he’s depressed, and thought that buying it might make him 
feel better. Mary might also say that Bill is only saying he bought it to annoy her because 
Bill doesn’t want anyone to know that he’s depressed. The problem arises because we are 
explaining Bill’s behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires, and these beliefs and desires 
are expressed using Nomadic concepts, such as ‘depression’, and ‘enhancing status’ and 
‘annoying’. A wide variety of behaviour falls under the scope of such concepts, which also 
do not have precise boundaries. This makes it difficult to determine whether Bill’s 
behaviour is an example of ‘depression’ or ‘enhancing status’, or ‘annoying’. Furthermore, 
because these concepts lack precise boundaries it isn’t clear exactly which aspects of Bill’s 
behaviour we should restrict ourselves to analysing. We are trying to explain why he 
bought a car, but, in doing so, we look at Bill’s wider behaviour; for example, who his 
friends are, what happened with his wife, whether he was depressed. It is unclear how 
much, or how little of this behaviour is relevant to judging the correctness of the 
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explanation of his buying the car. Moreover, it is not just unclear how much is relevant, 
but how we would go about deciding on relevance. For example, I might seek to explain 
Bill’s behaviour in terms of childhood influences. It seems that we can bring an almost 
endless amount of Bill’s past experience to bear on the question of why he used the 
family’s savings to buy a sports car. 
An objection to this is that some explanations might clearly be wrong. The 
example above is not intended to show that any explanation is as good as any other. For 
example, an explanation that Bill bought the car to impress his mistress would just be 
wrong if it turns out that Bill doesn’t have a mistress. This example is intended to show 
that when we seek to explain behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires and express these 
beliefs and desires in terms of Nomadic concepts, there may be a number of plausible 
explanations that we are unable to choose between. This is because the concepts with 
which we are analysing behaviour are Nomadic.  
Following the analysis of Nomadic concepts in Chapter 2, we can offer a number 
of competing, but plausible explanations of the same behaviour, and it is difficult to agree 
about whether a specific behaviour is an example of a generalisation about behaviour. For 
example, suppose that it is widely accepted that men of Bill’s age go through a mid-life 
crisis. Despite our agreement that this generalisation is true, we can still disagree about 
whether Bill’s buying the car is an instance of a man, of a certain age, going through a 
mid-life crisis. Despite it being one explanation, I may put more weight on Mary’s view 
that Bill is depressed (but not about his age). Another person may simply believe Bill, and 
say that he bought the car purely out of a desire to annoy his wife.  
One response to the worry that explanation in terms of beliefs and desires is 
problematic, is to suggest that, perhaps, if beliefs and desires are redescribed, explanations 
will be more precise. The remainder of this chapter takes this suggestion as its starting 
point. The first section outlines McIntyre’s (1994) argument for thinking that the social 
sciences will only find regularities in behaviour if beliefs and desires are redescribed. 
McIntyre’s concern is with regularities, but his argument is equally relevant to a discussion 
of explanations. Furthermore, McIntyre discusses regularities relating to individual 
behaviour, not regularities of the sorts discussed in previous chapters (such as whether 
inequality leads to revolution). I conclude that McIntyre’s argument is only partially 
convincing. He is right to think that we should explain behaviour using concepts other 
than beliefs and desires, but he is wrong to think that beliefs and desires are redescribed.  
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McIntyre takes it as given that the behaviour he analyses is, in fact, intentional. 
The second section of this chapter takes issue with this, and demonstrates that the aspects 
of the behaviour he describes are intentional, in an ordinary sense. To show this, I discuss 
my own example of regular behaviour in order to discover what really is going on in cases 
such as these. Attali and Bar-Hillel (2003) describe ‘middle bias’. Middle bias is the 
tendency for people to bias the middle option when presented with a finite set of linearly 
arranged options. The attraction of analysing middle bias is that this phenomenon appears 
in a variety of different contexts, such as when people are asked to ‘pick a number between 
one and ten’, when they are asked to make a choice from among a row of objects, or 
when they are answering multiple choice questions. Understanding middle bias is 
important because it appears to be an example of a stable behavioural regularity. If this is 
true, then this is a first step towards formulating regularities which describe this behaviour. 
This section of the chapter aims to discover firstly, why this behaviour is regular, and 
secondly; whether, by understanding this behaviour we can uncover reasons which allow 
us to identify why most social phenomena in the social sciences are not regular. 
The third section of this chapter argues that middle bias is not intentional in the 
way intentional behaviour is usually understood. The middle bias phenomenon is fully 
characterised, and I show that this does not fit within the usual framework of intentional 
action. I describe the characteristics middle bias does have and I suggest that we call this 
type of behaviour ‘derivatively intentional’. The final section of this chapter shows that 
derivatively intentional behaviour is describable without using Nomadic concepts, which 
makes it considerably easier to find regularities. The regularities exhibited by these types 
of behaviour are the closest we can come to achieving the aim of formulating reliable 
generalisations in the social sciences. 
The aim of this chapter seems slightly at odds with the focus on social science 
concepts in previous chapters. This is because the discovery of a regularity describing 
individual behaviour does not necessarily imply anything about the discovery of 
regularities describing social behaviour. The justification for analysing middle bias is that 
it is a good example of a regularity concerning human behaviour, so it makes sense to 
understand it fully before considering what this example implies for the search for 
regularities in social behaviour. In other words, although middle bias is not quite what we 





McIntyre’s (1996) suggests that redescription of the subjects of social science 
research is central to finding regularities in the social sciences. He is not alone in thinking 
that this is the case. For example, Scriven’s claim that if physicists sought to explain the 
trajectories of individual falling leaves they would not have succeeded in finding laws was 
introduced in Chapter 1. McIntyre gives a number of examples of regular behaviour. He 
writes that his intention is to “give the reader purchase on what I mean by redescription. 
I hope to clarify and illuminate the concept of redescription […] by providing examples 
that present candidates for social scientific laws” (McIntyre, 1996, 105). He is explicitly not 
suggesting that the analysis of these cases is complete. The examples he gives are the 
tendency for people to re-evaluate historical choices they made so as to convince 
themselves that they made the right choice, even in the face of evidence to the contrary; 
the ability to manipulate people’s responses to questions by getting them to learn word 
pairs, position effects that influence the choice between identical products, and the effects 
of suggestions under hypnosis. What unites all these examples, according to McIntyre, is 
that the beliefs and desires of the subjects involved in these experiments are not 
explanatory because the subjects are unaware of the real reasons for their behaviour. 
McIntyre does not discuss these examples at length so I will focus on one of these, the 
word association case, purely to illustrate his argument. I will argue that his example, while 
successfully highlighting a regularity in behaviour, does not show that any redescription 
is taking place in the successful explanation of the phenomenon. However, his suggestion 
that the regularities suggested by this behaviour need to be expressed without reference 
to beliefs and desires, is correct. 
McIntyre’s central point is that some form of redescription is needed in the social 
sciences before they can find reliable generalisations (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 104). He argues 
that generalisations in the social sciences need not always make reference to things which 
we are used to talking about: Wars, revolutions, and democracies. One of his examples of 
a regularity is word associations. He describes this type of behaviour as “a good one for 
our purposes because it deals with intentional and freely chosen action that is nonetheless 
highly regular” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 106). He describes a 1977 experiment by Nisbett and 
Wilson in which subjects were asked to memorise lists of word pairs “some of which had 
been previously found to elicit specific target responses with high frequency” (McIntyre, 
1996, pg. 106). Subjects learned a word pair such as ‘ocean, moon’ and when asked to 
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name a detergent said ‘Tide’ more frequently than control groups. The reasons subjects 
gave for their choice included things like familiarity with the brand, rather than the word 
list they had learned.  
The significance of this type of regular behaviour is that explanation in terms of 
the beliefs and desires of the agent are not, obviously, explanatory because whatever is 
going on is not something that agents are conscious of. People reported that they had said 
“Tide” for all sorts of reasons, such as, to repeat, familiarity with the brand. McIntyre 
notes that explanation of such behaviour in experimental literature may not make much 
sense to the actor. Whatever is going on in cases like this is going on outside the agent’s 
awareness. McIntyre concludes that this shows “a role for redescription and suggest the 
value of nomological models in the explanation of human behaviour” (1996, pg. 106). In 
other words, while we may have originally thought that the explanation for saying ‘Tide’ 
had to do with subjects’ beliefs about the brand ‘Tide’, these beliefs do not in fact explain 
why subjects made the choice they did. The real explanation is that they were ‘primed’ to 
say this by learning certain word pairs. Other literature supports the idea that people’s 
self-reports about why they are doing things are often unreliable. For example, one recent 
study suggests that people are often not aware of their reasons for buying certain goods 
(Gram, 2010). Gram’s particular study was on family food shopping. She notes that 
parents know that children influence their parent’s decisions about food, but neither 
parents nor children agree about the degree of influence. Gram concludes that 
observational studies are beneficial in determining what is going on in situations such as 
these because of the unreliability of self-reporting. 
McIntyre’s focus is on the importance of redescription in identifying regularities. 
He suggests that, part of the reason, we struggle to find laws in evolutionary biology and 
social science, in contrast with natural science, is that we often suppose that the natural 
sciences refer to objects or kinds in laws that match what we ordinarily think about. A 
simple example is that astronomy makes generalisations and predictions about planets 
and tides. Planets and tides are also the things we initially set about to enquire into. He 
says, “To a large extent the “natural kinds” that serve as the referents of the laws in these 
cases match the natural kinds we already use to think about the phenomena in question.” 
(1996, pg. 96). This, McIntyre believes, has led social scientists to, wrongly, suppose that 
laws in the social sciences must refer to concepts with which we regularly deal. He also 
notes that this is an overly simplistic view of science because scientists often redescribe 
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these terms, or, “redefine the phenomena in such a way that we come up with new 
referents altogether, and thus may arrive at a law-like connection that gives us new insight 
into what the phenomena most basically are.” (1996, pg. 100. Italics in original). In other 
words, social scientists often begin the search for laws with common, everyday categories 
which were sometimes a fruitful place to begin in many scientific endeavours. However, 
as in many scientific cases, redescription is required to uncover what is really going on. 
McIntyre believes that evolutionary biology illustrates what he means by 
‘redescription’. I will discuss this biological example purely because it is the one McIntyre 
uses, not because I have any particular views about evolutionary biology. The critique of 
this example will be applied to McIntyre’s social science examples later in the chapter, but 
there would be a loss of clarity were I not to initially discuss his biological example because 
he believes it provides a model for how to deploy the strategy of ‘redescription’ in the 
social sciences. As will become clear over the following paragraphs, one of my objections 
is that it is unclear what McIntyre means by redescription. While noting that there is 
considerable disagreement among biologists about whether there are laws in evolutionary 
biology McIntyre takes Dollo’s Law as the best example of a law in this field because it 
has “mountains of empirical confirmation, virtually no exceptions, is theory based, and 
seems to be attempting to be genuinely explanatory” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 86). Dollo’s 
Law states that  
“A structure (i.e. a complex part of an organism or the entire organism 
itself) can never undergo complete reversal, so that it perfectly attains a 
previous ancestral state. Secondary convergences can always be recognised 
morphologically by preservation of some trace of an intermediate stage” 
(McIntyre, 1996, pg. 85) 
McIntyre reviews the dispute about the nomological status of this law. He cites 
Gould as arguing that the different possible interpretations of complexity empty Dollo’s 
law of empirical content (1996, pg. 86-90). The worry is that the stipulation that a complex 
part of an organism cannot undergo complete reversal leaves the debate open to 
equivocation about which parts of organisms are ‘complex’. If any reversal of a structure 
is found it can be rejected as a counterexample because it is not ‘complex’. This is a 
particularly significant problem because Dollo did allow for the reversal of simple 
structures and reversal of functions. However, McIntyre notes that Gould does accept 
the principle of irreversibility because evolution is an historical process; we can’t rewind 
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it. McIntyre takes this as Gould’s tacit acceptance of irreversibility as a law and reiterates 
his argument (reviewed in Chapter 1) that uniqueness is no barrier to the formulation of 
laws.  
It is McIntyre’s assertion that redescription is needed before laws can be 
formulated that is the central concern here, so controversies about whether Dollo’s Law 
is a genuine law, or worries about McIntyre’s criticisms of Gould, will be set aside. Even 
if we accept the nomological status of Dollo’s Law it is unclear that its formulation results 
from redescription of any sort. The importance of redescription, for McIntyre, is that 
scientists may need to redescribe phenomena in unfamiliar terms before the phenomena 
begin to yield law like regularities. This is not a new idea, Weber suggests this possibility 
when he says “In short, (the sociologist) imposes a totally different sense on the legal 
concept, which he makes use of because of its precision and familiarity.” (1978, pg. 17). 
The ‘legal concepts’ he has in mind include ‘state’, ‘nation’, and ‘family’. This is a 
particularly problematic assertion for Dollo’s Law. Dollo’s Law refers to wholes, or parts 
of, organisms. These are precisely the things people have historically thought about when 
considering the natural world. He says “we do permit science to cut nature at different 
perceptual “joints” than we do in our everyday experience” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 99). 
However, the scientific and everyday ‘joints’ of Dollo’s organisms and parts of organisms 
match up, quite literally. In his defence, McIntyre also cites Williams (1980), who defends 
the existence of laws in evolutionary biology and argues that part of this process is 
defining a new vocabulary. However, McIntyre’s example, that of Dollo’s Law, does not 
demonstrate that redescription is required. 
McIntyre’s suggestion is therefore that we need to redescribe the subject matter 
of the social sciences in order to formulate reliable generalisations. Unfortunately, his 
social science example works no better than his biological one, although for different 
reasons. The word association example above is an attempt to demonstrate how 
redescription might work. He says this, and his other example, illustrate “what I mean by 
redescription” (McIntyre, 1996, pg. 105). What is being redescribed here though? 
McIntyre says that the social sciences are often taken to be concerned with intentional 
description “and at this level of interest, we are just going to be talking about things in 
terms of the ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ of the agent” (1996, pg. 105). His examples are dealing 
with intentional behaviour, but “only upon redescription of talk about ‘beliefs’ and 
‘desires’ do we begin to be able to explain the regularities manifested in our social 
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behaviour” (1996, pg. 105). Specifically, any attempts to formulate generalisations about 
what people say when asked to name a detergent that are based on their beliefs and desires 
about detergents are an unpromising place to begin. By contrast, generalisations may be 
more successful if we explain people’s statements about detergents in terms of the effects 
of word association. In this specific case, that after learning certain word pairs, people are 
likely to pick a specific response. Admittedly, generalisations about word associations fall 
short of what is often hoped for in the social sciences, as such generalisations are little 
consolation for those hoping to generalise about wars and poverty, or those hoping to 
predict future states of society.  
The word association example reveals behaviour that is highly regular. 
Furthermore, it is certainly true that the explicit beliefs and desires of agents do not play 
a part in explaining this regular behaviour. Indeed, agents are mistaken about the 
motivations for this behaviour. In the word association case the subjects ‘invent’ reasons 
for naming a particular product. What is less clear is how this illustrates ‘redescription’ of 
beliefs and desires. 
McIntyre is not entirely explicit about exactly what redescription is supposed to 
mean. He says we need to “redescribe the beliefs and desires of the subjects” (1996, pg. 
108). His example does not show that desires and beliefs have been redescribed because 
beliefs and desires simply do not appear as redescribed terms. However, elsewhere he 
notes the “explanatory value of alternative levels of description” (1996, 106). Chapter 1 
noted a certain ambiguity about what ‘levels’ are, but the suggestion that the phenomenon 
itself is redescribed, or, perhaps more specifically, that the phenomenon is analysed using 
a different approach, or different conceptual framework, is right. Phenomena that we 
might once have explained in terms of beliefs and desires is now explained in terms of 
something else. 
To summarise, McIntyre suggests that we are more likely to find successful (that 
is, empirically verifiable) generalisations if we focus on theoretical or other entities which 
may not be the ones we are most used to thinking about. He suggests that the social 
sciences are usually concerned with explanation in terms of beliefs and desires of agents, 
not because we have particularly good generalisations stated in terms of beliefs and desires 
which underwrite these explanations, but simply because we are used to thinking about 
beliefs and desires. Once we redescribe beliefs and desires in other terms, reliable 
generalisations may become easier to find. He then provides a number of examples, one 
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of which is the regularities found with word associations. In each of these cases the 
behaviour is intentional, but cannot be explained in terms of beliefs and desires; thus, he 
would argue, we need a different conceptual framework to discuss these regularities. 
Davidson makes a similar point in “Actions, Reason and Causes” where he says that even 
though we believe that particular reasons cause certain actions and that these relationships 
are subject to an underlying law, this does not mean that the law is formulated in terms 
of reasons and actions. The law may describe neurological, or chemical, or physical facts. 
(Davidson, 1963/2002, pg. 17). McIntyre says that “if one wants a better explanation of 
the regularity manifested in their behaviour, one will have to redescribe the beliefs and 
desires of the subjects in terms they may not understand or have access to” (1996, pg. 
108). As with the biological example, I do not think his examples demonstrates that 
redescription of beliefs and desires is required, but he is right that the behaviour needs to 
be analysed without reference to beliefs and desires. 
McIntyre takes it as given that the behaviour he describes is, in fact, intentional. 
He says, when describing various experiments showing word associations, that “We are 
still dealing with freely chosen and intentional behaviour […] if one wants a better 
explanation of the regularity manifested in their behaviour, one will have to redescribe the 
beliefs and desires of subjects in terms they may not understand or have access to” (1996, 
pg. 108). However, later he writes “we are often interested in going beyond explanations 
that are given only in terms of “Intentions”’ (1996, 108) and that “the intentional 
perspective on human events is certainly important, but it does not alone provide a 
complete picture of human action” (1996, 109). He provides no justification for the view 
that this behaviour is intentional, and his later comments suggests that understanding of 
intentions may need supplementing. In the word association example I take this to mean 
that the intentional behaviour of the subjects needs to be combined with an understanding 
of the biases they show, which is not explained by referencing subjects’ beliefs and desires. 
This is important because if this word association behaviour is not intentional, being like 
a reflex, or a biological response, it is not obviously the kind of behaviour in which social 
scientists are interested. Also, McIntyre ties himself to one notion of intentional action 
because he only discusses beliefs and desires. There are other proposals for understanding 
what makes actions intentional. As the discussion below will illustrate, it is possible that 
what makes action intentional is not causation by beliefs and desires in the right way, but 
the role actions play in plans, or the right kind of bodily awareness.  
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The purpose of the following section is therefore to explore in more detail how 
intentions are relevant for understanding the word association behaviour. I firstly review 
the main proposals for understanding intentional action. This portion of the chapter is 
largely descriptive and my aim is not to endorse any particular view. This review is 
nonetheless necessary because in order to understand whether the regular behaviour that 
McIntyre describes is intentional, it is necessary to show how this behaviour can be 
analysed from a variety of approaches to intentional action. I will argue that McIntyre’s 
regular behaviour is not intentional in any ordinary sense. Demonstrating this solely by 
adopting the desire-belief approach to intentional action would leave open the possibility 
that the behaviour is unproblematically intentional from the perspective of a different 
account of intentional action. It is therefore necessary to take as broad an approach as 
possible. With this overview in hand I will conclude that an important distinction needs 
to made between the behaviour of subjects in experiments and the specific part of this 
behaviour that is regular and predictable. This distinction is critical to understanding what 
is happening in these cases. 
 
What are intentional actions? 
Discussion of intentional action often begins with the intuitive distinction that 
there is a difference between things we do and things that happen to us. Anscombe asks, 
“Why is giving a start or gasp not an ‘action’, while sending for a taxi, or crossing the road, 
is one?” (2000, pg. 10). A further example is distinguishing between raising my leg because 
someone has hit me on the knee, thereby activating a reflex, and raising my leg to kick 
someone. Kicking is described as an intentional action while my leg rising because of the 
activation of a reflex is not. We can try to make the distinction in terms of the mental 
states that an agent is subject to in the two cases. When I raise my leg to kick someone 
we can talk about my intention to kick someone, my plan to get revenge by kicking them, 
and my ability to control my behaviour to ensure that I kick them where it hurts. These 
psychological descriptions are not available to us when describing the activation of a 
reflex. If a reflex is activated, intuitively, there is no mental conceptualization taking place 
of which the agent is aware. 
There are three main approaches to the analysis of intentional action.  
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• The desire-belief account, which seeks to identify intentional action 
through the desires and beliefs which caused the action (Davidson 1963, 
1978; Garcia 1990; Pitcher 1970; Davis 1984). 
• The planning account, which focuses on the role actions play in plans that 
agents formulate. Both these approaches are ‘causal’ because they 
emphasise the causal history of an action (Bratman 1979, 1999).  
• In contrast, non-causal accounts of intentional action see the causal 
history of an action as, largely, irrelevant (Frankfurt 1978; Grunbaum 
2007, 2010; Castaneda 1982, 1992).  
 
The following discussion of the analyses of intentional action may appear lengthy, 
given the narrowness of the question addressed, namely, whether McIntyre’s word 
association example is an example of intentional behaviour. However, the arguments 
presented in this section are also necessary for the analysis of middle bias, so, to avoid 
repetition they are included here. 
 
Desire-belief account 
This is the account that McIntyre has in mind. Davidson writes that “if someone 
acts with an intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he been aware 
of them and had the time, he could have reasoned that his action was desirable (or had 
some other positive attribute)” (1978/ 2002, pg. 85. Italics in original). In other words, 
for Davidson, when people act with intention they have attitudes and beliefs about their 
action that make it desirable, or reasonable, or prudent, or some other positive reason for 
performing the action. One other key aspect of Davidson’s philosophy that will be 
relevant for the following discussion is the importance of how an action is described. 
Davidson says, “Action does require that what the agent does is intentional under some 
description, and this is turn requires, I think, that what the agent does is known to him 
under some description” (1971/2002, pg. 50). This suggests that it is not simply action 
that is intentional, but action under some description. Description is important because 
suppose that I intend to make a cup of tea because I am thirsty. In pouring the water out 
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of the kettle I fill my cup, but also spill water on my book. It would be right, according to 
Davidson, to say that I intentionally filled my cup with water, but it would be wrong to 
say that I intentionally spilt water on my book. Filling my cup and spilling water on my 
book are both descriptions of my pouring water from the kettle, but it is only when my 
action is described as ‘filling my cup’ that it is intentional because, in this case, I have 
positive attitudes towards filing my cup with water that make it intentional. I have no 
positive attitudes towards spilling water on my book.  
What matters for Davidson therefore is the causal history of an action, or, in other 
words whether beliefs and desires have caused an action ‘in the right way’. In my example, 
that my desire for tea, and my belief that pouring hot water from a kettle into my cup will 
help me to make some tea. The reason for saying that beliefs and desires cause the action 
in ‘the right way’, and not simply that they cause them, is because deviant causal chains 
are a problem for this account of intentions. Davidson gives the example of making stew. 
I am making stew and believe that adding sage will improve the taste. I hold the spice jar 
over the stew, intending to put some in, but then my cat knocks my hand, thereby causing 
sage to fall into the stew. In this case, what I intended did in fact happen, but it did not 
happen because of my intentions. Davidson summarises the problem as follows, “an 
agent might have attitudes and beliefs that would rationalize an action, and they might 
cause him to perform it, and yet because of some anomaly in the causal chain, the action 
would not be intentional in the expected sense, or perhaps in any sense.” (1971/ 2002, 
pg. 87). This is why these types of causal chains are called deviant and they make it difficult 
to decide whether an action is intentional or not. The beliefs and desires seem not to have 
caused the result ‘in the right way’. Such examples have motivated the inclusion of criteria 
stipulating that an agent does something intentionally only if events follow the agent’s 
plan sufficiently closely. Spelling out what ‘sufficiently closely’ means is going to be 
difficult. A further stipulation that has been suggested is that the outcome must not 
depend too much on luck, whether this luck has been foreseen or not (see Kieran, 2015 
for a summary of these approaches).  
Garcia (1990) sidesteps the debate about whether actions caused by intentions ‘in 
the wrong way’ are intentional by arguing that actions can be ‘partially intentional’. He 
defends the principle that for a person to do something intentionally is for them to do it 
in the way that they intended. ‘In the way’ they intended means along the causal path “along 
which an intention comes to produce the events of the types which figure in its 
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propositional content” (Garcia, 1990, pg. 192). It is important, for him, that I kill my 
friend by shooting him, not by running him over. When we do achieve our ends in a 
different way Garcia says that we have more or less achieved what we intended to achieve 
and acted more or less in the way we intended. Garcia’s analysis of these cases is that I to 
some extent killed my friend in the way I intended, and that my killing him was therefore 
partially intentional. He says this proposal is more appealing than saying either that I did 
or did not kill him intentionally (1990, pg. 192).  
Garcia distinguishes between the concept of intending, and acting with intention, 
(also known as acting intentionally). For him, the concept of intending is more basic. 
Garcia’s example illustrates this distinction. Bernice intends to shoot the king and fires 
her gun at him, but she misses and hits the branch of a tree, which falls on him and kills 
him (Garcia, 1990, pg. 192). Bernice intentionally fires her gun, but unintentionally hits 
the branch. Garcia argues that cases like this are difficult for Davidson, for whom Bernice 
firing her gun and shooting the branch are “one and the same action” (Garcia, 1990, pg. 
193). This is a consequence of a Davidson’s non-standard concept of an event. For him, 
events are “a fundamental ontological category”, analogous to material objects (Davidson, 
1969, pg. 307). This view of Davidson’s is of no further consequence for the following 
discussion. If they are one and the same action then both are intentional, or not. For 
Garcia, when we say ‘Bernice’s firing of her gun was intentional’ this is to say that 
‘Bernice’s firing her gun was done in the way she intended to fire her gun’. This is true. 
In contrast, when we say ‘Bernice’s shooting the branch was intentional’ this is to say that 
‘Her shooting the branch was done in the way she intended to shoot it’. She never had 
such an intention, so this is false. Her shooting the branch was not intentional. For Garcia, 
therefore, we can have actions, such as shooting the branch, that are not intentional. To 
summarise, an agent has intentions, and consequently acts with intention. However, 
because not all of these actions follow the path the agent intended not all of these actions 
are done intentionally.  
 Although appealing, Garcia’s account isn’t entirely satisfactory. If Garcia is right, 
and I ‘more or less’ killed my friend in the way I intended, then we need a way of deciding 
to what extent my plan is more or less the plan I intended. Although Garcia suggests that 
it is a matter of degree, he provides no criteria for judging the extent of the degree of 
difference. This is a problem because it makes it difficult to judge whether what happened 
really is, more or less, what I intended. 
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A further problem for deciding what intentional actions are is how we deal with 
side effects. Pitcher (1970) discusses an example first proposed by Chisholm, viz. the 
example of intending to kill the king. We intend to kill the king, but in doing so, also step 
on an ant. Does a person do both intentionally? Pitcher notes that part of the confusion 
surrounding such debates is that it seems wrong to say that the agent did them 
unintentionally, because, in most examples, the agent knows they are doing them. This 
observation holds particularly well in Bratman’s example. Bratman comes home in the 
dark and considers whether to turn on the light. Doing so will enable him to see but will 
also wake Susan. Were he to turn on the light, causing Susan to wake up angry and ask 
“Why did you wake me?” responding “I didn’t do it intentionally” isn’t satisfactory. 
Bratman did intentionally turn the light on, after all. Pitcher’s way out of this is to say that 
we can deny that a person performed an action unintentionally, while also not accepting 
that they did it intentionally. We can do something neither intentionally nor 
unintentionally. This differs from Garcia’s suggestion because, using Garcia’s framework, 
we can say that turning on the light was an intentional action because Bratman turned on 
the light in the way he intended to turn on the light, but waking Susan was not an 
intentional action because Bratman had no intention to do so.  In contrast, Pitcher just 
opens up a gap between intentional and unintentional action. Some action may be neither, 
but this does not mean that there are degrees of intention.  
Pitcher also notes that, although examples in the philosophical literature often 
direct our attention towards cases where the ‘side effects’ are large. “The standard—and 
we might as well say, the paradigm—cases of expected side effects, as the name itself 
implies, are relatively trivial things that we know will inevitably accompany what we intend 
to do.” (Pitcher, 1970, pg. 667). The importance of this observation is that any concerns 
over labelling actions neither intentional nor unintentional are alleviated if they are 
insignificant. However, this creates a degree of unease when we consider significant, 
particularly morally significant, side effects. Are we really happy to say that I did not 
intentionally kill a child who I ran over while drunk driving? Davis (1984) bites the bullet 
in cases like this, arguing that unwanted, but expected consequences are not intended. He 
discusses playing the piano, which he intends to do, but which will also annoy the 
neighbours. He notes that saying ‘I intend to annoy the neighbours’ sounds wrong. What 
he intends to do is practise the piano; he does not intend to disturb anyone. He says “no 
one ever expresses an intention to bring about expected but unwanted consequences” 
(1984, pg. 47). He gets to the heart of the concern about morally significant side effects 
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by suggesting that part of the reason for believing that expected consequences are 
intended is that we are responsible for them. However, responsibility and intention to not 
line up. He may be responsible for disturbing the neighbours, but this is not the same 
thing as intending to disturb them. We can therefore accept that I am responsible for the 
death of the child, and can be punished, but this does not mean that I did it intentionally.  
Davis (1984) also has a slightly different understanding of the causal account of 
intention by emphasising motivation. His view is that we only intend to do something if 
we are motivated to do it. He defines it this way: “S intends that p iff S believes that p 
because he desires that p and believes his desire will motivate him to act in such a way 
that p” (1984, pg. 51). He believes that including motivation is important because having 
the right beliefs and desires are not sufficient, in and of themselves, for making an action 
intentional. He discusses Maura, who has a track record of having wanted the winning 
World Series team to have won. In other words, the team she wanted to win, did, in fact 
win. She knows this and, in the current series, wants the Red Sox to win. This isn’t a case 
of wishful thinking, given her track record, but neither is it a case of intending, despite 
the fact that she desires that they win, and believes, quite reasonably (from her point of 
view), that they will win. Davis argues that the reason there is no intention here is that 
Maura knows that her desires will not bring about the result. If the Red Sox do win it will 
not be because Maura wanted them to. Motivation is what links beliefs and desires to 
other desires and actions. It is motivation, on this account, that is missing in the wayward 
causal chains. I did not expect my desire to motivate me to hit the branch. I therefore did 
not intend to hit the branch. Davis’ example is problematic though because, given Maura’s 
highly improbable track record, it isn’t clear that Maura is not at least partially justified in 
believing that her wanting the Red Sox to win will lead to their victory. She may be at a 
loss to point to the causal process linking her desire to a team’s success. But it isn’t clear 
to me that she isn’t justified in believing that there might possibly be such a process. In 
other words, it isn’t clear when motivation is justified.  
The philosophers discussed so far provide different ways of characterising 
intentional action. For Davidson, description is central to distinguishing intentional action 
from bodily movement. However, for Garcia and Pitcher actions may be unintentional or 
intentional. Garcia argues that actions may have degrees of intention, based on how 
closely they match what agents intend to achieve. Pitcher argues that we can do something 
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neither intentionally nor unintentionally. We are now in a position to assess whether the 
word association behaviour is intentional. 
It seems clear that it can be intentional under the desire belief account. The 
subjects’ behaviour can be described as ‘learning word pairs’, and ‘answering questions’, 
or ‘participating in an experiment’. The subjects would presumably recognise these 
descriptions of their behaviour. However, things are not as simple as this. A lot hinges on 
how we understand the ‘behaviour’ of the subjects. Their participation in an experiment 
is intentional. By contrast, it isn’t clear that the subjects answered questions in the way 
they intended to. In Garcia’s terms, it is clear that the subjects had a number of intentions, 
and therefore were acting with intention, but their intentional actions did not follow the 
path they intended that they should. They intended to name a detergent, but the name 
they said (surprisingly often) had nothing to do with their intentions. They also had no 
intention of being manipulated into giving a particular response. It isn’t clear, therefore, 
that the regularities in their responses is intentional, even though the more general 
behaviour (participating in an experiment) is intentional. An obvious suggestion is that 
the regular behaviour is a side effect. But this doesn’t seem obviously true either. The 
subjects did intend to give specific answers to the questions they were asked, and they did 
do this. A side effect, as described by Pitcher, would be something like stepping on the 
scientist’s foot, or dropping something. In our case, the regular behaviour doesn’t appear 
to be a side effect because it is inseparable from the intentional behaviour of question 
answering. Judging whether this regular behaviour is intentional is therefore more 
complicated than McIntyre suggests. At this point it is necessary only to note this, and to 
realise that there is a distinction between the behaviour in which subjects are engaged and 
the specific aspects of this behaviour that are regular. This distinction will be discussed in 
more detail when we turn to the example of middle bias because I do not think that it can 
be thoroughly resolved using McIntyre’s example. Before doing this it is necessary to 
assess whether McIntyre’s example is intentional using the other main analyses of 
intentional action. Recall, this is because, if my characterisation of this behaviour is right, 
then it should be right regardless of which approach to intentional action we take. If the 
word association behaviour is unproblematically intentional from the perspective of 
another account of intentional action, then McIntyre is vindicated, and he has highlighted 




Planning account of intentional action 
Bratman (1999) rejects the desire-belief model of intention, focussing instead on 
the importance of planning in guiding action. We form many plans which guide present 
and future action. Intentions are the “building blocks of such plans; and plans are 
intentions writ large” (1999, pg. 8). Bratman’s central reason for believing this is that 
under the belief-desire model of intention we ignore plans. Future directed intentions are 
not embedded in our present actions. In the same way, if we just focus on intentions we 
miss the fact that present action is often part of a prior plan. On this view, seeing my 
shooting of my friend just as an expression of my present desire to kill him, and beliefs 
about how I can achieve this, misses the historic plans of which this action is a part. For 
example, my desire to kill him may form part of a larger plan to make him change his will 
so I inherit his house when he dies; killing him is the culmination of this plan. 
Furthermore, Bratman notes that plans are often “formed, retained, combined, 
constrained by other plans, filled in, modified, reconsidered, and so on” (1999, pg. 8). 
These, he believes, are essential to understanding intention. Just focussing on beliefs and 
desires misses this. In other words, intentions need to be embedded in plans: Long term, 
short term, changing and interacting plans. Concentrating just on the beliefs and desires 
relevant to any particular action does not do justice to the complexity of what is going on 
when we act.  
Bratman begins with the observation that our common sense understanding of 
intention allows us to understand intentions as states of mind while also allowing us to 
characterise actions as done intentionally (1999, pg. 3). Bratman says that the “main 
tradition in recent philosophy of mind and action” (1999, pg. 5) has been to give intention 
in action methodological priority. In other words, the focus has been on analysing the 
intentions behind action. This leads naturally, according to Bratman, to the view that 
intentional action is to be understood in terms of an agent’s desires and beliefs, and the 
relations between these desires and beliefs and the action. On this view, future directed 
intentions (intentions about actions in the future) can be reduced to desires and beliefs. 
For example, my intention to get to London by train tomorrow is just for me to desire to 
get to London tomorrow, and believe that a train will get me there. There is no separate 
state of intending to act; desires and beliefs are sufficient for understanding intentional 
action.   
129 
 
Bratman explicates his notion of intention as a distinctive attitude, which is not 
reducible to desires and beliefs, by distinguishing between various aspects of intention. 
He writes that future directed intention involves commitment, which has two aspects. 
The first, volitional, aspect concerns the relation between intention and action. Intentions, 
in this sense, control action, whereas desires do not. Bratman says that intentions control 
action, whereas desires are just potential influencers of action. For example, I may have a 
desire to buy blue shoes this afternoon. However, I also weigh this desire against my other 
desire to finish this chapter. My desires potentially influence what I do. However, if I 
intend to buy blue shoes this afternoon I will simply execute this intention. The second 
aspect of commitment is the role it plays in making plans for the future. Bratman calls 
this the reasoning centred aspect of commitment. My intention to buy blue shoes this 
afternoon will influence the formation of further intentions. These two aspects, working 
together, “help explain how intentions play their characteristic role in supporting 
coordination, both intrapersonal and social” (Bratman, 1999, pg. 17). These two aspects 
of commitment help to explain why, when someone says that they ‘intend to x’ we 
generally believe that they will do x. This is a brief sketch of Bratman’s reasons for 
believing that planning is central to understanding intentional action. However, it is 
sufficient for analysing McIntyre’s example. 
Is the word association McIntyre describes intentional according to the planning 
account of intentional action? It is reasonable to suppose so, although the plans involved 
in this behaviour are not ones we know about, given his description of the situation. For 
example, the experiment may have formed part of a variety of plans; to help out with a 
scientific research project, to fill an otherwise empty afternoon, or to answer the questions 
quickly so as to not miss the bus home. It is therefore possible to see the subjects’ 
behaviour as influenced by plans. However, as with the desire-belief account, these plans 
do not seem, obviously, to relate to the behaviour in which McIntyre is interested; the 
frequency with which responses to questions can be influenced by prior learning of word 
pairs. This is because the subjects are unaware of the manipulation of their responses. 
Again therefore, although plans relate to the wider behaviour in which subjects are 
engaged, the specific aspects of this behaviour that are regular do not feature in any plans. 





Non-causal accounts of intentional action 
In contrast with both Bratman, and the desire-belief model, Frankfurt (1978) 
argues that the causal history of an action is unimportant in understanding intentional 
action. What matters is the extent to which the action is under an agent’s control. 
Importantly, he is not rejecting the idea that actions have causes, just that “it is no part of 
the nature of an action to have a prior causal history of any kind” (Frankfurt, 1978, pg. 
157). In other words, prior causes are not the right way to distinguish between what 
people do and what just happen to them. If causal history is primarily what matters, then 
intentional and mere bodily movements do not differ in how they are experienced by the 
agent once they are happening. This is clear from the discussion above. Observing the 
physical event of my leg rising does not, necessarily, tell us whether this event is an 
intentional action, or not. The proposal above is that we should look to the prior history. 
However, if this is primarily what matters, this suggests that the leg moving should be 
experienced in the same way in either case, but it is not. Our leg feels very different when 
it has been activated by a reflex than when we raise it ourselves. Frankfurt concludes from 
this that a person exhibiting this behaviour only knows whether it is intentional or not by 
introspection at the time the behaviour is occurring. In deciding whether we are behaving 
intentionally we examine what is happening, not the prior causal history of the behaviour. 
The decisive issue, for Frankfurt, is a person’s “connection with the movements of his 
body” (1978, pg. 158).  
Later, he highlights the importance of whether the physical behaviour is “under 
the person’s guidance” (Frankfurt, 1978, pg. 158). He concedes that when something 
happening under our guidance it is “under the guidance of an independent causal 
mechanism, whose readiness to bring about compensatory adjustments tends to ensure 
the behaviour is accomplished” (1978, 160) but he resists the suggestion that this amounts 
to a causal theory of action because these causal mechanisms co-occur with the bodily 
movements. Looking at things that occurred before the bodily movement began tell us 
nothing about how the action feels, or whether it is under our guidance. He reserves the 
description ‘intentional’ for behaviour that is purposive and under the guidance of an 
agent. His account therefore takes issue with the assertion that the physical act of raising 
my leg to kick someone and it rising because a reflex has been activated are physically 
indistinguishable. For Frankfurt they are primarily distinguishable because they feel 
different for the agent, not because of the different causal history. This difference in 
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feeling, he believes, is critical to understanding intentional action. The critical difference 
between an action and mere behaviour, or kicking and a reflex, is that the former is under 
the agent’s control or guidance. Intentional action is not only under the agent’s guidance, 
but is also purposive; it is undertaken deliberately or self-consciously.  
In Frankfurt’s account, a person may also engage in physical behaviour that is not 
an action, but which becomes an action, once he brings it under his control. He describes 
a car coasting down a hill under the force of gravity. The driver may be happy with the 
course and speed the car is taking and may therefore do nothing to affect the motion of 
the car. This does not demonstrate that the car is not under the driver’s guidance. This is 
because the driver is ready to intervene if he believes he needs to.  
This view has support from Grunbaum (2008), who defends the idea that an 
agent’s experience of moving “has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own 
intentional action” (2008, pg. 243). He begins with the observation that the idea that our 
experience of moving our bodies is “involved in our awareness of what we are 
intentionally doing when we act intentionally” (2008, pg. 244) is intuitively appealing. For 
example, when I raise my leg to kick someone I feel that I am raising my leg. Were I not 
to feel this I would probably stop the action believing that there is something going wrong. 
Despite this intuitive appeal, Grunbaum notes that most philosophers deny that bodily 
awareness plays a substantive role in an agent’s awareness of whether their behaviour is 
intentional. This is because it is often descriptions of behaviour which underpin notions 
of intentional action. We describe things people do, such a painting a wall, in ways that 
make the behaviour intentional. Such descriptions include ‘pleasing my wife’, ‘decorating 
my house’, ‘painting the wall’ etc. Grunbaum says “It would be at this level that the agent 
could be said to be aware of her own action, and at this level that she understands and is 
able to enter into the exchange of asking for and giving reasons for action […] Awareness 
of how one is moving is simply at the wrong level with respect to awareness of one’s own 
action as intentional under some description.” (Grumbaum, 2008, pg. 246). In other 
words, I am intentionally painting my wall because I have an awareness of myself ‘painting 
the wall’, or ‘getting through my chores’. My belief that I am acting intentionally has little 
to do with the feeling I have of lowering and raising my arm, or raising my feet to go up 
a ladder.  
Grunbaum’s proposal is that when we intentionally do something, our awareness 
of doing it intentionally is partly grounded on our awareness that the behaviour is under 
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our control. Were I to engage in some behaviour over which I have no control, then I 
would have no awareness of it being intentional. He illustrates this with the example of 
‘anarchic hand syndrome’, whereby people’s hands perform apparently goal directed 
movements, such as grabbing things. (See Della, Marchetti & Spinnler, 1994) This may 
look like an intentional action, but it is not, because the person with the syndrome has no 
control over their hand; they cannot stop or alter the movement. It is the sense of control 
that makes sense of the difference between anarchic hand syndrome and normal action. 
Grunbaum is not arguing that this is all that matters to intentional action, but that bodily 
awareness of performing an action is normally an important part of intentional action.  
Grunbaum also argues that our experience of active movement comes in degrees. 
There is a continuum going from “premeditated movements and passing by habitual 
actions, fast movement reactions to our surroundings, and conscious blinking of the eyes 
to truly passive movements such as reflexes.” (2008, pg. 249). At least at the level of bodily 
perception, actions can feel more or less intentional. The movement of my leg can be 
ranked in terms of awareness of control. When I am kicking, I have the most awareness 
of control, when my reflex is activated I have less, but not as little as when someone is 
raising my leg for me. One further philosopher will be reviewed before assessing 
McIntyre’s example from this, non-causal, perspective. 
 
Castaneda 
Castaneda (1992) also emphasises the importance of bodily movements. There 
are different levels of description that we can use when describing an action. If I plan to 
learn algebra I do not even think of how I will open the algebra book, how I will lay out 
the pages to write the exercises, or how I will fold the pages when I move on to another 
exercise. However, I do learn algebra intentionally (Castaneda, 1992, pg. 443). When 
describing my action, I will say that I am ‘learning Algebra’, or ‘studying this book’, I will 
not describe it in terms of ‘turning pages’, or ‘making marks on paper’. However, by 
drawing our attention to small physical actions he introduces the idea that the intentional 
action may bring with it other, unintended, actions, which nevertheless form part of the 
larger, intended action. He describes these bodily movements as ‘intersubstitutable’ 
because they are external to the wider project (1992, pg. 444). He means by this that, 
although it is necessary for me to turn the pages of the algebra book somehow, it doesn’t 
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matter how, exactly, I do turn them. The bodily movements constitutive of page turning 
are substitutable because they can be replaced by other, similar actions. I can replace the 
bodily movement of turning pages at the top with the bodily movement of turning pages 
at the bottom. He says of these bodily movements that “typically they seem to be 
performed in a reflex or habitual way. They are, when part of a complex project, 
intentional only by virtue of the project” (1992, pg. 444). In other words, such actions are 
not intentional in and of themselves, but intentional only as part of a larger, intentional, 
action. 
Intention, on this view, is conferred ‘from above’, by the end point of a process, 
which is intentional. He does not go into much detail about how this happens. He says, 
‘bodily movements gain any intentionality they may have precisely because they are the 
initial segments of processes whose terminal points, and some intermediate ones, are 
intentional.” (Castaneda, 1992, pg. 444), and later, ‘the central point is absolutely clear: the 
integrity and unity of a plan of action also comes from above […] i.e., from the terminal point.’ 
(1992, pg. 445. Italics in original). He believes this interpretation matches our ordinary 
language talk of intentions. He considers the following case: Francesca wants to kill 
Romeo. After considering various ways of doing this she decides on shooting him. She 
buys a gun and shoots Romeo. Although we can describe “Francesca’s shooting of 
Romeo as having been done with the intention of shooting him: this intention is not a 
terminal point in Francesca’s plan of action. We must say, appropriately, that she shot 
Romeo with the intention to kill him, not merely to shoot him.” (Castaneda, 1992, pg. 
445). I take it that this example is intended to illustrate the importance of the end point, 
in this case the killing of Romeo. The bodily movements leading up to this, including 
buying the gun, and firing the gun at Romeo, are intentional because the end point is 
intentional. Furthermore, when speaking precisely, we do say that Francesca shot Romeo 
with the intention of killing him and further, we only know this because we know what 
Francesca’s intended end point was. However, exactly how this end point makes bodily 
movements leading up to the end point intentional is unclear. 
A concern may also be raised about the extent to which such bodily movements 
are substitutable and permitted to vary. Accepting that pages can be turned at the top or 
the bottom is simple, but not turning pages at all, or turning ten pages at a time would 
change our understanding of the intentional action that is taking place. In such cases we 
might question whether we are still ‘learning algebra’. Castaneda says that varying degrees 
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of deviations from a plan are allowed, and that the deviations that do not “destroy the 
intentionality of the actions… may vary depending on the interests the community of the 
individuals involved have in those states” (1992, pg. 445). He expands on this later, saying 
that the degree of variation we can allow from a plan, while still considering it intentional, 
are not precise. They depend on the “moral and social gravity of the agents’ purposes and 
actions” (1992, pg. 446). Presumably, what he means here is that if the end goal is murder, 
for which we believe the culprit should be punished, the variations we will allow are less, 
than if we are assessing someone’s success in buying our shopping. Relating this to the 
present discussion, the degree of variation that we allow from a plan to learn algebra while 
still considering it intentional is, according to Castaneda, dependent on the normative 
framework within which we are operating. We might be willing to give more leeway to a 
person learning algebra for their own benefit than someone learning algebra in order to 
teach algebra to students. In the first case, if a person intends to learn algebra for their 
own benefit then we might accept that turning over two pages at a time does not change 
our view that they are intentionally learning algebra, if, for example, it is an easy textbook 
and they are very good at maths. By contrast, if the person aims to teach students, turning 
over two pages at a time may lead us to question whether they are intentionally learning 
algebra. It is important to note that Castaneda says that such judgements are not precise. 
He also suggests that no project in which we engage is bounded by, or totally 
constrained by, our bodily movements, unless those bodily movements are the goal which 
we are pursuing. Bodily movements are critical if our goal is to balance a football on our 
nose, while they are substitutable if our goal is to learn algebra. Given this, he argues that 
bodily movements are only causally, not intentionally, relevant to intentional courses of 
action. I take this to mean that the bodily movements that form part of an intentional 
action are not, themselves, intentional because they are substitutable. However, they have 
a causal role in the intentional action of which they form a part. 
We are now in a position to assess whether the word association example 
McIntyre describes is intentional according to the non-causal account of intentional 
action. In one sense it is because the subjects have, presumably, a bodily awareness that 
they are answering questions and learning word lists. These behaviours are under the 
control of the subjects. However, this question is problematic because although subjects 
feel as though their behaviour is under their control the frequency of certain answers (the 
response ‘Tide’ after learning the word pair ‘ocean, moon’) is not under their control. The 
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response is elicited by manipulation by the experimenters. If subjects were told that the 
answers they give result from the learning of word pairs then they may feel a lack of 
control over this behaviour. Again, this highlights the importance of pinpointing the 
specific part of the behaviour in which we are interested.  
 
Summary 
McIntyre suggests that social scientists need to redescribe the phenomena they 
are interested in in different terms before they will successfully formulate generalisations. 
He believes that cases of word associations illustrate this process. Behaviour that we 
would once have described in terms of beliefs and desires are now described in terms of 
something else. As argued above, it isn’t true that ‘beliefs and desires’ have been 
redescribed, but it is clear that they do not feature in descriptions of the situations of 
which word associations are an example. In his argument McIntyre relies on the assertion 
that this behaviour is intentional, but he provides no argument for this.  
This section has reviewed the belief desire account of intentional actions, and two 
further accounts, the planning account and the non-causal account. The purpose of this 
has been to determine whether McIntyre’s word association example really does describe 
intentional behaviour. Although a simple case can be made that the subjects involved in 
the word association experiments were acting intentionally, because their behaviour can 
be explained by beliefs and desires, it resulted from their various plans, and they had a 
bodily awareness of engaging in this behaviour, it isn’t clear that this gets to the critical 
point of the example. The important point is that the subjects were not aware that their 
answers to questions had been, to some extent, predetermined by their learning of word 
lists. They had no awareness of this aspect of the experiment, so beliefs and desires, plans 
and bodily awareness are not relevant for understanding it. This suggests that this 
particular aspect of their behaviour may not be intentional. Furthermore, given that beliefs 
and desires, plans and bodily awareness do not feature in an explanation of what was 
happened it is difficult to make sense of McIntyre’s suggestion that redescription is 
central. McIntyre’s example has raised some interesting issues, most notably, that 
although subjects were engaged in intentional behaviour (participating in an experiment, 
or answering questions) the behaviour that is of interest (the frequency of certain 
responses) is not uncontroversially intentional because it might be a type of side effect, 
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or simply something unintentional. In the following section I will discuss a different 
example, middle bias, to pin down exactly how we should understand this type of regular 
behaviour in the social sciences. 
 
Middle bias behaviour 
McIntyre’s example, although interesting, is unnecessarily complicated due to its 
reliance on self-reporting by agents. A more recent, and simpler, example is taken from 
Attali & Bar Hillel (2003), who describe a ‘middle bias’ in the placement of correct answers 
in multiple choice questions. In a four answer choice the two middle positions should, if 
answer positions are genuinely randomized, contain the correct answer 50% of the time. 
However, a variety of studies suggest that the correct answer is in the middle positions 
between 70% and 80% of the time. Attali & Bar Hillel note that the ‘middle bias’ is present 
in both test setters and test takers. Importantly, they note that: 
“None of the debriefed acquaintances suspected what the point of 
the little exercise was. They were quite surprised to hear its true purpose- 
and doubly surprised at the results. They admitted no insight as to why 
they had placed their answers where they did and indeed seemed to have 
none. When inventing their questions, position was the last thing on their 
mind, and correct answers were positioned with little if any deliberation” 
(2003, pg. 111). 
They also note that test takers are also unaware of their tendency to pick middle 
answers when they do not know the correct answer to a question, giving reasons such as 
“C just grabbed me” (2003, pg. 112). They also suggest that ‘middle bias’ is a feature of 
other phenomena, such as picking products on a supermarket shelf, or selecting which 
toilet stall to use. Middle bias is also observed when people are asked to ‘pick a number 
between 0 and 10’ (2003, pg. 115). 
Middle bias partly illustrates the characteristics that McIntyre believes important. 
The behaviour is intentional, it is regular, it is regular across contexts, and people 
exhibiting this bias are not, seemingly, aware of it. When asked to give reasons for their 
behaviour they do not give the, apparently correct, reason. As McIntyre suggests, this type 
of behaviour is a candidate for a reliable generalisation, such as: When making a single 
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choice between linearly arranged options, middle positions are favoured at a ratio of 
between 3 and 4 to 1 (Attali & Bar Hillel, 2003, pg. 1).  
Prior to reading Attali & Bar Hillel’s research we might have described question 
placement in terms of the beliefs and desires of agents. We might have said something 
like ‘question setters want correct answers to be, roughly, allocated equally to different 
positions’, or we might have suggested that they have no beliefs or desires relating to 
answer placement. However we think about the beliefs and desires of question setters, 
these beliefs and desires do not explain the pattern of answer placement. In order to 
explain the placement of answers we need to talk about a new phenomenon—-middle 
bias. McIntyre is right to suggest that a new theoretical framework might be needed to 
find regularities. In this case, this is exactly what has happened. Experiments demonstrate 
that people show a preference for middle positions, and this explains a variety of 
phenomena. But this still isn’t a redescription of beliefs and desires. I will argue that: 
 
1. Middle bias behaviour does not fit within the framework of intentional behaviour. 
It is a new category of intentional behaviour, which I will call “derivatively 
intentional”. 
2. Derivatively intentional behaviour is describable using concepts that are not 
Nomadic. 
3. Reliable generalisations can be formulated for derivatively intentional behaviour. 
 
1. Middle bias behaviour does not fit within the framework of 
intentional behaviour. It is derivatively intentional. 
Intentional action can be analysed in terms of beliefs and desires, plans, or bodily 
awareness. However, as the discussion above illustrates, there is little consensus about 
firstly, whether there can be action which is not intentional, and secondly how to 
distinguish behaviour that is intentional from behaviour that is not. Nevertheless, there is 
no need for a unified theory of intentions to use these theories to assess middle bias, 




It is difficult to describe middle bias as intentional in a standard sense because the 
agents involved have no psychological, conscious attitudes, whether beliefs or desires, or 
plans, regarding this behaviour. Nor does it fit within Bratman’s planning account, 
because biasing the middle forms no part of any plan. Neither does it fit well within a 
non-causal account concentrating on bodily awareness. Following Frankfurt’s account, 
there is no awareness of performing this action which can be interrogated to assess the 
level of control an agent has over it. The lack of awareness suggests that there is no control 
whatsoever over the phenomenon, as ordinarily understood. Using Grunbaum’s example 
it fits at one end of the continuum of bodily awareness; it is more like a reflex, over which 
we have no feeling of bodily control than a premeditated action. Question setters know 
that they are writing or typing, but do not have an awareness of the placement of what 
they are writing. Indeed, they express surprise when they are told that they are ‘biasing 
the middle’. It does not even fall within Davis’s focus on motivation to act, because 
middle bias does not motivate anyone to act, at least not in an obvious sense. Middle bias 
does not fit within any of the accounts of intentional action reviewed here. 
However, at the same time, this behaviour is the action of ‘self-consciously active 
human agents’. The agents in question are engaging in behaviour that, when taken as a 
whole, is intentional. They are setting questions for exams or quizzes, or trying to answer 
these exams and quizzes, or making a, seemingly random, selection from a linearly 
arranged set of options. They intend to set or answer questions and they intend to make 
a choice.  
If it isn’t intentional, as ordinarily understood, is ‘middle bias’ a side effect, or 
unintended consequence of intentional action? I argue it is neither. Pitcher and Bratman’s 
discussion highlights that side effects or unintended consequences are usually things that 
we are aware of doing— waking Susan, or annoying the neighbours. Much of the focus 
on side effects also concerns the allocation of responsibility. Neither of these features are 
relevant to the middle bias example. People are unaware of their tendency (at least until 
they are told about it), and given the incidental nature of this behaviour, issues of 
responsibility do not arise. However, the discussion of side effects does provide a useful 
insight. The problem with side effects is that they do not, obviously, fall into either the 
category of ‘intentional action’ or ‘unintentional action’. Garcia introduces the idea that 
actions can be partially intentional. But his proposal is problematic for the middle bias 
example as it is based on the idea of us achieving ‘more or less’ what we intended. In the 
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case of middle bias, how closely we achieved what we set out to do does not affect the 
extent to which our behaviour illustrates the middle bias phenomenon. For example, we 
might intend to set an exam with 50 questions, but actually set one with 40 questions. We 
have ‘more or less’ done what we intended, but the extent of the middle bias phenomenon 
does not vary with how closely we match our original plan. Nevertheless, there does seem 
something right about describing the middle bias behaviour as partially intentional. It isn’t 
entirely unintentional, because it just is part of setting questions, or picking answers, which 
is intentional. 
The account which matches the middle bias phenomenon most closely is 
Castaneda’s. He discusses bodily actions that are only intentional by virtue of the action 
of which they are a part. The way we turn pages when reading an algebra book, for 
example. However, there is an important difference here. Castaneda’s physical actions are 
substitutable. We can turn the pages of our algebra book at the top, or the bottom. We 
will need to turn them in some way or another, but it doesn’t matter to our learning 
algebra how we do it. The difference with the middle bias phenomenon is that the physical 
action of placing answers might be theoretically interchangeable, because we could place 
correct answers in any place, but in fact, it follows a regular pattern. In an important sense 
it is not substitutable because we have a tendency to do it with a particular bias. The fact 
that the middle is biased affects the way that test takers and test setters behave. Page 
turning, when learning algebra might be described as a ‘neutral’ phenomenon, which has 
no effect at all on the end goal. By contrast, biasing the middle may affect the outcome—
if test setters and test takers both show this tendency we can expect a higher pass rate 
than if test setters followed a policy of randomly selecting answer positions. On the other 
hand, it is possible that page turning follows a pattern. Were we to study it we might find 
that people turn 70% of pages at the top, and that this is a regularly observed pattern. But, 
in this case, it would still have no effect on the outcome. We would not be more successful 
at learning algebra if we moved from turning 70% of pages at the top to turning 50% of 
pages at the top.  
However, the other aspect of Casteneda’s description of intentional action applies 
directly to the middle bias phenomenon. This is that these actions are only intentional 
because of the behaviour of which they are a part. Castaneda says that the intentional 
action may bring with it other, unintended, actions, which nevertheless form part of the 
larger, intended action. This matches the middle bias phenomenon. I suggest that there 
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are two aspects to middle bias as it applies to the placement of answers. The agents intend 
to set an exam question and in doing so their intention is directed at wording the question 
appropriately, writing down the correct answer, and thinking about false answers that can 
plausibly be included in the set of possible answers. However, in engaging in this 
intentional action they are also engaging in other behaviour, which is unintentional, and 
this is the bias to place correct answers in the middle of the list of answers. The two types 
of behaviour are interwoven because the unintentional part of the event only happens 
when the agent engages in the intentional action. In contrast with Castaneda’s example, 
the middle bias phenomenon may affect the outcome of the intended task. Nevertheless, 
the unintended action depends for its existence on the intentional action.  
There is a further important distinction. Following Frankfurt’s suggestion that we 
can direct our awareness towards a bodily movement and ‘take control’ of it, although the 
tendency to bias the middle is not intentional, it might become so. For example, if I were 
to set an exam with the knowledge that I have a tendency to bias the middle and that my 
students have a tendency to pick answers in the middle I might well alter my tendency by 
self-consciously placing more correct answers at the edges. Therefore, although this 
behaviour is not intentional, it has the potential to become intentional once I am aware 
of it, and decide to have intentions about it. 
To summarise; middle bias behaviour does not fit neatly into the theories of 
intentional action. The behaviour of setting multiple choice exam questions is intentional 
for the agent setting the questions. We can describe this as intentional regardless of which 
analysis of intentional action we choose to accept. Setting exam questions could be 
caused, in the right way, by agent’s beliefs and desires about setting exams to test students, 
and their beliefs about how to go about this. Setting exam questions forms part of various 
plans, for example, to execute a task that we have been asked to do, to fulfil the obligations 
of a job, and to get through the day. While setting exam questions agents also have a 
bodily sensation of control over this behaviour. Questions are brought to mind, possible 
answers thought of and selected, final ideas are recorded. However, this intentional 
behaviour brings with it other behaviour—that of biasing the middle. This behaviour is 
only intentional because of the larger intentional action of which it is a part. In Castaneda’s 
analysis, this intention is conferred from above. However, were the agent to become 
aware of this behaviour, and have intentions about it, then this behaviour could become 
fully intentional.  
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O’Shaughnessy & Sub-intentional actions 
At this point, an insight from O’Shaughnessy is useful. O’Shaughnessy discusses 
a very similar behaviour to middle bias, which he calls ‘sub-intentional’ (1980 vol 2, pg. 
59). He begins by accepting Davidson’s general point that ascription of intention is 
description relative; but he rejects Davidson’s idea that all actions are intentional under 
some description. He says, “I am convinced that there are exist acts that are intentional 
under no description… there does not exist a description under which they emerge as 
intentional” (1980 vol 2, pg. 59). These are sub-intentional acts. Examples include the 
movement of a person’s tongue, or fingers, or toes, while they are performing other 
actions, such as listening to music or talking to a friend. O’Shaughnessy’s reason for 
believing these actions to be intentional under no description is our unawareness of their 
occurrence. While we may have beliefs, such as that our limbs were in a particular position, 
we are not aware of these beliefs. Further, that belief does not form part of the reason for 
moving the limb, because there was no reason for doing so.  
What determines whether an act is sub-intentional is “the character of its origin” 
(O’Shaughnessy ,1980 vol 2, pg. 59). By this he means whether ‘the faculty of reason’ has 
played a causal role in the generation of the act (1980 vol 2, pg. 60). However, he also says 
“…in the final analysis it is determined by the fact that no intention finds expression in 
the act”. His first explanation suggests that sub-intentional acts are those we haven’t 
reasoned about, but the second suggests that they are simply things we have not intended. 
These two descriptions are at odds with one another because, as the discussion about side 
effects suggested, there may be acts that we haven’t reasoned about, but which we can 
describe as intentional.  
What he means becomes slightly clearer with an example. O’Shaughnessy argues 
that when we think about what our bodies are doing at any point in time we will notice 
actions that we are performing, but which we did not intend to perform, such as 
drumming our fingers. The difference between this type of behaviour and the movement 
of our pupils or heart, for example, is that we are responsible for the first, but not for the 
second. When we notice the drumming of our fingers we become aware of an action that 
we are performing. It is something I am doing. This is not the case for the movement of 
my heart. Furthermore, before I notice the movement of my fingers I am unaware of it.  
142 
 
Once I do notice the movement of my fingers the action can become intentional, 
which is an interesting parallel with Frankfurt. I can decide to move my fingers differently, 
or stop moving them. So, an action that begins as a sub-intentional one can become 
intentional. For Grunbaum, bodily awareness is an important part of describing an action 
as intentional, and this bodily awareness is what is lacking in sub-intentional actions. We 
are not aware of sub-intentional actions, and therefore we do not reason about them in 
any way. Once we notice them, we may bring them under our control.  
 
Sub-intentional action and middle bias 
How, then, does this help our analysis of middle bias behaviour? As with middle 
bias, sub-intentional actions are things that we do, that are not unintentional, in the way 
that reflexes are, because we can bring them under our control. They are both things we 
are unaware of doing, while we are doing them. Sub-intentional actions are intentional 
under no description, and this is arguably the case for middle bias too. A number of 
descriptions are available for question setting behaviour. We could describe it as ‘putting 
pen to paper’, ‘trying to tax the students’, ‘fulfilling the obligations of our job’, ‘making 
up for an easy test last time’ etc. However, alternative descriptions, that might make the 
behaviour intentional are just not available for the middle bias aspect of the event of 
question setting. The phenomenon just appears. O’Shaughnessy says that this is because 
such actions do not involve any ‘reason’, in the sense of conscious mental machinery. 
Although this leaves open the problematic issue of how we are to understand ‘reason’, his 
account captures an important aspect of the middle bias behaviour. We are not aware of 
it, do not reason about it, and therefore it is difficult to see how it can be described as 
anything other than what it is—a tendency to place answers in the middle of the answer 
set. Under this one description it is not intentional, and there are no other descriptions 
available under which it might be made intentional. 
However, there is an important difference with O’Shaughnessy’s theory of sub-
intentional action. The middle bias phenomenon is derived from other, intentional, 
behaviour. There is something intentional going on that is bound up with the middle bias 
behaviour. This is not the case for O’Shaughnessy. He describes physical actions, like 
tapping fingers occurring while other actions are taking place, such as talking to a friend 
or reading a book. The sub intentional, physical, action is not directly related to the 
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intentional events that are occurring at the same time. Finger tapping could continue even 
after the music has come to an end, or after the conversation has finished. Middle bias 
comes to an end as soon as question setting is finished because it is a part of this larger 
action. Following Castaneda, we can confer some degree of intentionality on middle bias 
because it forms part of an intentional action. In his words, intention is conferred ‘from 
above’.  
A natural question here is whether side effects are also sub-intentional actions. I 
argue that they aren’t. In Bratman’s (1999i) example he arrives home late and wonders 
whether to turn on the light. Doing so will allow him to see, but will also wake up Susan. 
He decides to turn on the light, intending to see better, and expects, but does not intend, 
to wake Susan. Bratman gives three reasons for thinking that he does not intend to wake 
up Susan. Firstly, he is not inclined to pursue other means to wake Susan up, if it turns 
out that the light isn’t working; second, he doesn’t rule out other potential actions because 
they are incompatible with waking Susan; thirdly, he doesn’t see himself as faced with a 
problem of how to wake Susan (1999i, pg. 258). This means that, for Bratman, only the 
belief about turning on the light does the causal work in motivating action. In other words, 
“I have my turning on the light as a goal, but I do not have as a goal my waking Susan. It 
seems to me that this difference is reflected in a difference in intention” (1999i, pg. 261). 
Using Pitcher’s framework, side effects fall through the gaps in the distinction between 
intentional and unintentional action. However, this means that they aren’t unintentional. 
Whereas, in contrast, sub intentional actions are unintentional because, where they are 
physical or mental, they are unrelated to our intentions. Furthermore, as O’Shaughnessy 
describes them, we are unaware of sub-intentional actions, whereas we are, usually, aware 
of side effects, in the way that Bratman suggests. We are now in a position to understand 
the phenomenon of middle bias:  
• It is not entirely unintentional, because, following Castaneda, it 
forms part of a larger intentional behaviour. So, it is, to some 
extent, intentional by virtue of being part of question setting, or 
picking answers. From O’Shaughnessy we can take the additional 
reason that this behaviour is something that, when we become 
aware of doing it, is something that we are doing. It is not 
something that happens to us. Following Frankfurt and 
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Grunbaum, it is also something that we can bring under our 
control, and make intentional. 
• It is not a side effect of intentional action, because side effects 
are usually understood as things we are aware of doing. To the 
extent that side effects can be things that we are unaware of 
doing, middle bias is a type of side effect. However, because 
middle bias behaviour is tied in with, and an integral component 
of intentional behaviour it is not a side effect, as ordinarily 
discussed in the literature. These side effects are usually not ‘tied 
in’ with the intentional action. They include stepping on an ant, 
waking Susan, hitting a tree. None of these side effects form a 
part of the intentional behaviour as a matter of course. In 
Bratman’s case, for example, turning on the light only wakes 
Susan because she happens to be asleep. In other circumstances 
he could turn on the light without this side effect. Middle bias 
occurs whenever questions are set. 
• It is not intentional, because, following O’Shaughnessy, no 
conscious mental machinery is involved. We are totally unaware 
of this phenomenon (until someone tells us about it). Placing this 
within the usual understanding of intentional action reviewed 
earlier, it forms no part of plans, it is not caused by any beliefs 
and desires, and we have no physical awareness of it. 
• It is not sub-intentional, because, although it shares many 
attributes with O’Shaughnessy’s examples, middle bias is ‘tied in’ 
with intentional behaviour in a way that O’Shaughnessy’s 
examples are not.  
I will use the term ‘derivatively intentional’ to describe middle bias behaviour and 
other, similar, behaviour. Derivative, because it is derived from, and dependent on, some 
intentional action. However, it can be analysed as an independent phenomenon. The 
reason for picking the word ‘derivative’ is that financial derivatives are a good metaphor. 
Derivatives, such as options and futures depend, for their very existence, on the 
underlying asset on which they are based. You can only have an option on Microsoft 
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shares, when Microsoft shares exist. However, these options on Microsoft shares trade as 
independent entities, and are analysed as such. Nevertheless, the price of the options is 
related, albeit in a complex way, to the price of Microsoft shares. In the case of middle 
bias, the underlying behaviour is the question setting or answering, or the picking of an 
item. This is analogous to the Microsoft shares. Along with this behaviour is derived 
behaviour, which is the tendency to bias the middle. This is analogous to the options on 
Microsoft shares. The derivative behaviour only happens when the underlying behaviour 
takes place, in the same way that options on Microsoft shares only exist when Microsoft 
shares exist. Nevertheless, in the same way that option prices move independently of the 
movements in Microsoft’s share price, the derivative behaviour can be analysed separately 
to the underlying behaviour. This combination of dependence and independence seems 
to fit the middle bias behaviour quite well. The key disanalogy is that options are 
intentionally created whereas as derivative behaviour is discovered. Derivatively 
intentional behaviour is therefore defined by the following necessary, and jointly 
sufficient, conditions:  
1. Derivatively intentional behaviour is a subset of intentional behaviour. 
2. Derivatively intentional behaviour occurs whenever the intentional behaviour 
(of which it is a subset) is undertaken. 
3. An actor is, initially, unaware of this derivatively intentional behaviour and has 
no beliefs, desires, plans, or other deliberations relating to the derivatively 
intentional behaviour. 
4. If an actor becomes aware of the derivatively intentional behaviour they realise 
that it is something they are doing. It is not something that is merely happening 
to them.  
5. If an actor becomes aware of the derivatively intentional behaviour, it can be 






2. Derivatively intentional behaviour is describable using 
concepts that are not Nomadic. 
The previous section outlined O’Shaughnessy’s argument that sub-intentional 
actions are intentional under no description. Although I want to resist tying derivatively 
intentional actions to the belief-desire analysis of intentional action, this point is critical 
to linking this discussion about intentional action to the discussion about social 
phenomena is Chapter 2. This section will show that the possibility of redescribing actions 
is related to the possibility of attributing different meanings to action.  
One of Davidson’s examples of redescription is the following: The same physical 
action can be described as ‘flipping a switch’, ‘turning on a light’, ‘illuminating a room’, 
‘alerting a prowler that I am home’. He uses these alternative descriptions to argue that 
while I may intentionally have ‘illuminated the room’ I did not intentionally ‘alert the 
prowler’. When we give a reason for an action, such as flipping the switch, we say we did 
it because we wanted to illuminate the room, we redescribe the action, finding a place for 
it in a pattern of what we believed and desired. However, this is not my concern here, 
because I do not think that accepting the possibility of redescription necessarily ties one 
to accepting a belief-desire account of intentional action. Consider a person driving down 
the motorway. We can use a non-causal understanding of intentional action and say that 
the person is engaged in an intentional action because they have a bodily awareness of 
control over the car. They can press the accelerator and increase the speed, or turn the 
steering wheel to alter the direction. However, we can describe this bodily awareness as 
being about different things. It could be bodily awareness of ‘driving the car’, or it could 
be bodily awareness of ‘driving to work’, or even bodily awareness of ‘moving my foot 
down’. We can redescribe the behaviour without referencing beliefs and desires. 
Therefore, the possibility of redescribing actions does not seem, necessarily, tied to the 
desire-belief model of intentional action. It is possible just to redescribe behaviour in 
various ways.  
The reason for labouring this point is that there is a parallel between saying that 
behaviour can be redescribed and saying that behaviour can have many meanings. To 
return (again) to Taylor’s example of raising my hand. In raising my hand, I may ‘cast a 
vote’, ‘save the honour of my party’, ‘return a favour’, ‘act in accordance with my beliefs’ 
etc. Taylor points to one physical act and notes that it could mean many different things. 
In many critical respects this is the same thing as saying that behaviour can be redescribed. 
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In Davidson’s example we can ask what flipping the switch meant for the person 
performing the action. By flipping the switch, they could have meant that they ‘wanted to 
see what is in the room’, ‘wanted to turn on the light’ or ‘wanted to alert the prowler’. In 
Taylor’s case, Davidson’s analysis seems to apply uncontroversially. We can redescribe 
the behaviour as ‘raising my hand’, as ‘saving the honour of my party’, ‘returning a favour’ 
and so on.  
However, these examples do suggest one important difference between working 
out what an action means and redescribing it. When we try to work out what an action 
means we, usually, assume that we are getting at what the person meant. It is impossible, 
in Davidson’s example, for the person to have meant to ‘alert the prowler’, because they 
were unaware of the prowler’s presence. When redescribing in Davidson’s sense we are 
limited only to things of which the person is aware. With Taylor’s example it would not 
make sense to say that the person raising their hand meant to ‘wave to their friend’ if they 
hadn’t noticed that their friend was looking at them from across the room. When 
redescribing this is not a limitation—we can redescribe ‘flipping the switch’ as ‘alerting a 
prowler’ because this is one of the things that happened, but we can’t say that by ‘flipping 
the switch’ the person meant to ‘alert the prowler’ because for a person to have meant 
something by their behaviour we, usually, assume that they were aware of what they 
meant. 
What this suggests is that there is a symmetry between the ability to redescribe 
behaviour, and the ability to attribute different meanings to behaviour. However, the 
symmetry breaks down when we use redescription to point to something of which the 
agent was unaware. One way to bring the two into alignment is to draw an equivalence 
between meaning and intentional action. ‘Alerting the prowler’ was not what the actor 
intended by ‘flipping the switch’, nor was it what the actor meant by it. In other words, 
the different meanings we can attribute to behaviour line up with the possible descriptions 
that make behaviour intentional. This excludes descriptions of which the agent is unaware; 
alerting the prowler in Davidson’s example. To clarify, ‘what was meant’ means what the 
action meant to the actor, not what the action meant as some sort of symbolic, or 
communicative, role. This latter notion of meaning does not apply in this case at all. The 
concern with suggesting that there is a symmetry between intentions and meanings in this 
way is that bringing intentions in, in this way, involves a commitment to a causal 
understanding of intentional action. Fortunately, this is a problem that can be sidestepped 
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because, for the purpose of this argument, it can be established that just for derivatively 
intentional behaviour neither redescription, nor attributing multiple meanings is possible. 
These two points will now be argued for in turn. 
It is not possible to redescribe derivatively intentional behaviour for the following 
reasons. Firstly, it is important to understand exactly what middle bias is, although this is 
difficult given the current state of research on this topic. Attali and Bar-Hillel review a 
range of data on middle bias, which yields slightly different numbers. However, they say 
that in single, isolated, questions test setters and takers prefer middle positions to extreme 
ones in a ratio of up to 3 or 4 to 1 (Attali & Bar-Hillel, 2003, pg. 1). In a later paper Bar-
Hillel reviews a range of experiments yielding slightly different results. For example, 
significant differences are found when options are presented serially versus 
simultaneously, and it is often difficult to isolate middle bias from other position biases 
(Bar-Hillel, 2011). Nevertheless, in a commentary on her paper Rodway et al comment 
that “middle preference is surprisingly robust and widespread, having been found in a 
wide range of perceptual-motor tasks” (Rodway, Schepman & Thoma, 2016, pg. 1). 
Middle bias appears to be a robust phenomenon although it is not yet fully understood, 
nor comprehensively described. In advance of this it is difficult to formulate a precise 
definition. However, given the current state of play, let us take middle bias just as it relates 
to multiple choice questions and take it to indicate ‘a preference for the middle options 
in a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1’.  
How is it possible to redescribe this? We could describe it as ‘an aversion to 
options on the edges in a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1’, but this is simply a different way of saying 
the same thing. In multiple choice sets choices are either ‘middle’ or ‘edge’ so there is no 
fuzzy ‘intermediate’ category. It could be objected that ‘illuminating the room’ and 
‘flipping the switch’ are similarly just different ways of saying the same thing, but I dispute 
this. These two descriptions are not simply synonymous because each description tells us 
something different about the event in which we are interested. If we are just given the 
description ‘flipping the switch’ this leaves open what the function of the switch is, it 
might have turned on the radio or opened a trap-door. Even when we know that the 
switch illuminated the room the use of the word ‘flipping’ indicates that the light is neither 
dimmable nor motion sensitive. These descriptions give us more information. The 
redescription of middle bias gives no additional information. Therefore, I argue, 
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behaviour that is derivatively intentional cannot be redescribed in ways that provide 
additional information about the behaviour. 
It is not possible to attribute multiple many because such behaviour, before we 
become aware of it, has no meaning at all for the actor. Asking a person displaying middle 
bias behaviour what they mean by it makes no sense. They do not mean anything by it, 
because they are unaware of it. This is primarily because no conscious cognitive faculties 
have been brought to bear on the behaviour. We can ask what they mean by the larger 
behaviour, that of question setting, because that is what they are thinking about doing, 
that is, the task on which they are concentrating. Middle bias behaviour just comes along 
with it and we have no attitudes towards it, let alone meanings. It is the same for 
Castaneda’s algebra example, where there is nothing we meant by turning the pages of 
our book at the top rather than the bottom. Furthermore, there aren’t multiple meanings 
we, as observers, can attribute to actors.  
So, not only is there a connection between the ability to redescribe behaviour and 
the ability to attribute many meanings, but the reason we can’t attribute many meanings, 
in this instance, is that the behaviour involves no conscious mental machinery that 
motivates us to act. At first sight, this suggests a commitment to the belief and desire 
model of intentional action. However, I want to deny this by suggesting that the reasoning 
is the other way around. It is not particular descriptions that, necessarily, make behaviour 
intentional; it is the presence of motivation and conscious ‘mental machinery’ that lead 
both to the possibility of multiple descriptions and multiple meanings. Using Bratman’s 
terminology, there is no intention, as a mental state, involved in the behaviour that is 
derivatively intentional.  
However, one obvious objection is that it is possible to ask what causes middle 
bias behaviour. Bar-Hillel proposes that middle bias is explained by the middle option 
being easier to reach, either physically or mentally (Bar-Hillel, 2011). This is easiest to see 
in physical tasks where people may reach for the middle object more easily. Rodway et al 
dispute this, arguing that a better explanation is a decision heuristic suggesting that the 
best, and most popular items are positioned in the centre. To substantiate this they cite 
experiments showing that middle bias is much less prevalent when people are asked to 
select from a set of identical bad paintings or ugly faces. Furthermore, when people were 
asked to pick which item they preferred from a set of identical objects middle bias was 
present, but when they were asked which they least preferred, middle bias disappeared. 
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(Rodway, Schepman & Thoma, 2016, pg. 3) So, it is possible to ask whether middle bias 
means that people subconsciously think that middle options are the ‘best’ option, or 
whether it means that people think middle options are easier to reach. However, this just 
reflects our current ignorance. Presumably, at some point, the question will be answered 
definitively and there will be only one thing that middle bias means about human beings.  
Exactly how we are to understand the relationship between meaning and 
redescription when they are possible can be dealt with at a later date. The conclusion that 
for derivatively intentional behaviour neither informative redescription nor multiple 
meanings for the person engaging in the behaviour are possible allows us to bring together 
the analysis of middle bias with the analysis in Chapter 2. The argument is as follows: 
 
i. Derivatively intentional behaviours are describable using concepts that are less 
Nomadic. 
ii. Therefore, we can make reliable generalisations about derivatively intentional 
behaviour. 
 
i. Derivatively intentional behaviours are describable using concepts that 
are less Nomadic 
Chapter 2 explained that some concepts are better for making generalisations. 
Concepts that are better for formulating generalisations are those where there is little 
possibility for disagreement over which phenomena fall within the scope of a concept. In 
other words, concept that are less Nomadic. Central to this is the number of meanings 
people can have in mind when using a particular concept. Other characteristics are the 
the precision of the boundaries of these different meanings and the extent to which these 
meanings change over time. If a concept has only one meaning, and this meaning is 
precise, then it should be a promising one for using in generalisations.  
I have established that derivatively intentional behaviour cannot be redescribed in 
such a way as to make it recognisably intentional from the point of view of the person 
performing the action, and it does not have multiple meanings for the actor. It remains 
to link derivatively intentional behaviour to the concepts with which we analyse it. To do 
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this we need to distinguish between analysing the behaviour of a single actor and analysing 
at a more general level, making use of concepts. 
• Derivatively intentional behaviour and the single agent: An 
agent setting multiple choice questions engages in the 
derivatively intentional behaviour of biasing the middle. 
Consequently, this behaviour has no meaning for him, and, 
when analysing his behaviour there aren’t multiple 
descriptions of this behaviour that are not synonymous with 
the original description. This follows directly from the 
discussion of derivatively intentional behaviour above.  
• Derivatively intentional behaviour and concepts: When 
analysing the phenomenon of middle bias we still say that the 
behaviour has no meaning for the agents, but we, as external 
observers, clearly mean something when we talk about middle 
bias. But it means only one thing. When we talk about middle 
bias we mean the behaviour people show when picking items 
from linearly arranged options. This is all we can mean. Once 
we understand what causes this behaviour we will also be able 
to say what it means about human beings. 
What is the connection between the lack of meaning for an actor and the existence 
of only one meaning when an observer talks about middle bias as a concept? The reason 
why some concepts used in the social sciences can have many meanings is that we are 
aware of the things agents may have meant when engaging in the behaviour that we 
include within this concept. Consider again an example from Chapter 2. The concept of 
a ‘democracy’ can mean many things. These include ‘participation’ and ‘contestation’ to 
list just two. Why do we think the concept of ‘democracy’ can mean these different things? 
At least in part, this is because it’s plausible to think of the people who are engaging with 
a political process characterised by ‘contestation’ or ‘participation’ as thinking of 
themselves as members of a ‘democracy’. In other words, the actions associated with 
engaging with a political process are intentional in an ordinary sense, be it resulting from 
beliefs and desires in the right way, forming parts of plans, or bodily awareness of control 
over these behaviours. These behaviours do involve conscious mental machinery which 
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motivates agents to act in various ways. We know that these behaviours are intentional in 
an ordinary way because, when we ask people about what they are doing they will talk 
about what they intended, or wanted, or hoped to do. Because of this the things people 
do are amenable both to redescription and multiple meanings. When this behaviour is 
analysed, we are aware of these possible descriptions, and meanings actions may have for 
agents, and therefore describe them using concepts which import this possibility of 
multiple meaning and description. 
Furthermore, when behaviour is intentional in an ordinary sense people 
consciously think about their behaviour, be it in terms of plans, beliefs and desires, or the 
awareness of how they are executing a task. This means that each instance of a ‘democratic 
process’ will differ, in some respects, from other instances of a ‘democratic process’. 
Agents are usually aware of how other people have behaved in similar situations, reason 
about their intended behaviour, and alter their behaviour accordingly. The importance of 
this is that even when agents intend to create a ‘democracy’, or a ‘democratic process’ 
they are likely to do it in a different way to other people. When analysing ‘democracy’ we 
are therefore faced with social phenomena that are not uniform. Derivatively intentional 
behaviour, on the other hand, is relatively uniform because we are usually not made aware 
of it. When we are made aware, this behaviour will be less uniform. 
 
ii. Therefore, we can make reliable generalisations about derivatively 
intentional behaviour. 
Let us consider a generalisation about middle bias. 
When making a one-off choice between linearly arranged options, middle 
positions are favoured at a ratio of between 3 and 4 to 1 (Attali & Bar-Hillel, 2003, pg. 1) 
The relevant concepts here are ‘choice’, ‘linearly arranged options’, ‘middle 
positions’, ‘favoured’. Within the context of the cases we are applying this generalisation 
to, there is not much, if any, scope to question what we mean by these concepts. We could 
debate what a ‘choice’ is, but, when presented with a number of options and asked to 
‘choose one’, this concept is uncontroversial. We might also question what it means to be 
in the ‘middle’. When picking between four options the middle is clearly the middle two. 
However, when picking between five, do we count just the central position as the middle, 
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or also the positions either side of this central position? Similar questions arise as we 
include more items. However, unlike many of the concepts discussed in chapters 2 and 3, 
we can easily settle on our meaning. Once we have done so the concept does not have 
boundary issues. Additionally, if you disagree about my specification of the ‘middle’ you 
can use the same data and widen what counts as the ‘middle’. So, the concepts used in 
this generalisation are better suited for formulating generalisations than many of the 
concepts discussed in prior chapters.  
The purpose of this section has been to show that the phenomenon of middle 
bias is describable using concepts that make formulating reliable generalisations relatively 
uncontroversial; these concepts are not Nomadic. This is because middle bias behaviour 
is derivatively intentional, which means that it is not subject to multiple descriptions or 
meanings. The importance of this is that, when analysing this behaviour, we can do so 
using concepts that do not have multiple meanings, and therefore the concepts cover a 
small, and relatively precise, section of phenomena. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a discussion of McIntyre’s argument that the social 
sciences are in need of redescription before we can make reliable generalisations. In 
particular, he argues that we need to redescribe beliefs and desires in other terms. This 
chapter has sought to demonstrate that this is not true. Behaviour that is regular and 
predictable is behaviour in which beliefs and desires do not feature at all. The second part 
of the chapter analysed McIntyre’s assertion that the regular behaviour he describes is 
intentional. Taking each of the main interpretations of what makes actions intentional: 
the desire belief account, the planning account and non-causal accounts, I argued that, 
although prima facie this behaviour is intentional, it is difficult to describe the aspect of this 
behaviour that is regular as intentional. The final part of the chapter analysed a different 
example of regular behaviour, middle bias, to explore in more the detail the characteristics 
that this type of regular behaviour has. The conclusion is that the middle bias example 
illustrates that regular and predictable behaviour is derivatively intentional. It is not 
intentional in and of itself, but derives intentionality from wider, intentional, behaviour 
of which it is a necessary part. I propose that this is an example of a regularity in the social 
sciences and that other behaviour sharing these characteristics is likely also to be regular. 
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Additionally, a link was made with Chapter 2, by arguing that behaviour that is derivatively 
intentional is describable using concepts that are not Nomadic. Derivatively intentional 
behaviour is therefore the best candidate, so far, for formulating reliable generalisations 
in the social sciences. The worry that this type of behaviour is not what the social sciences 





















Chapter 5: Clarifications and further work 
 
This chapter attempts to anticipate some clarifications that may be called for after 
reading the prior chapters. Firstly, if many concepts that social scientists use really are 
Nomadic, this suggests that formulating policies in the social sciences is difficult. This 
chapter discusses an example of social science research and shows that working with 
Nomadic concepts is possible, and that recognising that many concepts social scientists 
use are Nomadic may make social science research more successful. Secondly, if it is true 
that behaviour that is derivatively intentional can be analysed using concepts that are less 
Nomadic, then the less Nomadic concepts in Chapter 2 should also be derivatively 
intentional. This chapter shows that the concept of ‘demand’, which was described as less 
Nomadic in Chapter 2, does share some characteristics of derivatively intentional 
behaviour. Finally, the middle bias example may be seen as uninteresting from a social 
science perspective. This chapter discusses some other, potential, examples of derivatively 
intentional behaviour. 
 
1. The idea of Nomadic concepts has troublesome 
implications for social policy. 
If policies are formulated using Nomadic concepts it appears, from the analysis 
in Chapter 2, that it will be difficult for social scientists to agree about whether a policy is 
the right one, and how to decide whether it has been successful. The discussion in Chapter 
2 illustrated these problems with the poverty example. Social scientists disagree about 
what the relevant meanings of ‘poverty’ are, and even if they agree about this, how they 
should measure changes in ‘poverty’. However, the purpose of the Nomadic concepts 
framework is not to suggest that working on social policy is a waste of time. The following 
example is intended to show that working with Nomadic concepts is possible and, when 
done well, can help with the formulation of successful policies.  
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) recently published a report on the provision 
of breakfast clubs at schools (IFS, 2017). The Magic Breakfast project was a randomised 
controlled trial in the UK that aimed to assess the impact of providing of a free breakfast 
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before school on academic attainment (which was measured by teacher assessed 
performance in English and Maths tests). The trial ran for one academic year and focussed 
on schools in relatively deprived areas. The concept of ‘academic attainment’ is 
synonymous, in this study, with performance on national tests in English and Maths taken 
at the end of Year 2 and Year 6. The trial provided evidence that providing breakfast 
improved the results in Year 2 tests by approximately 2 months’ worth of progress. The 
effect on the Year 6 test results was positive, but less significant. 
The concept of ‘academic attainment’ is a Nomadic concept, and it is debatable 
whether it just means ‘how children perform in national tests in English and Maths’. While 
English and Maths are, quite reasonably, the core of the school curriculum, there are other 
ways in which children can demonstrate ‘academic attainment’, for example in music, or 
science. Furthermore, a child might perform well in a relaxed classroom setting but 
struggle with formal tests; this is particularly plausible with Year 2 children, who are 7 
years old. We might also think that ‘academic attainment’ might be improved without an 
increase in test scores, if children are more interested in class, ask more questions, and get 
more work done. Improvement is test scores might lag such improvements in ‘academic 
attainment’ beyond the length of the study. ‘Academic attainment’ can therefore mean a 
number of different things. One of these meanings, the test scores, is precise, but the 
others are not. Assessing the level of interest in class, or greater concentration, is a 
subjective matter. After all, for one child showing greater interest in classes might mean 
reading more, while for another it might mean not hitting other children in lessons. 
 At first sight, the prior paragraph suggests that this trial focussed only on one 
meaning of ‘academic attainment’. Although performance in tests was the primary focus 
of the trial, other data was collected to assess how providing breakfast affected test scores. 
Teachers completed surveys on ‘Classroom behaviour and concentration’, ‘attendance at 
school’, and data on ‘health’ was also gathered (this was primarily weight and height data). 
Children and parents were also asked to comment on the trial. In summary, while the trial 
focussed on the effect of breakfasts on test scores the surveys provide information 
relevant to the other things that ‘academic attainment’ can mean. This other data proved 




“3. The findings suggest that it is not just eating breakfast that delivers 
improvements, but attending a breakfast club. This could be due to 
the content of the breakfast itself, or to other social or educational 
benefits of the club. 
4.  Pupil behaviour, as measured by a teacher survey, improved in 
breakfast club schools. This is interesting because it shows that 
breakfast clubs may improve outcomes for children who do not even 
attend breakfast club, by improving classroom environments.” 
(Education Endowment Foundation, EEF Projects, 2017, pg. 1) 
 
The information relevant to these other meanings of ‘academic attainment’ was 
relevant to making sense of the trial. The teacher surveys were conducted because it was 
believed that they would help to discover the mechanisms by which breakfast provision 
influenced test scores, not because improved behaviour and concentration were seen as 
things that ‘academic attainment’ can mean. This is a relevant difference. If it had turned 
out that despite improvements in behaviour and concentration test scores didn’t improve, 
the trial would have shown no link between breakfast provision and academic attainment. 
Recognising ‘academic attainment’ as a Nomadic concept would lead social scientists to 
use more diverse criteria for judging success in trials like this. 
Point 3 also highlights that different breakfast clubs functioned in different ways. 
Specifically, in some cases the clubs had social benefits rather than nutritional benefits. 
The report says, “the case study evidence suggests that staff perceived the social 
environment of the breakfast club as positive for children’s relationships and 
independence.” (Education Endowment Foundation, Magic Breakfast, 2016, pg. 38). The 
breakfast clubs often played games, encouraged interaction between children in different 
academic years, and developed relationships with teachers outside the formal school 
regime (pg. 57-8). It is possible that in one school the breakfast itself improved academic 
performance because the children did not receive sufficient food, or food of the right 
sort, at home. In this case the extra calories made the difference. In another school, the 
children may have already been well fed but the breakfast club allowed them to chat with 
teachers about problems and difficulties they were having that negatively affected their 
academic performance. In this case it isn’t the provision of breakfast that made the 
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difference, but the chance to chat informally with teachers. Providing breakfast may mean 
very different things, and there are a number of ways in which breakfast clubs can 
positively affect academic attainment. It would be very difficult to formulate a policy that 
specifies all these things precisely. 
In conclusion, ‘academic attainment’ is a Nomadic concept. The breakfast club 
trial suggests that when social scientists are dealing with Nomadic concepts, a number of 
meanings of concepts may be relevant to assessing the results of a trial. Recognising this 
can lead to the inclusion of a wide range of evidence when assessing improvements in 
academic attainment, rather than just focussing on the most obvious evidence provided 
by test scores. Also, when dealing with Nomadic concepts, an ‘intervention’ such as 
breakfast provision may be successfully implemented in many different ways. Breakfast 
clubs can mean different things for different schools, ranging from a provision of food, 
to a chance to mix with teachers on an informal basis. This heterogeneity is only a concern 
if social scientists are seeking to formulate prescriptive policies, but the success of the 
Magic Breakfast trial suggests that heterogeneity in breakfast clubs allows a variety of 
pupils to benefit in different ways. The Nomadic concepts framework does not suggest 
that social policy is difficult to formulate, but it does suggest that a wide range of evidence 
is relevant in assessing such concepts, and that effective policy is likely to be 
heterogeneous. A successful policy may be implemented very differently, so much so that 
two examples of the same policy have little in common.  
 
2. How does derivative intentionality fit in with the regularities 
discussed in Chapter 2?  
Chapter 4 suggested that behaviour that is derivatively intentional can be analysed 
using concepts that are less Nomadic. Chapter 2 also gave examples of concepts that are 
less Nomadic. If derivative intentionality really is a useful concept, then concepts that are 
less Nomadic should also be derivatively intentional.  
The following section argues that this is true, and can be demonstrated by re-
visiting the law of supply and demand introduced in Chapter 2. As a brief reminder, the 
concepts used in formulating this law are ‘demand’ and ‘supply’. Page 38, above, showed 
that the concept of ‘demand’ is less Nomadic than the concept ‘social exclusion’. This is 
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because ‘demand’ means the amount of a good or service that a customer is willing to buy 
at a particular price. Although there are two different meanings of ‘willingness to buy’, 
these are closely related, and precisely defined. Furthermore, ‘demand’ in an economic 
sense, is unlikely to change over time.  
How does the idea of derivative intentions fit into this description? The following 
paragraph will show that the concept of ‘demand’ fulfils some of the criteria of derivative 
intentionality. These criteria will be discussed in turn. 
 
a. It is behaviour that is a subset of intentional behaviour. 
‘Demand’ for a good or service is something that interests economists, but it 
is difficult to see how ‘demand’ is something about which people have 
intentions directly. For example, we may each demand a number of things at 
various prices, and we may intend to buy them, now, or when the price is 
right. What is less clear is that our intentions are about the level of ‘demand’ 
for these goods and services. There are some cases when we do care about 
the level of demand; cases where we intend that the demand for a particular 
good be at a particular level. This could occur if we want to stop people buying 
something, such as animal fur. In this case we have intentions about reducing 
the level of demand for this product, but in most cases, we have intentions 
about buying certain items; the level of demand is not something that 
concerns us. In many cases, therefore, ‘demand’ is a subset of the intentional 
behaviour of wanting certain products and services. 
 
b. This behaviour occurs whenever the intentional behaviour, of which it 
is a subset, is undertaken. 
When people want to buy things, there will be a level of ‘demand’ for these 





c. An actor is, initially, unaware of this derivatively intentional behaviour 
and has no beliefs, desires, plans, or other deliberations relating to the 
derivatively intentional behaviour. 
This is true when people just want to buy a variety of things. They have beliefs, 
desires, plans and other deliberations relating to the things they want, and 
prices they are prepared to pay for them, but usually, do not reflect on the 
demand for these goods. The obvious exceptions to this are cases where 
people fear a shortage, in which case they will pay attention to the level of 
demand, where these is a predictable connection between the level of demand 
and prices, or when (as above) they have views about demand for goods, 
either because they think there should be no demand, or because they think 
the level of demand should be higher (such as wanting to increase the level of 
demand for children’s car seats).  
 
d. If an actor becomes aware of the derivatively intentional behaviour they 
realise that it is something they are doing. It is not something that is 
merely happening to them. 
This criterion works rather differently for ‘demand’ than for middle bias. This 
is because, in the case of ‘demand’, each person’s contribution to the level of 
demand is likely to be negligible. So, it is something that they are ‘doing’ only 
in a very limited sense. Nevertheless, it is something that their actions form a 
part of.  
 
e. If an actor becomes aware of the derivatively intentional behaviour, it 
can be brought under the actor’s control, if they choose to do so. 
Again, this is not the case in the current example. Only in exceptional 
circumstances can one person control the ‘demand’ for a good or service. 
However, they can form intentions about it, and try to influence it. For 
example, they could begin lobbying, or writing articles in the hope of 
influencing other consumers. They can also bring their, limited, contribution 
161 
 
to the demand for a good under their control, for example by no longer buying 
it. 
 
Is the concept of ‘demand’ derivatively intentional? It does not satisfy all the 
criteria because it is difficult to see how the demand for a good is something that people 
are doing. In the middle bias example biasing the middle is something that people are 
doing, even if they are the only person doing it. When economists are concerned with the 
demand for a good, they are usually concerned with the aggregate effect of many 
individual decisions. Consequently, demand is not something that can be brought under 
a person’s control in any clear way. Nevertheless, it is true that the demand for a good is 
a phenomenon which arises, as a matter of course, out of the intentional behaviour of 
individuals, and about which they normally have no intentions.  
 The concept of ‘demand’ is less Nomadic than many other concepts, such as 
‘happiness’ and ‘welfare’, but neither is it entirely precise either. Regularities using the 
concept ‘demand’ have ceteris paribus clauses, and many exceptions. While it would be 
incorrect to say that the level of demand for a product is derivatively intentional, it does 
meet some of the criteria for being derivatively intentional. This is an area worth 
researching further. Specifically, it is possible that when demand is derivatively intentional 
it behaves more in accordance with the laws of supply and demand. However, this is best 
assessed using empirical data and is an interesting project for further research.  
 
3. Middle bias isn’t really ‘social’ science.  
One concern about Chapter 4 is that philosophers of social science have 
ambitions about generalisations in social science that go beyond formulating 
generalisations about biasing middle options. Instead, they hope to manage economies, 
or successfully foresee the impact of policy decisions. The middle bias example is no 
consolation, nor is it even ‘social’ in an obvious sense. The following section describes 
some other examples of behaviour that may be derivatively intentional which may alleviate 
this concern. These examples are intended to be purely illustrative at this stage and some 
of them may be shown to be mistaken. They are listed simply as interesting possible 
examples of derivatively intentional behaviour that are worth further research, and which 
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may be more relevant to a more standard understanding of what social science is than the 
example of middle bias discussed above. 
 
Other possible examples of derivatively intentional behaviour 
Sentence structure in novels 
This example closely matches the characteristics of middle bias. Drozdz et al 
(2015) discovered a surprising pattern in the variety of sentence lengths in a sample of 
international novels. They studied the sentence lengths in 113 English, French, German, 
Italian, Polish, Russian and Spanish books, and included books from a variety of time 
periods. Sentence length variability (SLV) was modelled and this points towards “power 
law long-range temporal correlations in SLV- thus to its fractal organisation- and indicates 
that it balances randomness and orderliness, just as it does for music, speech, heart rate, 
cognitions, spontaneous brain activity, and for other ‘sounds of nature’” (2015, pg. 6). In 
other words, variability in sentence lengths in these books appears to conform not only 
to a regular pattern, but to the same regular pattern as other phenomena, such as music.  
We might question whether the sample is large enough, and the extent to which 
the specific books chosen are representative of ‘literature’, or ‘good writing’. Nevertheless, 
if we take the study at face value the fact that variability in sentence length is subject to 
regularities, is interesting. The authors of the books were engaged in intentional behaviour 
while writing, and they were also, presumably, paying attention to each sentence to ensure 
that it sounded right, or expressed their thoughts in the right way. It is, almost, certain 
that they did not have any clear intention that their sentence lengths should conform to 
this pattern. Indeed, they might find it surprising that it does. Reviewing each of the 
criteria for behaviour to be derivatively intentional in turn: 
It is not entirely unintentional, because it forms part of a larger intentional 
behaviour; writing a novel. Where the authors to become aware of doing it, is something 
that would be doing. It is not something that simply happens to them; they are writing 
sentences with a specific structure. It is also something that they can bring under their 
control, either by checking that their new writing conforms to this pattern, or by ensuring 
that it does not. It is tied in with intentional behaviour, so it is not a side effect, as side 
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effects are ordinarily understood because it is tied in with the intentional novel writing 
behaviour. 
 It is not intentional, because, following O’Shaughnessy, no conscious mental 
machinery is involved. Authors, and readers, are totally unaware of this phenomenon (until 
someone tells us about it). Placing this within the usual understanding of intentional action 
reviewed earlier, it forms no part of plans, it is not caused by any beliefs and desires, and 
we have no physical awareness of it. 
This appears to be a potentially good example of derivatively intentional 
behaviour. Although it is, arguably, more interesting than middle bias, this example is also 
unlikely to satisfy the original motivations for finding regularities in the social sciences. 
However, the suggestion that sentence length variability conforms to the same pattern as 
other phenomena, such as music, does in my view, make this discovery important for 
understanding human behaviour. Clearly this is a matter about which opinions will differ. 
 
Laws of internet searches 
In 1998 Huberman et al proposed a ‘law of surfing’, which “determines the 
probability distribution of the search-depth that is, the number of pages a user visits 
within a web site.” (1998, 95). They suggested that this formula could accurately predict 
page hits. The internet was in its infancy in 1998, but the belief in the existence of 
regularities in search patters has persisted. For example, Halvey et al (2006) analysed 
patterns in web surfing on mobile devices. They set out to discover whether, what they 
refer to as the “Universal Law of Web Surfing” (for which they cite Huberman et al as 
their source) applies to search patters when people are using mobile devices. They 
conclude that their results “confirm the generality of the Universal Law of Web Surfing” 
(2006, pg. 77).  
The regularities they found “have been characterised by an inverse Gaussian 
distribution of surfing behaviour that helps determine the probability a user will click 
through a succession of pages (search to a given depth) in a surfing session” (Halvey et al, 
2006, pg. 77). The data suggests that most internet users only select two or three links in 
a session and are unlikely to pursue searches further than this. They expected that 
differences between mobile and computer technology, and the difference in the quality 
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of material available on mobile devices in 1996 would have led to differences in patterns 
of web surfing between computer and mobile based searches. However, the patterns 
originally derived from data on computer based internet searches applied to internet 
searches on mobile devices too.  
The use of the description ‘universal law’ makes this example worth discussion, 
even though this description is undoubtedly inaccurate. The described pattern to internet 
searches is possibly another example of derivatively intentional behaviour. It is not 
entirely unintentional, because it forms part of a larger intentional behaviour; searching 
for information on the internet. Where people to become aware of doing it, it is 
something that they are doing. It is not something that simply happens to them; they are 
deciding whether to click on certain links or not. It is also something that they can bring 
under their control, either by consciously noting that their behaviour is regular, or by 
trying to change their behaviour (although it is unclear why people would want to change 
their behaviour in this instance). It is not a side effect because it is tied in with the 
intentional internet searching behaviour. However, this behaviour is not intentional, 
because, following O’Shaughnessy, no conscious mental machinery is involved. 
Exhibiting predictable patterns in website searching forms no part of plans, it is not 
caused by any beliefs and desires, and they have no physical awareness of it. 
Understanding regularities in internet searching behaviour has a number of 
potential applications. It may help to understand in more detail how information is 
transmitted, and may indicate ways in which ideas can be communicated more effectively, 
both through website design as a whole, and by trying to increase the likelihood that 
people will increase their search depth. Huberman et al’s original model, which is also the 
one used by Halvey et al derives the probability of an internet search clicking on a link by 
assuming that the decision to click on a link reflects the searcher’s estimate of the 
probability that the next page will contain useful information (given the subject matter of 
many internet searches ‘useful’ and ‘information’ can presumably be very loosely 







The prevalence of mobile phones has enabled the collection of enormous 
amounts of data on people’s locations over long periods of time. Song et al (2010) studied 
data on people’s locations based on their mobile phone data and conclude that people’s 
mobility patterns are highly predictable, and these patterns remain predictable even when 
people travel over large distances on a regular basis. Song et al analysed the mobility 
patterns of 50,000 people over a three-month period. They did not have access to real 
time, exact, locations but received information on which mobile phone masts the people 
were closest to whenever they made a call. After collecting data they sought to predict the 
location (which mobile phone mast they would be closest to) where a person would 
appear next. They concluded that location is 93% predictable.  
However, things are not quite so simple as this. Predictability was, unsurprisingly, 
highest at night when most people are, predictably, at home. The least predictable time 
periods where when people were moving between locations, such as work and home. 
However, people did show a tendency to move predictably between locations. In other 
words, they do not often decide to walk a different way to work. Differences in age, 
gender, language groups, urban vs rural locations, did not affect predictability significantly. 
Importantly, the study did not find that people’s locations were less predictable at the 
weekends, compared with weekdays. The authors conclude that “…regularity is not 
imposed by the work schedule, but potentially is intrinsic to human beings… despite this 
inherent population heterogeneity, the maximal predictability varies very little… and we 
see no users whose predictability would be under 80%” (Song et al, 2010, pg. 1021).  
This behaviour also fits the criteria for derivatively intentional behaviour. 
Location predictability not entirely unintentional, because it forms part of a larger 
intentional behaviour. In this case, the intentional behaviour is not as well defined 
because at different times people’s intentions will be different. For example, on a 
Monday morning many people may simply be intending to go to work, while on a 
Saturday night their intentions might be to go out to dinner, or to meet friends, or to 
start a fight.  
Were people to become aware of the patterns generated by their behaviour, it 
would be something they are doing. It is not something that simply happens to them; 
they are going about their daily lives. It is also something that they can bring under their 
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control, some people might be horrified that their seemingly spontaneous lives conform 
to this locational predictability and make a conscious effort to be less predictable. It is 
tied in with intentional behaviour, so it is not a side effect, as side effects are ordinarily 
understood, because it is tied in with the intentional behaviour. 
It is not intentional, because, following O’Shaughnessy, no conscious mental 
machinery is involved. People are not aware of this phenomenon, until they find out about 
it. Placing this within the usual understanding of intentional action reviewed earlier, it 
forms no part of plans, it is not caused by any beliefs and desires, and we have no physical 
awareness of it. 
This, therefore is another example of behaviour that may be derivatively 
intentional, with one caveat. In this case the intentional behaviour is more difficult to 
define, because there is no one activity in which people are involved, except if it is 
something extremely general like ‘going about their daily lives’. Furthermore, the 
predictable behaviour is not tied in with one instance, or even one type of intentional 
behaviour. The people going about their daily lives are, in all likelihood, intentionally 
doing a number of very different things, including going to work, taking some exercise, 
and visiting friends. In this case we can understand the regular patterns in people’s 
locations as derivative on many, intentional, decisions about where to go next. It is unclear 
whether this makes any significant difference to our understanding of this regular 
behaviour. This is an aspect of this type of regular behaviour that needs to be analysed 
further. 
Song et al suggest that their research is relevant for urban planning, public health 
and traffic management. One potential use for this type for research is understanding 
patterns of disease diffusion and the spread of epidemics. However, Ferguson (2007) 
notes that analysing the possible spread of epidemics using travel and locations data from 
people’s behaviour in normal times is potentially useless. He notes that, while people do 
not usually significantly change their behaviour when they have a cold, news of a 
pandemic is likely to make them avoid certain locations, and flock to others. This will 
make such models highly unreliable. 
In conclusion, this section has tentatively proposed some examples of derivatively 
intentional behaviour that may be more relevant to social science research than middle 
bias. Even if these examples turn out not to be examples of genuinely regular behaviour 
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they suggest the types of situations where regularities in behaviour may be found in the 
future. Middle bias is a disappointing example of a regularity in behaviour as far as 
standard social science research is concerned, but it is possible that other regularities may 
be discovered that are much more relevant for social science research; the examples above 





















Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The social sciences are often thought to be inferior to the natural sciences because 
they have not discovered many convincing examples of laws. This thesis has suggested a 
new reason why this is so, which is that the social sciences often deal with Nomadic 
concepts. This thesis has therefore proposed a new way of thinking about the concepts 
that social scientists use. The advantage of describing concepts as Nomadic is that it 
allows a number of methodological problems faced by the social sciences (extensive ceteris 
paribus conditions, reflexivity, and multiple realisability) to be subsumed within a common 
framework. Concepts are Nomadic when:  
 
1- A wide variety of social phenomena can be included within the scope of the 
concept. This results from these concepts having many possible meanings, 
unclear boundaries, and changing over time. These characteristics are not an 
all or nothing matter because these concepts can vary in the number of 
meanings they have, how unclear their boundaries are, and the extent to which 
they change over time. 
 
2- The characteristics outlined in criteria 1 mean that disagreements about 
Nomadic concepts, and arguments making use of them, are difficult to resolve 
with academic analysis. Over time, analysis of a Nomadic concept leads to the 
incorporation of different social phenomena. 
 
There are two advantages of adopting the Nomadic framework for analysing 
concepts used in the social sciences. Firstly, viewing concepts in this way brings together 
a number of strands in the philosophy of social science literature. The concepts used by 
social scientists have been described in a number of ways, for example, that they are 
Ballung concepts, cluster concepts, essentially contested, multiply realisable, and vague. 
These descriptions are illustrated with different examples. To revisit some examples from 
Chapter 1, ‘happiness’ is an example of a Ballung concept, ‘market economy’ is an example 
of a cluster concept, ‘democracy’ is an example of an essentially contested concept, 
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‘money’ is an example of a concept that is multiply realisable, and ‘bald’ is an example of 
a concept that is vague. The problem with this is that these descriptions are of little use 
when trying to decide, for example, what sort of concept ‘happiness’ is. Furthermore, it 
is possible that ‘democracy’ is essentially contested, and multiply realised, and that it is a 
cluster concept, but it is unclear what we should conclude from this, or what implications 
this has for working with such concepts. The advantage of describing concepts as 
Nomadic is that it allows social scientists to discuss concepts using a single framework.  
Nomadic concepts have many meanings, unclear boundaries, and change over 
time, which means that disagreements about these concepts are difficult to resolve. These 
characteristics allow the characterisation of the types of concepts social scientists often 
discuss. For example, Ballung concepts are those which have many meanings that do not 
all overlap at a single location. Cluster concepts have many meanings which do overlap at 
one or more locations. Essentially contested concepts have many meanings which change 
over time; these meanings may, or may not, overlap. Concepts that are multiply realisable 
have many meanings, some of which may overlap, it was argued in Chapter 2 that these 
meanings often do not have boundary issues.  
Woodward (2016) argues in favour of a way of determining whether a concept is 
a good one for the purposes of analysis. Chapter 1 argued that his list is problematic for 
the social sciences because it relies on being able to judge whether a variable is able to do 
the work required of it. Within his manipulationist framework this means providing a 
clear answer to the question of what would happen when they are manipulated. 
Unfortunately, in the social sciences, this is difficult to know in advance of extensive 
research. Woodward says that ‘obesity’ is a bad variable, but does not say what it is about 
‘obesity’ that makes it a bad variable. The Nomadic framework allows us to see why this 
might be so. There are a number of things that ‘obesity’ might mean, and although we 
might decide on one meaning- BMI, this will also have boundary issues. Depending on 
the research we want to do with ‘obesity’ these different meanings may have to be taken 
into consideration. The Nomadic framework allows social scientists to think about 
concepts in a structured way, and to make comparisons with other concepts.  
The second advantage of adopting the Nomadic framework for analysing 
concepts used in the social sciences is that it brings together a number of methodological 
problems with the social sciences. The social sciences are subject to reflexivity, which 
describes the way behaviour changes as a result of interaction between people and the 
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concepts that are used to analyse them. Chapter 2 argued that reflexivity is one way in 
which concepts can change. Changes of this sort might also give rise to new concepts 
describing similar phenomena. The existence of extensive ceteris paribus conditions should 
come as no surprise when social scientists are working with concepts that have many 
meanings, which may have boundary issues, and which change over time. In such a case, 
the concepts include shifting and changing aspects of social phenomena. Multiple 
realisability can also be seen as a different way of highlighting the many meanings that 
concepts can have.  
 
Implications of adopting the Nomadic framework 
There are three implications of adopting the Nomadic framework for analysing 
concepts used in the social sciences. These are difficulties with formulating 
generalisations, making concepts more precise, and counterfactual analysis. The first is 
that it demonstrates why generalisations have been so difficult to formulate in the social 
sciences. When we are dealing with concepts that are very Nomadic there is unlikely to 
be agreement about generalisations, or laws, using such concepts. Chapter 2 discussed the 
example ‘income inequality makes revolutions more likely’. ‘Income inequality’, 
‘revolution’ and ‘more likely’ are all Nomadic concepts. This means that anyone analysing 
this regularity can consider a number of meanings of these concepts and, consequently, 
reach different, but reasonable, conclusions about this statement. Chapter 2 contrasted 
this with a generalisation using less Nomadic concepts. The example was ‘If the price of 
good x rises, then demand will fall’. The concepts of ‘price’, ‘demand’ and ‘fall’ are less 
Nomadic concepts because they do not have many meanings, or change over time. This 
means that social scientists analysing this relationship will focus on the same social 
phenomena. That is not to say that these concepts are entirely precise because they are 
not. Chapter 2 argued that these concepts are less Nomadic than concepts like ‘income 
inequality’.  
The second implication of adopting the Nomadic framework for analysing 
concepts used in the social sciences is that many proposals for making concepts more 
precise are problematic. Chapter 2 reviewed proposals from Crasnow (2015), Cartwright 
& Bradburn (2011), Goertz (2006, 2008) and Adcock & Collier (2001) which focus 
primarily on specifying what is mean by a concept, in a particular case. The example 
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discussed at length attempted to make the concept ‘democracy’ more precise by stating 
that it means ‘contestation’ and ‘participation’. Chapter 2 argued that ‘contestation’ and 
‘participation’ are also Nomadic concepts, because there are many things these concepts 
can mean, which have boundary issues, and change over time. This was contrasted with 
a proposal to make the concept ‘developed country’ more precise by saying that it means 
a certain level of ‘GDP per capita’. ‘GDP per capita’ is less Nomadic than ‘contestation’ 
and Chapter 2 concluded that simply seeking to specify what we mean by a concept is not 
sufficient for making it more precise. We also need to consider whether the meaning we 
have decided on is also a Nomadic concept.  
The third implication of adopting the Nomadic framework is that is makes 
counterfactual analysis problematic in the social sciences. Woodward (2003) proposes that 
counterfactual analysis is like running a ‘hypothetical experiment’. Chapter 3 argues that 
this view is difficult to endorse in the social sciences. Where social scientists are using 
counterfactuals which are stated using Nomadic concepts it is possible to construct 
multiple, plausible, counterfactual scenarios which there is little principled way of deciding 
between. Chapter 3 demonstrated this with a counterfactual that appeared to be a good 
candidate for a hypothetical experiment. This counterfactual asked whether the English 
Civil War would still have happened if Charles I had fought, and won, a battle with the 
Scottish rebels in June 1639. Adamson believed that the Civil War would not have 
happened, while Tucker believes that it would still have happened. This is a good 
candidate for a hypothetical experiment because the two armies faced each other and were 
prepared for battle. The backtracking that historical counterfactual often face is therefore 
minimised in this example. It is also clear what we mean by this counterfactual, and the 
manipulation required is small- Charles I just has to make a decision that he was already 
considering.  
Despite this, although the two historians agree about the immediate outcome of 
the battle, they disagree about whether the Civil War would still have happened. They 
disagree because ‘winning’ is a Nomadic concept. Beyond the narrow military victory 
there are many things that Charles I’s ‘winning’ could mean. It could mean that the 
opposition lost the will, or the courage, to stand up to the king again (if you are Adamson), 
or it could have meant that the pressure for change continued (if you are Tucker). The 
concept ‘winning’ has many meanings, and in assessing the consequences of this 
hypothetical experiment the historians can include a wide variety of social phenomena 
172 
 
within the scope of this concept, which allows them to reach opposing conclusions. 
Chapter 3 concludes that where counterfactual analysis involves the use of Nomadic 
concepts unambiguous conclusions will be difficult to find. 
 
The Nomadic framework and intentional behaviour 
The social sciences are usually concerned with understanding intentional 
behaviour. Chapter 4 began with the observation that taking an intentional perspective 
on behaviour usually means explaining behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires. These 
beliefs and desires are often expressed using concepts that are Nomadic. This means that 
there will often be a number of plausible explanations of behaviour which it is difficult to 
decide between. One possible response to this is to seek to redescribe beliefs and desires 
in other terms. McIntyre’s (1994) argument in support of this was reviewed, but found 
unconvincing. Despite this, there are a number of examples of behaviour that are regular, 
and predictable. Chapter 4 analysed the example of middle bias which, although an 
example of regular behaviour, is not intentional in an ordinary sense.  
Chapter 4 proposed that this type of behaviour should be described as derivatively 
intentional. Derivatively intentional behaviour is defined by the following necessary, and 
jointly sufficient, conditions:  
1- It is behaviour that is a subset of intentional behaviour.  
2- This behaviour occurs whenever the intentional behaviour, of which it is a subset, 
is undertaken.  
3- An actor is, initially, unaware of this derivatively intentional behaviour and has no 
beliefs, desires, plans, or other deliberations relating to the derivatively intentional 
behaviour.  
4- If an actor becomes aware of the derivatively intentional behaviour they realise 
that it is something they are doing. It is not something that is merely happening 
to them.  
5- If an actor becomes aware of the derivatively intentional behaviour, it can be 




Derivatively intentional behaviour is describable using concepts that are not 
Nomadic because there are not many things that derivatively intentional behaviour can 
mean. Furthermore, as the middle bias example demonstrates, what middle bias means is 
not subject to boundary issues, nor does it change over time. Chapter 4 concluded that 
derivatively intentional behaviour is the best example, so far, for formulating 
generalisations.  
Chapter 5 discussed whether concepts that are less Nomadic are also derivatively 
intentional. Using the example of ‘demand’, from the law of supply and demand, it 
appears that this less Nomadic concept does share some characteristics with derivatively 
intentional behaviour, but that it does not meet all the criteria for being derivatively 
intentional. However, the law of supply and demand does also not describe behaviour 
that is as regular and predictable as middle bias. This suggests that exploring the link 
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